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Politburo's Nikonov Visits Turkmenia 23-25 Feb

Farm Tour

18300501a Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 25 Feb 89 p 1

[Report by A. Rybak, Turkmeninform special correspondent: "To Deepen the Process of Renewal; Visit by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee V.P. Nikonov to Turkmenistan"]

[Text] Ashkhabad 24 Feb—On 23 February, in the second half of the day, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee V.P. Nikonov visited the Order of Lenin Sovet Turkmenistany Kolkhoz in Ashkhabadskiy Rayon.

The Sovet Turkmenistany Kolkhoz is a diversified farm. Its extensive possessions stretch over tens of thousands of hectares. Flocks of sheep of the valuable Saraja breed are pastured in the Karakums and the gorges of the Kopetdag. The fields of the crop raising brigades stretch along the 1,100-km Karakum Canal and grain crops are raised in the foothills. The thousands of square meters of hothouses each year produce up to 800 tons of vegetable products. The network of the in-house kolkhoz stores virtually year-round provide the republic's population with the gifts of the fields and gardens. The farm is the main supplier of excellent-quality grapes both for the local market and for all-Union supplies. The people of Ashkhabad have long since ceased being amazed by the lemons raised in the kolkhoz hothouses.

Beautiful statice, narcissus and calla lilies are raised by the careful hands of the farmers in the vast flower farm. They bring pleasure to the customers and profit to the kolkhoz. Incidentally, the annual net income of Sovet Turkmenistany exceeds 11.5 million rubles. The profitability level of the farm is one of the highest in the nation, some 73.3 percent.

The new food store built recently with kolkhoz funds and which was inspected by V.P. Nikonov basically sells products produced on the farm. The secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was interested in what the store's commodity turnover is.

"The store has just opened but during the month we plan to sell a total of around 200,000 rubles of product," replied the specialist.

"International ties are broadening," said the Chairman of Turkmenpotrebsoyuz [Turkmen Consumer Union Society], N. Nurklychev. "With an Italian firm, for example, we plan to jointly produce and deliver to the foreign market tomato paste, the demand for which is great."

The kolkhoz has its own Children's World [Store]. V.P. Nikonov also visited this store.

In inspecting the canning shop, V.P. Nikonov pointed to the particular need for modernizing production. The question came up of resuming the old practice of making natural food dyes from plants.

The bakery greeted the visitors with the heady aroma of fresh-baked "churek" [a type of bread]. Viktor Petrovich [Nikonov] commented on the initiative of the workers in the consumer cooperative who organized the production of excellent oat bakery goods.

The guests inspected the sausage shop which manufactures several types of meat products.

In saying farewell to the farmers, V.P. Nikonov wished that they would continue their search for reserves and more widely employ the ties with the consumer cooperatives. There is a mass of pressing questions which could be settled even now by bold initiative and entrepreneurship. Here they should follow the experience of the Sovet Turkmenistany Kolkhoz and the republic consumer union.

"I have long dreamed of visiting this institute and have read a great deal about its activities," said V.P. Nikonov, turning to the Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences A.G. Babayev who heads the Order of the Labor Red Banner Desert Institute Under the Turkmen Academy of Sciences. Here the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee met with the institute's leading scientists.

This scientific institute which this year has celebrated its 27th anniversary is the head coordinating center for the study and development of the Soviet desert territories. The institute has become an international center for training personnel in combating desertification for the ESCAP [Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific] region. The republic has gained a good deal of experience in developing desert lands without harming the environment. The desert scientists have turned over to production workers recommendations on a fundamental improvement in the desert pastures and combating drifting sands.

All the same, commented V.P. Nikonov, the contribution of academy science to solving practical problems is still slight. The nation presently has around 40 million hectares of swampy lands and the desert occupies enormous expanses. And each day around 70 hectares is added to this area.

Before a map of anthropogenic desertification in the arid Soviet territories, A.G. Babayev told about the approaches of the Turkmen scientists to solving this ecologically dangerous process as well as about the forecasts for the future.

"It is essential to undertake everything possible so that the critical areas marked on the map in red after 20 years, for example, do not double in size and, particularly, do not triple," commented Viktor Petrovich.

"We are confident that a solution to the problem will be aided by establishing a state special-purpose Desert Program by analogy with the programs for the Virgin Lands, the Nonchernozem, Siberia and the Far East," said A.G. Babayev. "We already have a number of specific developments."

The Head of the Laboratory for Feed Resources, Doctor of Biological Sciences V.N. Nikolayev, described the problems of rationally utilizing the extensive desert pastures in the Karakums.

G. Mukhammedov drew the attention of the CPSU Central Committee secretary to the problems of multiplying the feed resources. A doctor of agricultural sciences and winner of the USSR State Prize as well as head of the Laboratory for the Ecology and Reclamation of Pastures at the Desert Institute, at the urging of his heart, Mukhammedov recently took over the Kolkhoz imeni Makhtumkuli which was operating at a loss in Ashkhabadskiy Rayon. He has decided over the next few years to bring the farm where he himself was born and raised out of its slump. G. Mukhammedov has set as his main goal the bringing together of science and agricultural practice.

Accompanying the CPSU Central Committee secretary were the First Secretary of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee S.A. Niyazov, the members of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee Buro R.A. Bazarova, Yu.K. Mogilevets, S.M. Nesterenko, V.N. Rebrik, B.M. Sakhatmuradov and A. Khodzhumuradov.

Republic Agricultural Restructuring
18300501a Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in
Russian 26 Feb 89 pp 1, 2

[Turkmeninform report: "A Modern Agrarian Policy—An Important Element in Perestroika"]

[Text] On 25 February at the Ashkhabad Political Education Club a meeting was held with the candidate for USSR people's deputy from the CPSU and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the CPSU Central Committee Secretary V.P. Nikonov.

The meeting was opened by an introductory speech given by the First Secretary of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee S.A. Niyazov.

Comrades! This is the fourth day that the party organizations, the labor collectives and the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the republic continue to meet with the candidate for the USSR people's deputies from the CPSU, the Member of the Politburo and the CPSU Central Committee Secretary Viktor Petrovich Nikonov.

To today's meeting of the republic party aktiv with Comrade V.P. Nikonov we have invited the members and candidate members of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee, the secretaries of the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms, the responsible workers from the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee, the Presidium of the Turkmen Supreme Soviet and the Turkmen Council of Ministers, the leaders of the ministries, departments and public organizations of the republic, the local soviets, the representatives of the party organizations and labor collectives, party veterans and workers of the mass information media.

The current election campaign and the elections of the people's deputies to the superior political body of the nation are the main thing which determines the content of the nation's political life at present. They represent an important stage in the practical implementation of the reform in the political system and the decisions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference adopted on this question. As was emphasized in the Appeal of the CPSU Central Committee to the Party and to the Soviet People, the elections will be a major step along the path of renewing our society. The party's campaign platform has aroused great interest among the republic population and all our people. This is a document of enormous persuasive force and which combines sweeping goals and realism in defining the ways to them.

In essence, this is a program with which the party is entering the entire coming period of power as the superior body of state authority in the nation. The results of the first stages of the election campaign convincingly show the support of the communists, the workers and population of Turkmenistan for party policy and its campaign platform. The republic has received with approval the decision of the January (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee for submitting as candidates as USSR people's deputies from the CPSU the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the members and candidate members of the Politburo and the secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee.

We are sincerely happy to meet today with the candidate of USSR people's deputies from the CPSU, Viktor Petrovich Nikonov. The republic's communists and workers know him as a prominent leader of our party, participating actively in the elaboration and practical implementation of party policy, an active participant in perestroika, an active and energetic man. This is not his first visit to the republic, he is well acquainted with our problems and has shown a profound interest in the development of the republic's productive forces and primarily its agroindustrial complex and the implementation of the Food Program.

Viktor Petrovich Nikonov is a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He was born in February 1929 on

the farm of Belogorka Farm in Veshenskiy Rayon of Rostov Oblast, he is a Russian and a member of the CPSU since 1954.

In 1950, Viktor Petrovich completed the Azov-Black Sea Agricultural Institute. His career began on that year. He worked in Krasnoyarsk Kray as the chief agronomist of the Andronovskaya MTS [machine tractor station], as deputy director of the regional agronomic school and the director of the Uspenskaya MTS.

From 1958 through 1979, he was employed in party work: deputy director and then director of the Agricultural Section of the Krasnoyarsk Party Kraykom, instructor at the Party Body Section of the CPSU Central Committee, the Second Secretary of the Tatar CPSU Obkom and the First Secretary of the Mary CPSU Obkom. From 1979, he was the chairman of the All-Union Production-Scientific Association for Agrochemical Servicing of Agriculture or Soyuzselkhozkhimiya and USSR deputy minister of agriculture. In 1983-1985, Viktor Petrovich Nikonov was the RSFSR minister of agriculture. Since April 1985, he has been the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Viktor Petrovich Nikonov was a delegate from the 22d through the 27th CPSU Congresses as well as the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. Since 1971, he was a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and a member since 1976. In June 1987, he was elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. He was a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet 6th-11th Sittings. The labor and social activities of Viktor Petrovich Nikonov have been highly regarded by the Soviet state. He has received two Orders of Lenin, the Orders of the October Revolution, the Labor Red Banner, the Honor Badge and numerous medals.

In putting up Viktor Petrovich Nikonov as a candidate for the USSR people's deputies from the CPSU, we are confident that he will devote all his strength, knowledge and energy and his rich experience in economic and party work to serving the people and to the cause of perestroika and renewal of our society.

Comrades! In discussing today at the party aktiv meeting the professional and political qualities of a candidate people's deputy, it would certainly be right to also bring up the urgent problems of perestroika and the state of affairs in all spheres of republic life—political, economic, social and spiritual. There are definite changes. The public and workers of the republic are aware of them and know about them. Changes for the better are also occurring in the solving of social problems and the moral-political atmosphere is becoming completely different. The social and political activeness of people has increased. They are sincerely concerned by the questions of the economy, social development of the towns and

villages, the preserving of the monuments of history and culture, improving the ecological situation—in a word, all that concerns their living conditions and their spiritual world.

The democratizing of our life has contributed to developing the abilities to think differently and in a fresh approach, as well as work out collectively the ways for solving urgent problems. The creative activeness of the communists and nonparty persons is increasing as well as their contribution to implementing the tasks posed by the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

Of course, not everything has happened and the desired result is not always achieved. We realize that the reasons lie not somewhere to the side but rather here, right nearby, in each of us. For eliminating them, we must first of all create the ability to critically analyze what has been done, the style of our work and its end results. We will have to do much more in work and achieve the unconditional fulfillment of the tasks posed by the party. I feel that we should have a frank, constructive discussion of the ways for deepening perestroika and accelerating in carrying out the tasks of the renewal of our society.

The floor was turned over to the brigade leader of the corn-raising brigade of the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin in Turkmen-Kalinskiy Rayon, A. Ezizov.

Almost 4 years have passed since the nation under party leadership has begun the process of perestroika, the process of fundamental changes in our life, he said. What has perestroika provided the rural workers? Above all, independence in settling many questions and it has returned the land to its real master. This has led to increased output of products and to a better economic condition of the farm system. At present, the social problem of the countryside is being resolved quicker and contract and lease relations are becoming widespread.

Due to the introduction of the lease and family contract, our kolkhoz last year fulfilled the plans for the production of all types of agricultural products. But now, unfortunately, there still are many unsolved questions and this prevents the extensive dissemination of the progressive forms of organizing and encouraging labor.

We have converted to self-management but we are told how much we must pay for a product, and the amount of the leasing fee for land, livestock and equipment is forced on us. And if increased prices are essential then why do the purchasing prices for cotton and other products remain unchanged?

The rayon agroindustrial associations have not met the expectations of the rural workers as the associations have remained a bureaucratic management apparatus which

is unnecessary for the peasant. We need an organization which defends our interests and provides help with business-like recommendations and advice, in a word, we need a true partner.

It must also be said that the introduction of lease relations has led to the liberation of manpower. In considering this fact, it is essential to build more manufacturing enterprises in the republic.

I feel that there is no need to say what concern is needed for the growing of a crop on our irrigated lands. Here there must be accurate leveling of the land and this requires high-powered equipment. The kolkhozes have the funds but where is the equipment to come from? We must more quickly open up free wholesale trade. This will make it possible to accelerate the introduction of cost accounting and self-financing in the countryside.

We are hopeful that the forthcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum on the agrarian question will help solve these problems.

Speaking after this was the bulldozer operator from the construction directorate for installation work at the Turkmenneftstroy [Turkmen Petroleum Construction] Trust, V.M. Mishchenko.

Before leaving for the given meeting, he said, I visited a number of the party organizations and talked with the brigades and shops of our administration. I felt very acutely how many hopes the people link with perestroika.

We converted to cost accounting as of January this year and how each member of the collective is counting the pennies and seeing how they are spent.

I want to say something about our problems. As before, we work virtually by hand. Where is sectorial science? Our innovation proposals are not a solution to the problem.

What is the state of our housing construction combine? Its equipment and supplies are scores of years out of date and worn out.

I would like to voice complaints also against the leadership of the USSR Minneftegazstroy [Ministry for Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises] which has delayed on the question of placing orders for manufacturing equipment for the new 148 Series of houses. The questions of allocating equipment are being settled slowly for reconstructing the housing construction combine and the Stroydetal [Construction Part] Combine, and this is holding up the implementation of the housing program.

In representing the worker town of Nebit-Dag here, I would like also to take up its problems. Above all, there is the acute question of job placement. The republic and

the town are making a definite effort to solve it. I would like to draw attention to the location of the industry's scientific-intensive sectors in the republic. Our town has good traditions and a strong working class. As a construction worker, I can confirm that in the event of the location of the electronics industry in the city we are capable of introducing the sector at the designated time.

In being the party organization secretary in a construction collective, almost daily I encounter problems which were described at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. Not so long ago the leader and I had an interesting conversation which was rather unpleasant for him concerning the role of the shop party organization in a labor collective. I feel that such conversations would not take place if there was a clear status for the part-time secretary of a primary party organization and which would regulate his rights and duties. I see the task of the party organization as well as my own as a secretary in raising the militance of the party organization and achieving a rise in the vanguard role of each communist.

From the present meeting and meetings with communists and workers I will take away with me the firm conviction that we greatly needed such open and confidential discussion prior to April 1985 and I feel that this is the real fruits of perestroika. We are firmly convinced that the CPSU Central Committee Politburo will steadily maintain the course set after the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and we, the workers, will do everything to carry out the program of perestroika.

The Rector of the Turkmen Agricultural Institute imeni M.I. Kalinin, B.K. Balakayev, devoted his speech to the question of a fundamental perestroika in higher agricultural education.

It is essential to better prepare the future specialists for mastering the new intensive methods of crop raising and livestock raising considering the industrialization of agricultural labor and agroindustrial integration of production, as well as the converting of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes to full cost accounting, self-financing and the lease contract, he said.

Each year, the Turkmen SKhI [Agricultural Institute] imeni M.I. Kalinin graduates around a thousand scientists, agronomists, zootechnicians, economists and engineers. However, the level of their practical training is not sufficient. At present, this situation is being rectified. In the process of instruction, the students have begun to be more involved in conducting scientific research and the creative elaboration of diploma projects, while practice is being more closely tied to their future activities. Proceeding from the fact that precisely production is the natural testing range for the training of personnel, we are shifting a portion of the training process into production and, in particular, we have established affiliates of the specialty chairs of the institute, a veterinary clinic and sectorial scientific research laboratories. Under such

conditions, a student during the years of instruction at the institute gains a feeling for himself as the master of the land and a participant in carrying out the Food Program.

I recently visited Krasnodar where they were holding an All-Union Scientific Practical Conference on Improving the Scientific Support for the Agroindustrial Complex. I became acquainted with the Krasnodar SKhI and the scientific training and production facility Kubanagropromkadry [Kuban Agroindustrial Personnel]. One could scarcely compare its physical plant with ours. We are profoundly convinced that the USSR Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee] must fundamentally alter its attitude toward the VUZes and show equal concern and attention for all the VUZes.

Perestroyka in the agroindustrial complex dictates the need of training new-quality specialists who are professionally literate and possess organizing abilities. The collective of the Turkmen SKhI for 2 years now has been providing special training for a reserve of superior and middle-level leadership personnel and this has already produced positive results. We have trained 140 organizers of agricultural production. We feel that this progressive form for training specialists must be developed in every possible way and proceeding from the present tasks of perestroyka, train specialists who are well acquainted with the forms of the contract organization of agricultural production. For this the efforts of just one VUZ are not enough. We must have daily help from the subdivisions of the republic Gosagroprom.

I should say that the institute does not possess a sufficient amount of computers needed for acquiring organizational skills in operating modern computers and using them in the APK [agroindustrial complex]. For this reason, it is extremely essential in the near future to seek out the possibility of providing several modern computers for the VUZ.

There is the opinion about that with the transition to cost accounting, the need for high-skilled specialists will decline. This is profoundly mistaken, for modern methods of management increase the need for them. Only with highly-skilled specialists is it possible to achieve high production results. Even now we have not received from the planning organizations precise information on the need for specialists. It seems to us that planning should be put on a scientific basis.

Speaking from the rostrum was the 3d-year student from the legal faculty of the Turkmen State University imeni A.M. Gorkiy, O. Khadzhamedova. Signs of the new have appeared in the life of the youth and the students of the republic, she said. We were the first among the republic VUZes to hold democratic elections for the Komsomol committee secretary. Student self-government is being established. We are participating in the

sessions of the academic councils and in the elections of the department heads and deans. The youth must be trusted more. Great trust evokes great responsibility. And we do not fear this.

Numerous problems have built up among the students. Primitive student life and the shortage of places in dormitories. Food is poorly organized. There is the acute problem of establishing conditions for young student families. We are rightly counting on the help of the deputies in resolving these questions. In Ashkhabad two young representatives of the working class have been registered as candidates for the USSR people's deputies: the carpet weaver from the Turkmenkover [Turkmen Carpet] Production Association, T. Annataganova and the master baker from the Ashkhabadkhleb [Ashkhabad Bread] Production Association, the holder of the Prize of the Turkmenistan Lenin Komsomol, G. Akmamedov. At the same time, we are capable of resolving many problems ourselves, using the forces of the student detachments. Thus, a staff of the youth labor associations has been organized under the Turkmenistan Komsomol Central Committee, and this staff in essence will become a construction organization responsible for this. It needs help in providing funds, supplies and building materials.

I am profoundly convinced that if the facilities of our public education remain on the previous level and financing is based on residual principles, then we will never make progress. A major change must be made in the attitude toward public education.

The current meeting with the candidate for the USSR people's deputies, V.P. Nikonorov, provides an opportunity to share our thoughts about perestroyka and to openly discuss the existing problems, said the First Secretary of the Iolotanskiy Party Raykom, A. Mukhammedova, in her speech. It is also important that this is held on the threshold of the CPSU Central Committee plenum on the agrarian question. We have many problems in this area and understandably they cannot be resolved in a single sweep. We are adjusting ourselves to long and painstaking labor. But does this prevent the labor collectives from carrying out the tasks posed by perestroyka now?

The main reason, in my view, is that the command-administrative leadership system has not given up its positions and this gives rise to an imbalance in our national economy. For example, year after year our rayon has increased the cotton production volumes without any consideration to the availability of land or its fertility. What does this lead to? To a decline in the land area planted under vegetables, melon crops and feed crops and this tells on the food supply for the public.

An important area in improving agriculture should also be the strengthening of the elite-seed farms and the development of seed production. It is no secret that the kolkhozes of the oblast and the republic lack disease-resistant and high-yield varieties of cotton. The reason

for this is in the absence of serious plant breeding. Judge for yourselves: the rayon has the elite Sovkhoz imeni Chapayev and the scientific-experimental facility of the TNIISTKh [?Turkmen Scientific Research Institute for Cottonseed Development], where they are raising and preparing cottonseed for the rayon's kolkhozes. However, fettered by plan quotas for selling cotton to the state, they are unable to carry out their main function. Science has also been impotent in combating agricultural pests.

The enterprises are greatly impeded by the current instructions which restrict independence and initiative. Due to the imbalance in the production and material-technical supply plans, the enterprises do not carry out the plans, they do not earn a profit and, hence, the economic incentive fund is empty. Or another matter: the enterprises do not have the opportunity to resolve social problems using their own profit. For example, 95 percent of the profit from the Iolotan Fish Farm is collected by the superior organizations. Some 450,000 rubles of profit were confiscated from the interfarm transport and mechanized column No. 36 by the Mary-oblagropromstroy [Mary Oblast Agroindustrial Construction] Association to cover the expenditures of enterprises operating at a loss. All of this impedes social reform and reduces the interest of the people in the end results of labor.

In order to escape from this bind, we have decided to establish an agroindustrial combine in the rayon, giving it independence in resolving farming questions. Bringing together all the collectives involved in production of farm products, the combine will be able to conclude direct ties.

The Chairman of the Republic War and Labor Veterans Council, the writer S. Atayev, in his speech expressed a feeling of gratitude to the party for concern for the older generation of Soviet people.

In the campaign program of the CPSU, a worthy place has been given to the party's demand that concern for veterans be a high moral duty and important obligation for all Soviet society, he said. A new Pension Law is being prepared. But this is a matter of the future. For now, we must solve urgent problems of today. In our republic, there are almost 59,000 pensioners who receive pensions under 50 rubles. Under the conditions of a general rise in prices, they find it difficult to make ends meet. I feel that in the given instance the local soviets can help using money from the budgets which will now be formed in a new manner. The cooperatives can also provide reductions for the pensioners, thus recompensing them for the outrageously high cooperative prices.

We request support for our proposal to lift the restrictions on obtaining pensions for working pensioners. The reduction of the Soviet Army will soon begin. Thousands

of officers who are full of energy, intelligent and experienced will enter the national economy but only in those positions where they can keep their pensions and not those where the nation and perestroika might benefit.

One other question. In words they are pushing earnestly for the local soviets and each worker to develop a feeling of being the master, without which rayon, city and republic cost accounting is inconceivable. But in fact this is not always the case. Our republic cannot fully utilize the fruits of its labor. A portion of the profit from the gas produced on our territory but processed in other regions is not received by our treasury. Just like the share of profit from the Turkmen cotton processed in other republics. We support the notion of "a strong center and strong republics." Our people are industrious and they work in the heat and the cold. But if this fatiguing work is unable to provide us with prosperity, then this means the reason is either in the inability to reckon or in the inability to manage. At present, we are being criticized for the fact that we cannot feed ourselves. But certainly we are operating under the conditions of the all-Union division of labor. It must not be forgotten that we are held captive by cotton monocropping with all the consequences stemming from this.

The floor was given over to the member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, V.P. Nikonov.

Nikonov Speech

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[Speech by V.P. Nikonov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, candidate for the USSR People's Deputies]

[Text] Dear Comrades! First of all, I would like to voice words of the most sincere gratitude and thanks for your coming to this meeting. In your speeches you have set a definite and rather sharp tone for our meeting. Like you, I am hopeful that we will have an interesting talk, particularly as it is occurring during the period of a very abrupt turn toward practical deeds in the socioeconomic perestroika of society, in carrying out major political reforms, that is, a period of solving those problems and questions which concern all the Soviet people.

The broad processes of democratizing society, the glasnost and the real steps to involve the masses in managing social development have greatly raised the activeness of the people and aroused an interest in all the problems of life. And they have set new approaches to a broad range of questions concerning our life and have altered their evaluations.

I have been before in Turkmenistan in the near and distant parts of your vast territory. I have met with persons from different professions and with different views on life, with unique persons but equally sincere, with a developed sense of their own dignity and respect for other nations and nationalities. One will always remember this.

Now I am visiting you as a candidate for the USSR people's deputies from the CPSU.

Just a month remains until the elections for the new superior state body which in the coming 5 years will define the domestic and foreign policy of our nation, exercise leadership over perestroyka and establish a socialist state of law.

These elections will be a turning point in the nation's political life. We will begin to realize the main idea of the political reform: all power to the soviets. For the first time in many decades, elections are being held on a completely different basis as an opportunity has arisen for all social organizations to put up their own candidates. These processes are going on on an extensive democratic basis for the territorial and national territorial districts.

In considering the exceptionally important significance of the forthcoming elections, the CPSU Central Committee on 10 January at its plenum, and this was also done for the first time, adopted an appeal to the party and the Soviet people. This summed up the results of the first years of perestroyka and set out the initial areas of party policy for the immediate future.

The main idea of this document is unity and a consolidation of all the citizens in our society on a platform of the ideas of renewal and perestroyka, accelerating socio-economic development for the sake of a better material life for people and democratization of society as the basis for establishing great respect for the individual.

As a candidate for the people's deputies, I completely share the ideas and conclusions of the appeal and I have followed them in my campaign platform as a communist and in my daily work of achieving the set goals.

Let me take up certain urgent problems in the development of our society, as I see this, as well as the questions of agrarian policy for which I am largely responsible.

Like any revolutionary process, perestroyka has its own stages of development. Presently, we are living through one of the most crucial, that is, the transition from an analysis of the past and an analysis of the ways to improve the situation to the realization of the designated program of change. We are aware that the change is just beginning and the essential prerequisites have not yet been fully created for a real strong movement and for the healthy development of the nation.

All the same, over the period which has passed since the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, it has been possible to do the main thing, primarily to change people and the way of their thinking. We have begun to analyze more profoundly the previous stage of our history as well as today. From all the possible paths we have been able to select the most rational ones, without fearing that they must be defended in a clash of views. At present, each person can boldly voice his own opinion on one or another question. Freedom and unfettered thinking, a constant search for the optimum ways to achieve the goal and man's desire to bring as much benefit as possible to society—these are the distinguishing features of the short period which we are living through and the start to which was made by the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Of course, our practical actions have changed. If one speaks about our plans and their social focus, then not only in figures but also in real life they have been expressed in a significant rise in capital investments channeled by the state into the building of housing, nurseries, hospitals, clubs and roads. It is worthy of note that last year for the first time in many years, the rate of increase in consumer goods of the so-called "B" group significantly outstripped the growth rate of the means of production, that is, the "A" group. Thus, yet another fundamental change has occurred in solving a very important problem.

Great efforts are being made to fundamentally reconstruct the light and food industries. The share of the defense enterprises has been growing in producing vital necessities. This is an accomplishment of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet M.S. Gorbachev who has steadfastly carried out a policy of improving international relations. What has been done over the last 4 years has made it possible to establish a calmer situation throughout the world and to begin eliminating a certain portion of both nuclear weapons and conventional ones and to channel a significant portion of the funds which would be used for defense purposes into the development of the light and food industries, that is, to purposes which lead to a greater satisfying of the needs of the Soviet people.

As a whole in the national economy, positive shifts can also be seen. For example, in recent years we have obtained the entire increase in national income from raising labor productivity. But now, when we are summing up the first results of perestroyka, we must not exaggerate the importance of these shifts. The state of affairs in the economy is changing more slowly than we assumed in setting out on the path of perestroyka. In many regards the economy continues to develop along the old extensive ways. Product quality is improving slowly. I am in absolute agreement with the comrades who have said here that no matter how much one speaks about product quality, no matter how many laws are passed, no matter how many inspectors are provided,

things will not change if we do not indoctrinate above all a completely different attitude toward things in each man. This indoctrination is also manifested in the quality of articles and all our labor. Supervision and pressure temporarily can lead to positive changes in this very complex process, but there will not be any ultimate improvement.

The pace of the structural perestroika of construction and the introduction of progressive production methods have lagged behind the planned. Unfortunately, wages are rising more rapidly than productivity. Last year, no matter how we rushed around, something was missing. We miscalculated the coefficients, and the rise in the income of the population significantly outstripped the growth of labor productivity and the production of consumer goods. While during the years of the 9th and 10th Five-Year Plans, we had an increase in wages of 6-8 and a maximum of 10 billion rubles a year, in 1988, when the mass conversion of the enterprises to cost accounting began, the increment in wages as a whole for the nation was 38 billion rubles while labor productivity over this time increased by just 5 percent. All of this caused additional difficulties.

With such errors we cannot solve the socioeconomic problems. We also cannot solve them in the event that we cover up our shortcomings and do not take the necessary measures for rectifying them. But, on the other hand, the economic, social problems will be settled much more slowly if we do not simultaneously reform the political system as was outlined at the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The key elements of this reform are the greatest possible furthering of socialist democracy, the delimitation of functions between the party and state bodies, the setting up of new governing structures and the establishing of a state of law.

The current year will be very full on the level of carrying out the program of political changes. After the establishing of the superior state body, the second stage will commence in the political reform, that is, the perestroika of the state bodies and the establishing of more harmonious relations between the center and the local bodies. In the autumn, elections will be held for the people's deputies on the republic and local levels and the work of the soviets will be improved. With full political rights, economically independent and under the control of only the people, they will become truly authoritative bodies. With the introduction of local self-government, the entire system of government will actually be transformed.

The party sees the essence of all this work in placing the working man at the center of the political process as well as freeing and channeling the enormous creative potential of the Soviet people into the good of socialism. But this, comrades, is still far from fully apparent.

Just my brief trip through your republic, the meetings with scientists, lessors, the leaders of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, industrial enterprises and with the workers have shown how many internal reserves we still have hidden and the use of these depends primarily upon a correct assessment of the current state and upon the possibilities for advance. If properly assessed, the people will support a leader and strong acceleration is ensured. And the specific labor collective also benefits from this. As well as the entire state.

Knowing from previous years about the state of affairs at the Chardzhou Chemical Plant imeni Lenin, I went there now internally ready for a serious and acute discussion. When we visited the shops, when we met with people and when we listened to them, we left not only satisfied but also imbued with the atmosphere which has now been created at the plant.

The conversion to cost accounting, the precise setting of quotas for each worker, the strict observance of production methods and a creative search by the engineers and technicians—all of this has led to the enterprise's rapid emergence to full power in producing valuable fertilizers. The people have taken heart and one can feel the interest of the people in everything happening at the plant. We were again convinced that under conditions when a collective is granted great independence, it can achieve a great deal.

Under present-day conditions, the improving of interethnic relations is of particular importance. The fundamental approaches of the party on this question were worked out long ago and they are well known to all. They were restated in a very concentrated form in the Resolution of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and in the Appeal of the CPSU Central Committee to the Party and the Soviet People.

In the middle of the current year the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee is to review and approve an elaborated, modern approach to these problems. And again this will be based on Lenin's principles of an integrated nationality policy of the party and state. Very serious, profound work is required on all levels, beginning with a theoretical elaboration of the problems of interethnic relations and ending with the formation of the state and social structures which would make it possible to a maximum degree to consider the national requirements of all the peoples of our country within the framework of an Union-wide socialist state.

The party has put improving the spiritual and ideological sphere of our society on the same footing as the economic and political reform. We all can see how much more interesting and diverse the spiritual life of our country has become. Education is being reformed, science is being democratized and public opinion is gaining great strength. The historical memory of the people is being awakened. All the past is being reanalyzed with concern for the future. The information situation is

becoming more open and it compares different viewpoints. In truth, we, probably like you, are not always content with these comparisons, particularly when the central press, radio and television touch upon republic problems and treat them perhaps more acutely than you would wish. Differences of opinion arise here.

But the period of glasnost, comrades, will confront us with ever-new, more acute problems. Because only through glasnost will we be able to eliminate the shortcomings which exist in our society. Through glasnost we will provide a purity of our moral positions and advance at a broader pace toward the goals which have been outlined by our perestroyka.

Comrades! The party and its Central Committee have been the initiator and organizer of the changes occurring in the nation. The strengthening of its functions as the political vanguard of society and the gradual freeing it of economic concerns will make it possible for the Communist Party to focus its attention on elaborating a strategy for society's development, on the questions of domestic and foreign policy, and on organizational, political and ideological work. And not merely, as we are accustomed to saying, strengthening political work in the masses of workers. We need political work on a concrete problem, with a concrete person, on that matter with which he is concerned. For this reason, I would like in a comradely manner to warn the party workers of all ranks that when we speak about the separation of the functions of the state, soviet, economic and party bodies, and you are pleased that soon you will not have to be concerned with practical questions, nothing of the sort will happen.

The party has always had and will always have the main task of the economy and improving the life of man through the economy. The economy is the behavior of man in the process of production and is the indoctrination of the best qualities in him. And the demands which in the future will be placed on us by life will grow significantly.

The restoring and strengthening of the party's authority are one of the important accomplishments of the post-April period. A renewed Communist Party should operate in a renewed society. You clearly have drawn attention to this idea found in the Appeal of the CPSU Central Committee to the Party and to the Soviet People. It applies not only to our 20-million-strong party as a whole but also to each group and to the activities of each communist. Thus, comrades, the process of renewal is going on in breadth and in depth and will encompass all spheres of our life and draw millions of people into its orbit.

At the same time, we all have seen that there still are difficulties, complexities and at times contradictions. What is preventing us from moving faster and why has there been an obvious blockage in certain areas? I in this context would mention three main reasons. In the first

place, the deformations of the past are too great. Secondly, we can also feel the objective factors of the transitional period, when we are endeavoring to carry out new tasks by obsolete, being burdened down with old problems.

It would be wrong not to point out our mistakes and failings which have been made in the course of perestroyka. In such an innovative, truly revolutionary process, these are clearly inevitable. But it is also imperative that they not be so extensive and that they be quickly rectified. You certainly noticed that during his trip through the Ukraine, M.S. Gorbachev frequently returned to this problem. Certainly our progress is impeded not only by the shortcomings of the past but also by those errors which we have made during the period of perestroyka.

The third reason is the resistance put up by individual antiperestroyka forces and this is expressed on conservatism, in the old manner of thinking and hence in a manner of action which gives rise to such a phenomenon as parasitism.

In order to overcome these difficulties and achieve what has been planned, we must activate the creative forces of our people who can perform great deeds. The activist position in life for each of us is a guarantee that we will attain the planned goal and will bring our nation into a new orbit of social progress. In a word, the tasks confronting us are complex and we have many unsolved problems. Nevertheless, the most imperative of these is the food problem. To a significant degree the fundamental solution to this determines the fulfillment of all our plans in improving the life of the Soviet people, the sociopolitical situation in our nation as well as all our progress.

The party Central Committee considers as its primary task an improvement in the supply of the republic with food not in the distant future but over the next few years. This task is completely realistic. The necessary prerequisites have been created for us to carry it out.

As we all see, in the agroindustrial complex, for a guaranteed solution to the posed tasks, for all regions of the nation we must carry out three closely related tasks.

We must steadfastly achieve fundamental changes in the production and economic relations in the countryside and ensure efficient utilization of the already created economic potential on each farm, at each enterprise and production section.

Even if we compare the operation of the farms located in the same natural and economic conditions but with a differing attitude toward production discipline, we can see an enormous gap in the productiveness of crop raising and livestock raising. And multiply this by the republic scale and you will see that when the peasant

becomes the actual master of the land, then an improvement in the production indicators will be possible in the shortest time. If we continue the old routines both by those who work the field and those who lead the various kolkhoz and sovkhoz divisions, it will be the same old slogans and speeches.

In the countryside we must create conditions for life and labor which in no way are inferior to those in the city and for a number of parameters might even surpass these. We must continue to develop the physical plant of agroindustrial production at an accelerated pace in order to make the extensive introduction of intensive production methods in crop and livestock raising accessible for each farm and ensure the growing process of the scientific and technical revolution in all production in the countryside. That is, to unite normal living and working conditions for man with leasing relations which make man the master, and arm him with all knowledge ensuring scientific and technical progress. The next Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee will be devoted to these questions.

We have already been able to achieve something in this regard. During the current five-year plan, gross agricultural product has increased by 9 percent. Last year, when we began introducing the higher form of cost accounting, the lease contract, the economy of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes was significantly strengthened. They received 6 billion rubles more of net profit and as a whole for the nation the number of farms operating at a loss declined from 6,500 to 1,400.

The increased production in recent years has made it possible to raise the consumption level of many food products. For example, over the 3 previous years the per capita production of meat, milk, vegetables and fruits has increased. But this is still nothing to boast about. In order to satisfy the demand of people for meat products, we must increase their per capita production by more than 10 kg. And as long as this does not exist, there is a shortage. And a shortage means speculation and speculation is social injustice.

We will bring about a fundamental change in solving this question. Because of the shortfall in agricultural output the nation has been forced to purchase food abroad. Year after year we have imported grain, meat, sugar, vegetable oil and other foods. And this, of course, is not a matter of pride for us. This cannot be tolerated further either from the economic or political viewpoint.

There is one other question I would like to discuss with you today. The insufficient development level of agricultural production has had a negative impact on the entire national economy, it has introduced into it elements of imbalance and disproportions, it has intensified the deficit in the state budget, it has created tension on the food market, it gives rise to a sharp discrepancy in solvent demand and the supply of consumer goods and serves as a medium for the most negative phenomena.

Over the next few years, we must reach higher levels in the production of agricultural products and above all carry out the tasks set for the current five-year plan, as this marks the first stage in carrying out the nation's Food Program. For this we must all now be working in a new manner, more effectively, and with greater certainty that no one can carry out these tasks for us.

We must fundamentally change our attitude toward establishing facilities for storing and processing crop and livestock products. You probably heard the discussion which occurred yesterday in Chardzhou. What has gone wrong? And area which could supply all types of fruits and vegetables for several major industrial oblasts itself provides them just 3 months a year. And it is not even a matter of certain exotic types but the most ordinary cabbage and tomato. The reason for this acute shortage lies in the lack of storage facilities in the city as well as enterprises for processing the vegetables and fruits. It is essential to mobilize all forces on solving this question and technically reequip the manufacturing sector of industry.

Let me say frankly, there are questions for which you can be praised. But you also have problems for which strict demands must be placed. One-half of the dairy products in the republic, for example, the whey and skim milk is not processed but rather sent back spoiled to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes and is used as livestock feed.

How can one explain the fact that a number of dairies in the nation produced 54 types of products while your recently built plants produce only 4. The children's diet combine cannot master the output of the essential product needed by children or observe the hygienic requirements. The situation is no better at the slaughterhouses.

In the future five-year plan, some 51 million rubles will be allocated for the development of the enterprises of the nation's food and processing industries. This is almost 2 1/2-fold more than over the preceding 8 years. We must fundamentally rectify the situation which has come into being here. We must also analyze the situation in your republic. Certainly over the last 3 years, Turkmenistan has not used some 56 million rubles allocated for these purposes. Over the 2 years remaining to the end of the five-year plan, you must use some 204 million rubles. And how do you plan to escape from the existing situation?

Each year the republic ships in some 40 million can units of fruit and vegetable products. Even the kolkhoz stores handle products produced at the enterprises of the Ukraine, Uzbekistan and other republics. Thus, you are not carrying out the Food Program. However you wish each kolkhoz and sovkhoz must have its own shop for processing fruits and vegetables and a shop for subsidiary products.

It is time to resolve the question of providing standards for livestock on private farms. At present, you assign only 3 percent of the coarse feed for the private livestock while 97 percent goes for socialized livestock raising.

In Turkmenistan some 14 feed units are spent to produce 10 eggs while as a whole for the nation the figure is 1.8 unit. As the CPSU Central Committee secretary responsible for the agroindustrial complex, I am asked why I have been so spineless. Certainly the feed which is allocated to the Turkmen poultry raisers could produce 7-fold more eggs.

During our present visit to your republic, we have seen much that is good and which you are doing to develop the social sphere. Both on the Ashkhabad farms and on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of Chardzhou Oblast, where extensive construction has been started on sociocultural projects. I feel that many others will come to Turkmenia in order to pick up on the experience of establishing cultural centers in the countryside. This is because this is done comparatively cheaply and most importantly, is convenient for the people.

Comrades! Among the numerous problems which are of concern to us, I would like to particularly take up the questions of ecology and land reclamation. The ecological situation—whether it is normal or negative—is always the result of the interaction of man with nature. In recent years, public opinion has become more and more acute and at times has become intolerant when for the sake of a momentary advantage there are hitches, the poor utilization of conservation measures and then the pollution of the water, air and land and the destruction of protective forests.

The human environment is becoming poorer and future generations of mankind will be further deprived of this. The Appeal of the Party Central Committee states that the CPSU shares the concern of the Soviet people for the exacerbation of the ecological situation and is taking a concerned approach to solving the complicated problems arising here. Programs are being worked out for the improvement and preservation of the environment and for rational utilization of nature.

In Belorussia, the Baltic republics, in the south of the Ukraine, in the nonchernozem zone of the RSFSR, in the Far East and particularly here, in the Central Asian republics, the connection of man with the environment through reclamation is particularly pointed. It is hard to imagine that under these conditions we could increase the production of food resources and raw materials for light industry without carrying out reclamation work, including irrigation.

But now voices are heard more and more frequently in our mass information media that we should curtail or halt reclamation work. All of this has some validity to it.

Under the pressure of instances of flagrant violation of the use of nature, the people perceive these demands as valid. But is this the case? Are we not confusing the consequence for the cause?

It is not reclamation that is to blame, as without it the life of many agricultural enterprises would be simply impossible. Particularly here, in the south, where man over the centuries has repeated: "Water is life." But we cannot tolerate for a single instance hurriedly worked-out plans or flagrant violations in the construction of the systems, incompleteness or poor quality operation of the irrigated lands.

We must struggle with all our forces not merely against reclamation, as the centuries have shown that life without this is impossible, but rather against the poor utilization of reclamation work and technological violations in carrying this out. And here we must struggle seriously and not with just appeals.

For example, in your republic the irrigated lands occupy just 2.5 percent of the territory. But they produce 97 percent of the crop products. Over the last 20 years—and these have been years of a sharp increase in the amount of reclamation work—production of agricultural product has risen by almost 300 percent, from 700 million rubles to 2 billion rubles. Grain production due to the increase in irrigated land has risen by 6-fold, vegetables by 2.5-fold, feed crops by 6-fold and raw cotton by 2-fold. And here we basically produce fine-staple cotton. All of this has fundamentally altered the socioeconomic life of the countryside and the republic.

At present, work is being carried out extensively to systematize water utilization. Over the last 2 years it has been possible to reduce water consumption from 22,000 to 16,000 m³ per hectare. But as a whole the reclamation state of land on a majority of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes remains very complex. Listen to the following figures: 662,000 hectares, or 52 percent of the irrigated land, are in an unsatisfactory state and require an immediate and fundamental improvement, complete reconstruction, while on a portion of the area there must be new construction of the collector-drainage network, major work in desalination of the land, careful leveling and other emergency practical measures. If you do not do this there will be no shifts in the economy, the land will lose its fertility and with great expenditures you will produce a poor crop. If this work is done then you will increase by one-third the production of all agricultural products. In carrying out the work here following modern, technically advanced plans, you will achieve also a savings of 20-25 percent in water consumption on an irrigated hectare. This will make it possible to significantly improve the situation in the Aral Sea Area. And here there will be a significant step forward in increasing the production of agricultural products. There must be a

balanced, well-planned approach to these problems. This is our main cotton growing area and hence clothing for man, as well as early and late vegetables, fruits and melon crops.

The questions of ecology and reclamation require a studied approach. You have everything necessary to solve the problems of the utilization of land and other natural resources on an intelligent and skilled basis. It is essential to remember that the next generation should receive the land in a better state than it was received from your grandfathers and great grandfathers.

In the course of the trip with the leaders of your republic, we have discussed many other problems. You have been very slow in developing the contract and lease relationships. You hold one of the last places in the nation in terms of the number of operating lease-hold collectives. Although there are very many persons who desire to establish lease-hold relations and turn the kolkhozes into lease-hold collectives. In Chardzhou Oblast alone, around 6,000 families submitted requests to allocate land for producing crop products. But these as yet have not been satisfied. And you must sharply increase the labor productivity of the workers. Labor productivity per employee in agricultural production in your republic is 5,300 rubles. As a whole for the nation, this figure is almost 10,000 rubles.

Comrades! Each day confronts you with evermore complex and crucial tasks. The ever-increasing demand of the people will complicate this further. The main thing is we cannot put anything off to tomorrow. Time is pushing us. This is why it is so important now to master the new management methods more effectively, to develop initiative and a creative approach of the personnel to solving the questions, as well as strengthen labor and production discipline. Glasnost, democracy, frankness and the strict observance of the laws—all of this is an indivisible concept. Only the unity of them embodied in life and in the daily deeds of each of you will bring us closer to the ultimate goal of socioeconomic changes in the nation and to the renewal of socialism.

Society needs a positive result from the activities of each person. We can solve all the problems and satisfy the needs and demands of man only in successfully developing the social economy. Man himself should aid society in this. It is our main, basic task to instill such concepts in each person. And let us realize all that we have conceived of: peace on earth, happiness in your families and the successful conclusion of all your undertakings. I wish you good health and success.

Giving concluding words was S.A. Niyazov.

Our meeting with the candidate for the USSR people's deputies from the CPSU, the Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU

Central Committee, Viktor Petrovich Nikonorov has come to an end. As was expected, there was an interesting discussion of the course of perestroika and of the state of affairs in all areas of economic, social and cultural construction. The speeches of Comrade V.P. Nikonorov and other participants in the meeting convince us of the need to redouble our efforts in carrying out the fundamental changes in our life. It is important for us that the party aktiv, the communists and through them all the labor collectives have conducted an ongoing search for reserves and have used all opportunities—political, economic and social—for accelerating our advance. We ask you, Viktor Petrovich, to assure M.S. Gorbachev and the party Central Committee that the communists and workers of Turkmenistan are profoundly aware of how important it is now to achieve ideological unity and get things started and we will do everything within our power to make progress along the entire front of perestroika.

I feel that everyone without exception has been stirred and sincerely interested in the campaign program presented by you, Viktor Petrovich. Extremely concrete, realistic and, most importantly, feasible, it reflects the most cherished aspirations of the people and provides an answer to many of our questions. And here we are truly interested in its practical implementation. We have no doubt that your candidacy to the USSR people's deputies will be unanimously approved by the communists and by all the republic population.

Participating in the meeting were the members of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee Buro, R.A. Bazurova, A. Kubanova, Yu.K. Mogilevets, S.M. Nesterenko, K.M. Orazov, V.G. Otchertsov, V.N. Rebrik, B.M. Sakhatmuradov, A. Khodzhamuradov, V.S. Chertishchev and the Candidate Member of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee Buro, Ya.P. Gudnogdyev.

Nikonorov Activities

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[Report by G. Osipov, Turkmeninform special correspondent: "The Main Concern is for People; Visit of the Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, V.P. Nikonorov, to Turkmenistan"]

[Text] Chardzhou, 25 Feb—The acquainting of Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the CPSU Central Committee Secretary V.P. Nikonorov with Chardzhou Oblast commenced on 24 February with a visit to the Kolkhoz imeni Khalturin in Chardzhouskiy Rayon. This farm is highly profitable. Last year alone here more than 3.5 million rubles of profit were produced. A significant portion of the funds is allocated annually for social development. Here the social, cultural and service facilities are basically erected by the

direct labor method. This makes it possible to accelerate the pace of their construction. Comrade Nikonov inspected a small cultural center at the kolkhoz where there is a club, a stadium, stores, a feldsher-obstetric station, a library and consumer service enterprises. Similar centers are operating presently in all the major population points of the farm.

In the store selling vital necessities, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was interested in the assortment of goods and the quality of services and he spoke with the purchasers.

The services for the rural workers including medical, trade and consumer should be just as good as in the city, he emphasized. Great attention is now being given to this question. It is essential that people remain to live in the countryside. This is one of the main conditions for successfully implementing the Food Program. The example of your farm again convinces us that the more concern shown for the people the better the work goes.

V.P. Nikonov visited one of the kolkhoz residents.

Isn't it difficult to manage such a farm?—he said, turning to the owner of the home, the labor veteran, B. Ovezov—I see that you have a vineyard, a hothouse and a bee yard here.

We have a large family, there are seven children and they all help. Of course, there is much to do but on the other hand we provide ourselves with everything necessary and the children learn the value of peasant work and learn to manage the land.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary inspected the kolkhoz storage facilities where they have put down for the winter the melon crops and grapes which go from here to the city market. This brings the farm a good deal of profit, although the prices for them are significantly lower than for the private farmers. The Chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Khal'turin, M. Alamanov, explained that such a storage method has been known for many years and the storage facility costs comparatively little for the farm, as local materials were employed in building it. In the near future, using the direct labor method, the farm will put up another two similar storage facilities and expenditures for this will be paid back in a year.

One cannot help but be pleased by the fact that during the winter you supply your kolkhoz members and city dwellers with melons and grapes and you plan to develop this farther, said V.P. Nikonov. But it is also essential that your farm build its own shops for processing the products as, for example, we saw at the Ashkhabad Sovet Turkmenistana Sovkhoz. This will help solve several problems all at once. In the first place, there will be much less crop losses, the farm's profits will rise and the surplus labor resources will be put to work. Food supply for the public is presently a primary task and all the reserves should be employed to solve it.

Unfortunately, the republic has numerous problems related to supplying the public with food and, in particular, confectionery articles the demand for which is only half satisfied. So some 26,000 tons of product must be shipped in from other regions of the nation. The reason for this lies in the lack of proper attention to the food industry facilities and the unsatisfactory utilization of existing capacity. V.P. Nikonov spoke about this frankly and at times sharply in a talk with the leaders of the republic Gosagroprom and Gosstroy in visiting the confectionery factory under construction in Chardzhou. The first stage of the enterprise with a capacity of 17,000 tons of confectionery articles a year should have been in operation by the end of December, but the dates for submitting the plans of installation work have been drawn out. The CPSU Central Committee secretary pointed out that the obkom and oblispolkom must take the course of construction at the factory under constant supervision and show greater tenacity and exactingness for both the designers and the organizations responsible for supplying the enterprise with materials and equipment.

Comrade Nikonov visited the ceramic drainage pipe plant. In the shop producing basalt fiber, he became familiar with a method for producing a valuable material employed in reclamation construction and the insulating of housing panels as well as with the opportunities for broadening this production.

Then the CPSU Central Committee secretary visited the Chardzhou Chemical Plant imeni Lenin and was interested in how the collective was working under the new conditions.

I remember that 5 or 6 years ago your enterprise was among the lagging ones in the sector. The fertilizer production plan was less than half fulfilled, said Viktor Petrovich in a meeting with the workers. Now, as the plant director, Comrade Starodubtsev, has said, you are annually producing almost 90 million rubles worth of commodity product, that is, you have virtually reached full capacity, you have established close contact with the agricultural enterprises and are planning to produce a new, highly efficient type of fertilizer, hummophosphate. You have clearly chosen the correct path and now you might give some thought to introducing a second model of cost accounting and possibly convert to a leasehold.

In converting to cost accounting, it is more difficult to operate but also more interesting, said the shift chief, T.S. Imamova, in entering the conversation. A feeling of responsibility has increased, output is higher and personnel turnover has declined.

How much do you now earn?

For a senior equipment operator in the sulfuric acid shop, for example, where I am employed, it is over 400 rubles. I receive wages of 210 rubles, plus a coefficient and bonuses. But the main thing is that we have more

rights. We have agreed to deliver fertilizer to the People's Republic of China. In return, we will receive industrial goods from there. Recently a specialized store was opened at the plant, we have organized our own hot-house system and we now supply the nursery and dining room with fresh vegetables.

V.P. Nikonov: And what are the problems at the plant?

Voices: There still is not enough housing.

V.P. Nikonov: I feel that you must more widely develop private initiative construction. There already is such experience in the oblast. Obviously in the future you will have more profit and you will be able to allocate more funds for housing construction. The election campaign is underway now. Raise these questions for your candidates to the USSR people's deputies.

Voice: More private land plots must be allocated.

V.P. Nikonov: Such a decision, as you know, has been taken. Over the 2 years as a whole for the nation, land plots have been received by 3.5 million families. This is an essential undertaking and there are opportunities for this in your oblast and republic. Find out from your obispolkom. Here there should not be any obstacles. I wish you all the best and success.

During the second half of the day, V.P. Nikonov met with workers from the party, soviet and economic bodies and the leaders of industrial enterprises, family and leasing collectives.

During the drop through Chardzhou Oblast, the member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and CPSU Central Committee Secretary V.P. Nikonov was accompanied by the First Secretary of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee S.A. Niyazov, the members of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee Buro, R.A. Bazarova, Yu.K. Mogilevets, V.N. Rebrik, B.M. Sakhatmurodov and A. Khodzhamuradov.

Ashkhabad, 25 Feb (special Turkmeninform correspondent)—In the morning of 25 February, the Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee V.P. Nikonov visited the trade enterprises of Ashkhabad. He became acquainted with the food store at the republic's largest trade center Gulistan. He walked through the rows of the market where he struck up a conversation with representatives of the Polimer Cooperative which produces artistic and decorative articles. Viktor Petrovich was interested in the collective's profits and whether their products were in demand.

Women turned to the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee:

The prices on the market "eat us up." Just look, a kilogram of dried apricots costs 8 or 9 rubles, a bunch of greens is 50 kopecks and apples are expensive. How can you buy this with our wages?

Here, on the spot, I feel your leadership should take things in hand. We will hold a serious discussion of this today at the party-economic aktiv. As you say, apples are expensive. They will be expensive in Ashkhabad until the lease contract is widely introduced in the countryside.

In speaking with the pensioner, M. Fedotova, the CPSU Central Committee secretary pointed out that the republic has all conditions for successfully solving the food supply problem. A great deal depends upon the initiative of the farmers and upon the ability to intelligently dispose of the resources. At present, they have permitted collective orchard raising and the free sale of up to 30 percent of one's product to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Everyone must be actively involved in the perestroyka process.

On the same day, V.P. Nikonov visited the stud farm Komsomol, where the famous Akhalteka horses are raised. The CPSU Central Committee secretary was interested in what work was being done in the republic to improve the famous breed as well as increase the number of head of Akhaltekan horses.

Turkmen Oblast Corruption Unchanged Despite Recent Leader Removals

*18300500 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 Mar 89 Second Edition p 2*

[Article by V. Loginov, PRAVDA special correspondent: "And the Chair Hasn't Fallen Over, Or Why the 'Infallible' Remain in Power"]

[Text] It seems that today, more often and more frankly than ever before, they have begun using a sort of psychotherapy in dealing with journalists in the local areas. Especially where, to put it mildly, it is a long way to perestroyka. No sooner do you cross the threshold than the owners inform you: Recently a correspondent came to see us, they will say. We thought he was an honest person, but later he made up such stories, poured such a bucket of mud on our glorious collective and its respected leaders. Why, such a "scribbler" should be taken to court. For slander! And, it would seem, there is so much sincere puzzlement and righteous wrath concentrated in such announcements that you just had better watch out. Your pen will quaver more than once when you yourself sit down to write about how badly things are going here. This, at the very least, is what the "psychotherapists" are counting on.

However, let us spare our emotions and turn to the specific history which has, we might add, yet another subtext. "Be sure that you don't overdo it," warns the chairman of the Tashauz oblast consumer union O.

Altyyev in speaking to local newspapermen Sh. Matveliyev and G. Otuzov, with whom he met on the eve of the oblast congress of consumer cooperatives. "Your colleague from PRAVDA wrote about me, and almost everything was from hearsay. I never lived in the same village with the former first secretary of the party obkom. And our oblast consumer union is one of the best in the republic. I would like to address PRAVDA with a request to let me have my say. After all, the reader has been simply misinformed."

It is easy to guess what a strong impression this monologue made on the newspapermen. It is no accident that they later placed it, "unedited", at the beginning of their extensive article on the congress. Moreover, their energetic resume followed the monologue: "And nevertheless (!) many believed that the fate of Altyyev had been decided. That is what those who knew him well thought, as well as those who judged him by rumors". It was just a few phrases, yet it in an instant it became clear: Matveliyev and Otuzov do not think so, and therefore they are ready to stand behind Orazguly Altyyevich with all the capacities available to them. And they did stand up for him! Here the authors, with unconcealed sympathy for him and equally frank disregard for their colleague from PRAVDA, described how even at the congress itself the speakers, noisily supported by the audience, were also indignant at the "series of inaccuracies" and "errors" allowed by our newspaper.

We might add that there have as yet been no publications specially devoted to the head of the Tashauz oblast consumer union in PRAVDA. There were only a few lines about him in the interview by Turkmenia correspondent M. Volkov with the republic CP Central Committee buro member, rug-maker A. Kurbanova, published on 27 October of last year. Known among her countrymen for hwe active position, Amangozel Kurbanova said quite definitely in the interview: "As long as we still have 'infallibles', i.e., appointees and heirs of Gapurism, perestroyka will not be hastened. They had quieted down, but not for long..."

The Turkmen CP Central Committee Plenum held in October of 1986 removed from their positions and excluded from the CPSU certain "prominent" leaders of Tashauz oblast for connivance and complicity in false reporting. Among them was obkom First Secretary V. Atayev. Yet there has been no decisive change for the better. Judging by the mail, the readers living in the north of the republic are still concerned by the situation in cadre policy. Specifically, they note the liberalism of the new oblast leaders. In this connection, the name of the oblast consumer union chairman was also listed, among others. He came to leadership at almost the same time as Atayev, about 18 years ago. Both of them were from the same village by birth, according to the PRAVDA correspondent. "By our standards," noted A. Kurbanova, "this means we should consider them—relatives". How could the members of the discussion not wonder: The oblast consumer union is chronically unable to meet the plan (it

is symptomatic: "under Atayev" the percentages were met more or less, "without him"—things are really bad—V. L.), and even today there is rampant waste, misappropriation, and shortages here, yet O. Altyyev's chair has not wavered. He still lives in the lap of luxury.

Obviously, something like this, even though it is presented in only a few lines, is probably a bitterly unpleasant thing to read about oneself or one's superior of many years. But which of these lines is written "by rumor"? That is the question. What kind of "errors" have crept into them? And finally, in what way has the "reader simply been misinformed?" When I was in Tashauz, I persistently but fruitlessly asked both Altyyev and the authors of the article on the congress, as well as its participants, about this.

Essentially the only "argument" that was presented was—"It is a pity!". After all, we cannot consider as an argument the affirmation that the Tashauz oblast consumer union is "one of the best in the republic". After all, there are only three oblast consumer unions here, and all three have so far been more successful in losses from shrinkage and settling, misweighing and miscalculating than in their concern for the working folk of Turkmenia. Although, of course, there just happen to be three steps at the pedestal of honor...

"But this is not true, that I come from the same village as the former party obkom first secretary, Atayev," repeated Orazguly Altyyevich again and again.

For some reason, his eyes made the greatest impression on me. They were clear eyes, washed with sincere puzzlement... Yet I would like to look at them today, as I hold before me the xerox copies of pages from the "personal matters" of Atayev and Altyyev. Here is the column—"place of birth". Both here and there they have written in their own hand: Kurt Village, Ilyalinskiy rayon.

This rayon is famous from former times. Its name has emblazoned itself in my memory from the day of the above-mentioned Turkmen CP Central Committee Plenum, at which I had occasion to be present. Condemning the wanton practice of cadre selection and placement based on indicators of relationship, association by place of birth, and servility, the plenum participants presented some eloquent statistics.

I will permit myself to present just a short quote from the report on that plenum: "Thus, every third titled worker is a native of Ilyalinskiy rayon, where Atayev himself was born... Among Atayev's fellow countrymen are two deputy chairmen and the secretary of the oblispolkom, the first deputy chairman of the oblast APK [Agroindustrial Complex], the administration chief and deputy chief of the UVD [Internal Affairs Administration] political section, as well as the heads of the departments of public health,

public education, finance, prices, and social security. Also—the chairman of the oblast consumer union and the directors of the trade bases... In short, "his own" people are everywhere.

Altyyev is mentioned as one of the last in a long, though far from complete list of "one's own" people. Yet this does not mean that he was the last in the multi-tiered pyramid constructed with frank cynicism, which up until quite recently still cast its shadow over all of Tashauz oblast, forcing people to live "quietly" or to cringe before the strong ones of that world. Oh, how they prided themselves then on belonging to the "chosen few," those who today, like the chairman of the oblast consumer union, are ready to re-write their autobiographies anew! After all, they did not envision perestroika in their wildest dreams. Its coming, really expressed in the downfall of Atayev, forced many of them to pull their proud heads into their shoulders. And for good reason. The dismissals, often even without announcement of grounds, at first followed one after the other. Yet soon (and who but they, who had mastered the secrets of social mimicry could not notice this?), the force of the wind which threatened to disperse the clouds of Atayevism over the oblast began to die down. But why?

Of all our thrice accursed habits, of which we are currently trying to rid ourselves, the most tenacious, in my opinion, is to begin something and not bring it to its conclusion, to begin over and over again, and to be satisfied with half-measures and half-deeds. The most important thing, they assured us during the years of stagnation, is to announce in a timely manner and as loud as possible one's support for the decisions made at the top, to hastily compile and begin a bit at a time to implement the measures for eliminating the "noted" shortcomings, i.e., only those that have fallen under the pen of the superior organs. And tomorrow or the day after, perhaps, if successive directives do not follow from above, it will again be possible to let things take their own course. That is how it is here, in Tashauz.

Having significantly renovated itself after October of 1986, the Tashauz obkom has changed little in its style and methods of operation, as well as in its approach to personnel evaluation. The resolutions of the Turkmen CP Central Committee Plenum motivated them to express to the end all the truth about Atayevism, to expose all its roots and to show a basic concern for guarantees that all aspects of the life of the oblast party organization would be cured. Here they limited themselves generally to taking measures (and not always proportionate to the deeds) aimed at persons who were criticized from the tribunal of the Central Committee Plenum and the obkom plenum which followed it.

Yet now more and more often, on the background of the former unfavorable state of affairs, there have been relapses of complacency and show, squandering of the public wealth and ignoring the needs of the people. And now, having felt that "the storm has passed," leaders

such as Altyyev, with their former Olympian calm, listen to the watchful obkom criticism and customarily assure us that "they will do everything necessary to correct the noted shortcomings." Glancing through the protocols of the obkom plenums and its buro and secretariat meetings for the last 2 years, I lost count of how many times and for what reasons they "criticized" the oblast consumer union and its unchanged leader.

We must admit, this sonorous word "leader" has asked to be written down on paper. It was very memorable in the article by Sh. Matveliyev and G. Otuzov. "Recognized leader of the oblast consumer union," "singular leader"—these words are from there, from their article. But what is the "noisy framework": "The squall of applause... was the expression by the congress delegates of a vote of confidence for the disgraced chairman of the governing board"; "the hall literally exploded with applause and greeted its chairman for a long time"; "tumultuous applause"; "a wave of enthusiasm"!

You must agree, rarely even in the height of the infamous epoch of stagnation did such enthusiasm rain down on far more notable leaders. And in order to define the attitude of our colleagues toward their "client," it is perhaps time to clarify the fact that the article which was published simultaneously by the two press organs of the republic CP oblast committee, TASHAUZSKAYA PRAVDA and KOMMUNIZM YELY, was entitled "Willful Decision Made by Party Obkom (!) and Leadership of 'Turkmenpotrebsoyuz,' But Delegates of Consumer Cooperative Congress Reject It." (The subject, I will note parenthetically, was the decision not to recommend Altyyev for reelection as oblast consumer union chairman).

What surprises some of our fellow brothers of the pen bring the readers, at times losing their bearings in that which seems to them an endless sea of pluralism of opinions! This, specifically, leads to the cases of ignoring the elementary basics of political "subordination." But let us be objective. They are motivated, as a rule, by concern (how sincere it is is quite another question) for renovating our life. But what about in Tashauz?

During the meeting, the authors of the article "Willful decision..." tried to convince me that they were simply showing how people, having emerged from their sleep, have made use of their rights to glasnost and to the selection of the kind of leader they want. "Simply"? Oh, how clever our colleagues were... In almost every other paragraph, more than dozens of times, the article mentioned the name of the party obkom second secretary, A. Loyko, who—and I quote—"often proclaimed out loud that the obkom still is not able to present to the congress facts which would defame Altyyev, but if he is elected chairman of the governing board, such facts will emerge." Like obispolkom chairman V. Rashidov, who tried to say his piece, [Loyko's] "only trump card (?) which he held in his hand against Altyyev was the fact that he had managed the governing board for too long."

And then—the final jubilant accords: “The battle between the presidium and the audience went on for several hours... Nevertheless, the vote was held. Its outcome was predetermined. According to the results of the secret ballot, Orazgul Altyyev was elected chairman of the oblast consumer union governing board.”

I believe now we have a complete understanding of everything that went on at the congress, as well as of the position of the Tashauz newspapermen. But what can we say about the actions of the obkom “takeover attempt”? That was a tradition—and really an assault landing. Aside from buro member V. Tashidov, the following held seats in the presidium: buro candidate member and former Komsomol obkom First Secretary S. Saryyeva and first secretary of the Tashauz party gorkom B. Ishankuliyev, who was soon elected obkom buro member. In essence, they entrusted A. Loyko alone with the task of conducting a hastily drawn out “line” a day before the consumer cooperative meeting (instead of Altyyev, to elect one of his deputies as governing board chairman). And Loyko implemented this line as best he could, as he had become accustomed to doing. In short, he “pressured.”

The obkom did not even give a thought to the sentiments of the audience who had to be convinced of the need to dismiss Altyyev. Why, and why bother discussing the matter? We will come, we will dictate, and they will elect anyone we say. There was a conversation with Altyyev, who, although he expressed dissatisfaction, would still... agree. Particularly since the position offered to him was not bad, and in the same system.

“Of course,” Altyyev admitted to me, “I could have influenced the people. Yet I had asked the obkom that the position which they were outlining for me be included ...in the nomenclature. But the obkom did not agree.” And—I paid for my ‘intractability’! That’s the way deals go...”

After all, Altyyev knew the “audience” forward and backward. He knew every breath they would take and what they would say. It is no wonder that on the eve of the congress the following letter was sent to three addressees—to PRAVDA, to the Turkmen CP Central Committee, and to the obkom:

“The article in PRAVDA will not let me rest. I do not agree with the correspondent that cadre policy is being violated only because Altyyev continues to work in his capacity. I do not understand why he chose for himself (or they gave him) Amangozel Kurbanova for a conversationalist, who states: ‘By our standards, these are considered relatives.’” (This, we will recall, is how A. Kurbanova commented on the fact that Altyyev and the former obkom first secretary were from the same village by birth.—V. P.) “This expression somehow reminds us of the year 1937. No one was held responsible for anyone else, especially such people as Orazgul Altyyevich... If there are some shortcomings, he is not be blame alone, but all of us are...”

And let the fact that Altyyev lives in the lap of luxury not disturb certain ‘readers of the north.’ None of us are paupers, and those who write are also not poor. The longer the ‘chair does not waver’ under our chairman, I believe, the better it will be for the oblast.”

“Written by my own hand—Filippovskaya, Valentina Sergeyevna, deputy chief of the procurement industry cooperative administration. My fellow workers, who have affixed their signatures, are also in agreement with me.”

This is followed by about 30 signatures...

This is an entire philosophy which many share (and the “struggle for Altyyev” is one of the frequent illustrations of it). And not only that—just listen to the discussions seething all around—in Tashauz. Enough, they demand ever more persistently, of talk about the cult and about repressions. Enough about the stagnation, the words break through in many voices! We are tired of it, they say, how long can we carry on about it?! It is time, they say, to stop and forget about all that. But did you notice how skillfully that same Filippovskaya laid the bridge from our days to 1937? It is a popular analogy today... Just watch out, soon demonstrators will appear on the streets bearing placards that read: “Whoever remembers the old, out with his eye!” What, is this too impressive of a slogan? It is really balm for the suffering souls of the Gapurovs, Atayevs, and obviously, those of their thick cohorts who, having waited out the storm, are now straightening their shoulders.

As I write about this, I seem to hear the excited voices of the participants in the organizational plenum of the Tashauz obkom elected at the last party conference. The Plenum expressed a number of serious directives to the secretaries and the obkom buro members. Yet the following directive was also repeated many times: Try to see, dear comrades, that the central press stops criticizing Tashauz oblast. One of the speakers even suggested asking the Central Committee to “prohibit them from criticizing us.”

The following thought slipped through in the comments at the plenum, and in the lobby conversation it appeared in “open text”: Enough of dismissals. In other words, it is time to leave the “infallibles” alone. How can we, complain some of them, finding ever greater sympathy, criticize and remove people from their positions solely on the basis that they worked under Atayev? Not a word is said about how they worked and how they are working today. Yet how clear their eyes are, and how full of perplexity and insult!...

Having written these comments, I was in no hurry to submit them to print. I wanted to see what kind of evaluation the obkom itself would give to the events “surrounding Altyyev.” After all, they had promised to “draw conclusions” there... I telephoned Tashauz once, twice... I called again. Yet it seems that in the obkom

they are already surprised: Why such interest? Well, things were the way they were... Yet the number of Altyyev's sympathizers has increased. And the "infallibles" feel a little more secure. It is a good lesson that Orazgul Altyyevich taught the obkom, they say.

**AzSSR: Nakhichevan Obkom First Secretary
Isayev Interviewed on Autonomy**

18300483 Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
9 Feb 89 p 2

[Interview with G. Isayev, first secretary of the Nakhichevan Obkom, by B. Imanguliyev: "To Justify the Confidence of the People"]

[Text] Today is the 65th anniversary of the formation of the Nakhichevan ASSR. The participation of its toilers in the processes of restructuring, the problems which concern the people of this territory, and the tasks facing the party organization are discussed by the first secretary of the Nakhichevan Obkom of the Azerbaijan CP, G. Isayev.

[Imanguliyev] Geydar Isayevich, you have headed the party organization at a time which has not been simple for the autonomous republic. Tell us, how are the relations of the party obkom with the communists and workers of the republic formed today?

[Isayev] For the party official, the most important thing is to know what people are thinking about, what concerns and worries people. In short, to set going and to strengthen lively relations with them. Of course, the obkom officials have always been sufficiently informed about the situation in the provinces. But no information coming through "paper channels" can take the place of a dialogue with people, of lively intercourse with them. Every meeting in the collective is not only an opportunity to investigate the problems more thoroughly, but also to get acquainted with people, to understand their mood. Without this, it is impossible to work today.

I will cite an example. On the third day after I began my new duties, the party obkom received a telegram from the inhabitants of the village Vanand of Ordubadskiy Rayon, who complained about the violation of the law during the apportionment of land parcels. We went out to Vanand and solved the question there, on the spot. But we were in no hurry to return. We walked through the village, we talked with people. Then there were trips to other villages. It turned out—there were lots of unresolved questions: Water supply, gas supply, road construction, questions of the public services and amenities for the villages, and the creation of new working places. And another thing which was noticed during this trip: The loss of the architectural distinctiveness of the Nakhichevan villages, the cheerless standardization of their appearance. One of the results of this trip was the decision to proceed with the development of a comprehensive program for the development of all 204 villages of the autonomous republic. In its general features, this program is already finished.

Now there are two telegrams on my desk, signed by the inhabitants of Bananiyarskiy and Abrakuninskiy villages of Dzhulfinskiy Rayon. We will certainly travel to them. A great deal has accumulated on people's souls.

During a recent meeting in the village of Negram, one of the elders openly said: "We have heard enough words from you, now we will judge you by deeds."

I think that it was precisely idle talk, unfulfilled promises, and the absence of concrete deeds which led people to social apathy and indifference. It is difficult to work with such a legacy received from the time of stagnation. We must convince people of the irreversibility of perestroika.

[Imanguliyev] To tell the truth, the former leadership did not indulge our own correspondents with frequent invitations to the buro, but, even being at them from time to time, we became witnesses of the tense, nervous atmosphere in which the sessions were held. A command style held sway. Respected people, members of the buro, as soon as their names were called, jumped up from their seats and hurried to associate themselves with the already expressed opinion. At that time, only one opinion was accepted as the truth—that of the first secretary.

[Isayev] The composition of the buro has been almost completely renewed. The style, methods, and forms of party work are changing. At the sessions of the buro and the secretariat, we are trying to strengthen democratic with communists and to discuss urgent problems collegially. You see, only a diversity of opinions makes it possible to work out a unified policy with respect to questions of one sort or another, in which one can take into account the existing differences and reconcile them.

The Party Obkom has ceased to be a bureaucratic institution, its doors are today open for all. If possible, I receive people on a daily basis. Other secretaries and department chiefs also work in this way. Everyone, right up to the instructor, is obliged to decide questions pertaining to the sphere being restored effectively, without putting them off. Moreover, the members of the obkom regularly receive visitors. A direct telephone connection with the obkom secretary has been established—their telephone numbers have been published in the press.

True, as the result of these innovations there has been a sharp increase in the number of letters and telegrams. But we are not complaining: It means, the people believe us.

Of course, it is impossible to say that the processes of the renewal of the forms and content of work are developing dynamically, without impediment. Too many serious miscalculations had accumulated. Too serious were the consequences of the gap between word and deed. To take agriculture. Triumphal sessions had become a ritual, at which challenge banners were handed over, there was

effusive talk about the growing profit of the farms and the growth of the prosperity of people, but in fact these so-called profitable kolkhozes and sovkhozes were not in the position even to pay off their workers. Inflated reports and deception were perceived as something natural. A whole group of farm and enterprise managers was removed from the zone of criticism, they got away with everything. The work suffered from this, and honest and principled people suffered from this.

And how the obkom treated the young people! During the past 5 years, the former leadership promoted only 7 young communists to responsible work. For comparison, I will say that during the past 2 months 10 persons went from the Komsomol to party and soviet organs.

Things were no better in the spiritual sphere. Creative and scientific collectives tore contradictions apart, people expended time, energy and strength for the solution of the conflicts constantly arising in their midst. In such an atmosphere, no one thought seriously about culture and science. This is why mediocrity consolidated its positions in these spheres. Most regrettable is the fact that all of this happened during the third year after the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

[Imanguliyev] Now, in the course of the pre-election campaign, there is an opportunity to develop the democratic transformations that have begun. I would like to know what is being done in the republic in this direction?

[Isayev] The nomination of candidate members in the republic is taking place in a more democratic atmosphere and in the conditions of broad glasnost. We have, finally, ceased to elect "one out of one." It should be said that already in 1987, in Ilyichevskiy Rayon, by of an experiment, elections to local Soviets were held on the basis of multi-mandate districts. Today this experiment has proved useful to us. However, it is important to avoid window-dressing, a formal approach to the undertaking, and excessive organization.

It is gratifying that the discussion of candidacies is taking place in an atmosphere of criticism, in a sharp struggle of opinions and the clash of positions. Precisely such an approach to the discussion of candidacies made it possible to expose a negative tendency, where people, because of local and clan interests try to nominate a candidate who pleases them and attempt to use democracy for selfish ends. Against this, we are waging an uncompromising struggle. And here glasnost, which has increased the activeness of the voters, is of great help to us.

[Imanguliyev] The workers of the autonomous republic, as well as all of Azerbaijan, had to experience difficult days in connection with the aggravation of the international relations in the Transcaucasus. Today the autonomous republic has encountered the difficult problem of migrants. The reasons for the conflict that has arisen are known—these are unresolved problems in the socio-economic sphere, the spheres of culture and ecology, and shortcomings in the international education of the workers. What concrete steps is the oblast party organization taking to improve the situation?

[Isayev] As is well known, the autonomous oblast in October and November of the past year accepted thousands of migrants from Armenia. At this time, about 1,900 persons of Armenian nationality left the Nakhichevan ASSR.

Every conceivable assistance is extended to the migrants: From the payment of loans to the allotment of land parcels. But nevertheless, our main concern is to achieve the return of people to their native homes, their places of permanent residence. Positive changes have already been outlined here. More than 50 Armenian families have returned to the Nakhichevan ASSR. In solving this serious problem, the party organization of the autonomous republic is guided by the well-known decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, aimed at the normalization of the situation in the region and is organizing its work in the spirit of the Appeal of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Presidiums of the AzSSR and ArSSR Supreme Soviets and Councils of Ministers to the citizens who have left their permanent places of residence. A commission of three groups for work among the migrants has been established under the Council of Ministers of the autonomous republic. They regularly go to the ArSSR and meet with party and Soviet leaders. We are planning the holding of suchy meetings at all levels both in our republic and in Armenia. Our first duty is to restore good-neighbor relations between the two peoples.

In Nakhichevan, the disturbances were, to a considerable extent, detonated by the "stagnant" thinking of the former leadership of the party oblast committee, which manifested itself in the work on international education. The usefulness of triumphant measures instead of the analysis of the real processes in the sphere of international relations, the ignoring of the accumulated problems instead of the search for ways of their solution, and toasts to friendship instead of painstaking individual work—all of this led to negative phenomena.

At present, it is necessary, above all, to attain mutual confidence and to restore economic and cultural contacts. In the name of friendship, we must more boldly take upon ourselves the responsibility of the first step.

GSSR Glavlit Chief on Changes in Censorship Rules

*18300466 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
15 Feb 89 p 3*

[Interview with Vakhtang Andreyevich Petriashvili, chief of the GSSR Council of Ministers Main Administration for Protection of State Secrets in the Press, by Gruzinform correspondent, under the "Timely Interview" rubric: "Glavlit: Many Restrictions Have Been Removed"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] It is difficult now to find any sphere in the social and political life of our country which, to one degree or another, has not been touched by the crisp wind of the changes born in the bosom of democracy and glasnost. Also being reorganized substantially are the activities of the GSSR Council of Ministers Main Administration for Protection of State Secrets in the Press [Glavlit]. A Gruzinform correspondent talked about this with its chief, V. A. Petriashvili.

[Correspondent] Vakhtang Andreyevich, to begin with, perhaps, it would be good to talk about the functions of Glavlit.

[Petriashvili] This is necessary, inasmuch as it is not only people who are far removed from the kitchen of the printed word who have an extremely foggy notion about these functions, but even some workers of the periodical press, radio and television. This is no accident, inasmuch as, until relatively recent times, censorship was also an integral part of the command-and-bureaucratic system's mechanism which operated in our society. Unfortunately, even in our republic, it was used to establish forbidden zones and positions for criticism.

Now, specifically about the functions. Glavlit and more so its republic administrations themselves do not invent prohibitions and, naturally, do not have a monopoly on them. They carry out the orders of the ministries, departments and organizations, excluding from materials ready for publication information which is considered to be secret. Briefly, our workers, together with the associates of the mass media, edit the corresponding materials, without going, at the same time, outside the framework of Glavlit's basic guidelines. For example, just over the last year, thanks to the vigilance of our editors, the publication or broadcasting of a large amount of secret information of a military, scientific, technical and economic nature were prevented.

[Correspondent] Here, obviously, the mass media workers should play a large role also?

[Petriashvili] Naturally, it is a fact that political editing of a text is part of their responsibility. Moreover, the administrators of the mass media bear responsibility for the ideological and political content of a work. Therefore, it is very important that they know well Glavlit's basic restrictions and operating principles. And it also

happens that, in the editorial offices and the publishing houses, they tell the authors about the inadvisability of publishing such materials, alluding to Glavlit, in order to escape publishing works, against which the editors have completely different grudges. In recent times, thanks to democratization and glasnost, many restrictions have been removed, but, not knowing about this, journalists are skirting these themes. As a result, the common cause is suffering, inasmuch as the problems remain unsolved because they are ignored. In addition, the authority of Glavlit, which, unfortunately, is still assigned the unseemly role of a prohibitory organ, also suffers.

[Correspondent] If possible, disclose a production secret: how are Glavlit's special editorial staffs set up and what kinds of information comprise, for example, a scientific and technical secret?

[Petriashvili] The protection of state interests depends to a large extent on the work of the expert commissions in the scientific research institutions. They are supposed to "purge" the materials prepared in their system of that information, the divulgence of which would inflict damage on our economic system and defense capability. Indeed, it is no secret that we still have, for the time being, an economic mechanism which is lagging notably behind the rate of development of scientific and technical thinking. As a consequence of this, there is frequently a delay in the practical realization of inventions, while their developers, having prematurely published information about their own developments, in fact, are making them the free property of foreign entrepreneurs. Such examples, unfortunately, are numerous. Starting with this, it is possible to say that a proper sense of informational culture is required equally from both the Glavlit workers and the corps of associates of the mass media and the scientific research institutions.

[Correspondent] What is the degree of glasnost's influence on the list of secret information?

[Petriashvili] Rather large. In recent times, this list has been reduced by nearly 50 percent. Being saved from the "cult of secrecy" are the departmental lists and, consequently, Glavlit's summary list. Being illuminated now in the press are many previously "concealed" themes—drug addiction, crime statistics, disease epidemics, accidents in transportation, construction and industry, ecological problems... Glavlit is currently operating on the principle: everything is permitted which is not prohibited.

[Correspondent] Yet, all the same, what is prohibited?

[Petriashvili] Whatever may inflict damage on our society and the state, for example, war propaganda, coercion based on racial or national and religious discrimination, infringement on the country's security and defense capability and on public order. There is a whole series of sensational themes, the illumination of which, to put it frankly, may impart to a publication a lot of popularity,

but this can hardly be compared to the damage which would be inflicted on the people's public morals and health by such publications. Among such themes are the detailed description of methods of murder and robbery and the manufacture of drugs, explosives and poisons. I do not think there is any need to explain why the appearance of such materials in print is unadvisable.

[Correspondent] What would you say about the special resources and how are we solving this problem?

[Petriashvili] Today, there are no longer any so-called "dead" book depositories. Nearly 8,000 publications previously banned in the Soviet Union have found life anew. Books, magazines and newspapers, which were inaccessible until recently for widespread examination and familiarization, were held in special depositories of the basic libraries. They have again begun to serve literature, history and scientific thinking. Thus, a special commission, jointly with interested departments, has removed the ban, not only on the works of figures we have rehabilitated, but also on the books of authors considered to be our enemies. In short, the commission has returned to the common fund all publications which do not contain calls for the kindling of war, conflict between nations and pornography. Of the books thus reviewed, 461 have still been left in the special resources. These are basically anti-Semitic brochures published during the Civil War by Petlyurovites and the slanderous concoction of General Vrangel's minions about V. I. Lenin and Soviet power and included in this same list are Zionist literature and publications which contain praise for Beria, Yezhov and Yagoda.

[Correspondent] Such work, obviously, is also being carried out in our republic.

[Petriashvili] A special commission, which operated under Glavlit's supervision, has done a great deal of work. As a result, readers have again received 588 titles, original books published in Georgia. What has been left in the special resources are basically works devoted to Beria. Occupying their own place in the native literature and science are the works of Grigol Robakidze, Viktor Nozadze, Zurab Avalishvili and others. Readers may freely enjoy such previously prohibited books as "A Quarter of a Century. Reminiscences of the Revolutionary Past" by B. Bibileyshvili, the collection "Hard Labor and Exile," "Once Again on Georgian Emigration" by M. Kakhiani and many others.

[Correspondent] We are now talking a lot about the mistakes of the past. Our young people themselves want to delve into their causes. In the meanwhile, in the libraries, it is getting harder and harder to find the works of I. Stalin, V. Molotov, N. Khrushchev, L. Brezhnev, M. Suslov and other figures...

[Petriashvili] This is already the fault of the library workers, inasmuch as there are no restrictions with respect to the works of these authors.

Initial Low Demand for Foreign Periodical Sales in Tashkent Explained

18300437a Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian
8 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by O. Strelnikov, *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* correspondent: "The TIMES in the 'Soyuzpechat' Kiosk"]

[Text] Since the first days of the new year, such newspapers as the *TIME*, *ASAKHI*, *GUARDIAN*, and other foreign publications have appeared in the "Soyuzpechat" kiosks.

"Tashkent residents will be able to obtain through open sale more than 13 titles of newspapers from 16 capitalist countries, including France, England, the USA, Sweden, and Canada," commented S. Khatamov, chief of the Tashkent city agency "Soyuzpechat."

These publications were sold before, but in small quantities and only in hotels where foreign citizens stayed. Today newspapers in the English, German, and Swedish languages have appeared in the kiosks of the TashGU [Tashkent Order of the Labor Red Banner State University imeni V. I. Lenin], the Institute of Foreign Languages, the residence halls of TIIIMSKh [Tashkent Order of the Labor Red Banner Institute of Agricultural Irrigation and Mechanization Engineers], and the center of the republic's capital.

As yet the number of copies of the newspapers is small. The "trial" sale at the end of last year showed that the demand for them was not great. This may possibly be associated with their high cost. For example, the *INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE* costs 1 ruble 20 kopeks, the *TIME*—80 kopeks, and *NEWSWEEK*—3 rubles. Our readers are also not accustomed to the structure of the publications. Only 15 out of the 120 pages of the *FINANCIAL TIMES* contain information of socio-political content, as we say. The rest is comprised of advertisements, tables of market prices, and private announcements.

Syr-Darya Oblast Radio Now Broadcasting in Five Languages

18300437b Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian
14 Jan 89 p 2

[UzTAG report: "In Five Languages"]

[Text] Dzhizak, 13 January—Today the broadcasts of the Syrdarya Oblast radio resounded in five languages. Kazakh, Tajik and Crimean-Tatar were added to Uzbek and Russian. Now the latest news from the life of the virgin lands, where representatives of almost 100 nations and peoples of our country toil, can be understood by practically everyone.

Here is an interesting detail. In order to change over to multilingual broadcasting, the journalists had to solve only organizational and technical problems. There were

no linguistic problems. This is simply explained. The chairman of the radio committee has a command of all five languages in which broadcasting is done, and the editor-in-chief has a command of four of them. Among the editorial associates there is not a single person who speaks less than two languages.

Uzbek Rayon Newspaper Adds Tajik Language Pages

*18300437c Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
15 Jan 89 p 3*

[UzTAG report: "A Newspaper in Two Languages"]

[Text] The subscribers of the Rishtanskiy Rayon newspaper RISHTON KHAKIKATI are now receiving it in a bilingual version. In the third column of each issue, the material is printed in the Tajik language. The wishes of the Tajik population, who comprise a significant portion of the rayon's residents, have been fulfilled.

The large-circulation newspaper KHAETI NAV ("New Life")—the organ of the partkoms and directorates of the nearby Sokh and Leningrad sovkhozes, whose population is comprised primarily of Tajiks, is also published in the Tajik language in the rayon.

Lithuanian Youth Journal Begins Russian-Language Edition

*18300437d Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
27 Jan 89 p 2*

[Article by Ye. Ivenkova, editor for the RYADY MOLODEZHI Russian-language edition: "The 'Premiere' of the Journal"]

[Text] The first Russian-language issue of the journal JAUNIMO GRETOS has been published. Its title—RYADY MOLODEZHI [Ranks of the Youth]—already defines the thematic directionality and age of the audience to which the publication of this journal is primarily addressed.

The journal has come to the reader at a notable time for Lithuania—a time of national rebirth. RYADY MOLODEZHI will help the young Russian-speaking citizens of our republic to understand the problems of their contemporaries and will tell them about their current aspirations. The editorial staff of the Russian edition will try to bring to its reader the national uniqueness which is characteristic of the journal JAUNIMO GRETOS.

A new column entitled "From the History of Lithuania" is being introduced in the first issue. The Russian reader will evidently be interested in the materials which will further his acquaintance with the history of the region, the beliefs, customs and traditions of the Lithuanian people. The discussions and hypotheses of historians and significant scientific endeavors in their popular rendition will provide useful educational material. The column entitled "History and Fates" illuminates the tragic episodes of the sinister years of Stalinism. The journal will acquaint you also with creative personages—writers, artists, composers, and popular public leaders to whom the reader will be able to pose any question.

How can one become an interesting conversationalist and an attractive partner in personal contact? How can one correctly build one's relations within the family? Our journal will become the good friend and advisor of young people on all these and other questions. The column entitled "Secrets of Love," in which qualified advice of specialists and materials on the ethics and psychology of intimate relations are published, is called upon, in our opinion, to satisfy to a certain degree the informational shortage in this most important sphere of human life.

The section entitled "Phonorama" tells about the history of pop music, its various current directions and leading artists. Sports fans will meet leading athletes and authoritative trainers on the pages of the journal. Starting with the second issue, the series entitled "Lessons of Culturism" will begin.

The original Russian literary page will acquaint readers with the works of young writers of Lithuania who write in Russian.

Fashion advice, a competition for enthusiasts of chess and checkers, a column entitled "Let's correspond" in which you will be able to find the address of a pen-pal who shares your "hobby"—in short, everything that interests the youth—is reflected on the pages of the colorful, tastefully illustrated journal.

We have only to add that RYADY MOLODEZHI will be available for retail sale in very limited quantities, so hurry and subscribe now. Subscriptions are accepted in all the business offices up until the 15th day of the month prior to the subscription's going into effect. Publication index—76771, cost of single issue—35 kopeks. The journal is published once a month.

Igor Klyamkin on Historical Deception and Its Consequences

*18000814 Moscow NOVYY MIR in Russian
No 2, Feb 89 pp 204-238*

[Article by Igor Klyamkin: "Why It is Difficult to Speak the Truth: Selected Places From the History of a Certain Disease"]

[Text] This is how it is: everything that becomes the past differs strikingly from what it was at the time when it was the present. It differs in color, smell, and, most importantly, meaning. It may be that only works of art possess a definite stability in this regard. We ourselves change, whereas the works of art do not change, or change almost not at all, but in our evaluations that which possesses the greatest changeability is politics, everything that we call political and social life. It may be for this reason that politics is always something of today and it possesses only today's scale for evaluating all the events, everything that surrounds us, and ourselves first of all.

We say "the experience of history" and we think and are even convinced at such time that every day, or practically every hour, we use that experience today, but, most probably, we cross it out every hour, or distort it decisively. Especially when it is that experience that is never to be repeated at any time, anywhere, under any circumstances.

It is another matter when today becomes yesterday and the past. That is when we become, with respect to it, true (although not always genuine) historians. It is then that we have the capability not only of looking in a different way at our yesterday, but also to inscribe it practically into the entire preceding series of the past—the day before yesterday, the past decades, the centuries, and seemingly even into the millenia.

It is then that we master, or attempt to master, "the experience of the past" and in conformity with this we create that new scale of evaluations which, however banal this sounds, if not in everything, then to a large extent represents yet again that which is old and well forgotten, the well forgotten moral evaluations, such as "lies" and "the truth," from the point of view of which one begins to reevaluate such ideas as "correctly" and "incorrectly," as "the goal" and "the means," as "dogma" and "theory," and many, many other ideas.

And this is excellent, and there is only one circumstance, one question, that darkens this re-evaluation: where, indeed, was that truth when yesterday was today? Where was that very obvious, very necessary, very indisputable truth? Why, at that time, did it not stand up for the innocent or expose the guilty?

Instead of an answer to this question, one begins to dream: after one more generation, the truth will acquire its true and lawful place everywhere that, up to now, for

some reason, it has not existed—in absolutely all relations among people: personal, social, state, international, everything! Even in politics, in which the lies and the truth allegedly, in and of themselves, have always striven to exchange places, so that the impression remains that truth exists specifically for the sake of their interchangeability. It may be that mankind in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, united by the dramatic task of common survival, will truly find new paths to the truth, and will find them not even because it suddenly will become more intelligent and better, but because the circumstances will force this. But in order for this to happen, it is necessary to prepare the truth for this, to prevent it from remaining inactive, and to practice daily using any material that is accessible for this purpose. If this is historical material, if in modern-day life we are still not sufficiently able to differentiate clearly between what is good and what is bad, then in order to acquire an effective capability for this, we must do that which we know how to do right now, today: we must consider our history impartially and truthfully, answering the question of how we have come to this kind of life.

This article, then, is the latest in a series of attempts of this kind. The attempt, in and of itself, of course, is not irreproachable, and the editorial office does not agree with the author in all respects, but the crux of the matter does not lie here. It lies in the fact that such attempts definitely must be free both of editorial diktat and coercion, but also of any other kind.

Approximately three years ago the word "truth" became practically the most important one in our vocabulary. It is easy to guess why that word moved into first place, because it proved to be a symbol and slogan of changes: it was that reason, and only for that reason, that we, for the most part, lied (or were lied to).

But here is something interesting. During the time that passed after perestroika was announced, we said so much about our shameful past and our sad present that it would seem that there is nowhere farther to go. But the word "truth" continues to appear on the newspaper pages and to be broadcast over the air, and it remains a slogan for purification and renovation. And, as everyone knows, slogans express people's striving not for what they already have in abundance, but for what they are lacking. If I am satiated, I will not ask for bread; if I am convinced that I will not be deceived, the idea will never even come into my head to appeal to all those around me to be truthful.

Sometimes it seems that the final victory is quite close at hand, that all one has to do is to strain a little harder, press down a little more, and the last bastions of lies, which frequently are called "zones that are closed to criticism," will finally fall and the high ideal of truth will become the most ordinary reality. Unfortunately, this is not so. Lies cannot be driven out as one would drive an

enemy off the territory that he has occupied, because lies, unlike an enemy army, has the ability to grow even on the territory that apparently has already been won. Not even the liberation movement that is called perestroyka has yet become an exception to this rule. Of course, we are only learning, and students do make mistakes. But if we do not recognize or analyze them, what will we learn?

The haze of mystery around the "Yeltsin case," the disinformation—especially at first—about the events in and around Nagornyy Karabakh, the election of delegates to the All-Union Party Conference, the discontinuation of the discussion that was beginning to take place with regard to the privileges granted to the leading workers, under the guise that no such privileges have ever existed or exist now, the unmonitored use of the nation's funds and natural resources by the departments—all these things could not fail to embarrass people, and whereas at first there was a temptation to explain the new untruth by intrigues carried out by the rightist, conservative forces, it was soon ascertained that the rightists conceal the motives for their actions not only when they are threatening the leftists, but also when they themselves are leaving the scene.

It is difficult—oh, so difficult!—to learn the truth! I am writing these lines in late October. The press is discussing the draft version of the new Law governing the election of people's deputies, and many people are perplexed as to why these social organizations are receiving the right to special representation, and why those organizations include the party (according to the constitution, it is not a social organization), whereas others, including some that are very large in number of members, are not included. People are beginning to wonder why the democratization of the political system has been accompanied by measures which, even by a person with the most highly developed imagination, would be difficult to call democratic. And, having begun to wonder, people come to the conclusion that the crux of the matter is by no means that the leftists are hurrying, and the rightists are inhibiting, but in the serious ailment of the entire social organization, an ailment that is much more serious than appeared quite recently. It is as though we are only beginning to become aware of what a profound and difficult spiritual renovation we will have to experience.

But any ailment has its sources and it is precisely now, at a time of strained thoughts about our common fate, that it would not be a bad idea once again to leaf through the history of the disease and to dwell on certain pages of that history which have not yet attracted the attention that they deserve.

The Argument About the Freedom of Conscience in the VKP(b)

I want to stipulate immediately that I have no intention of supplementing the ranks of the moralists or of writing yet another sermon on the topic of the need, in political

activity, to operate in conformity with the principles of that which is good and with the commands of one's conscience. Long before Machiavelli it was known that truthfulness and genuineness are not the most reliable path to political success, that is, to the winning and consolidating of power. I would like even less to be understood in the sense that is a customary one for us, that lies are organic for any politics except our own, that "under socialism," in accordance with the nature of things, there must be no such thing, and if it does exist, then this is only a random and awkward deviation from what is the only thing that is supposed to exist. The thing that upsets me is not that our politicians have not always told the truth to each other or to the nation. I would like to know why those awkward randomesses under our conditions led to a catastrophe to which the political deception did not lead even where no one considered it to be reprehensible. I would like to know, on the other hand, why it was precisely those politics—that proclaimed themselves to be the servant of the truth and that discarded as historic trash the "bourgeois lies"—that ended up as such cynicism, separated by such a gap from the elementary ideas of good and evil, that the civilized world had never previously seen.

What might be the most important lesson that we have learned from our experience is that political lies lead to catastrophe wherever a certain organization or group of persons possesses the absolute monopoly on power and information, wherever there is no one to expose as being deceptive, or, to put it more simply, wherever there is no democracy. Even the most unselfish deception in an undemocratic environment, inevitably and irreversibly, become a tool for someone's selfishness. Here the lies do not save, even if they are "for salvation." Here they inevitably select and elevate those who lie the most. Read and study the history of the disease that we share in common and you will find thousands of confirmations of these terrible truths that have been written in blood.

If it possible, for example, that Zinov'yev and Kamenev, after Lenin's death, entered an alliance with Stalin to conceal Lenin's "Will and Testament" for reasons that seemed to them to be somewhat like a lie "for salvation." Having a certain idea about the spiritual makeup of their ally, they could not fail to understand that what had been said about him in the "Will and Testament" was not completely without substance. But they had studied world history and they knew that revolutions usually end by military coups, and they feared—much more than the Stalin who was unknown to the country—Trotskiy, whose strength derived from his tremendous personal popularity and the army that he headed.

They made a miscalculation. Trotskiy, with his idea of permanent world revolution—an idea that was not very suitable for achieving the national consolidation of a tired nation—and with his mockery of the "building of socialism in one country," was least likely to fit the role of dictator or could scarcely perceive himself as being a candidate for that role, and therefore he did not take a

single serious step to seize the power (as I imagine it, he preferred to remain the second person, while considering himself to be, and letting everyone know that he was, actually the first). But the intensification of the Stalinist party apparatus, which Zinov'yev and Kamenev deliberately undertook because of the lack of any other force capable of opposing the army, ended not only in the desired "defeat of Trotskyism," but also in the completely undesired and unexpected political failure of Zinov'yev and Kamenev themselves.

When Kamenev, after only two years, or even less, demanded the execution of the last wish of the deceased leader to remove Stalin from the position of General Secretary, it would already be too late: the tardy truth, as always, looked suspicious, and the unification of Stalin's former allies with the Trotsky who had been branded by them a thousand times could not help but seem to be blatant and, obviously not unselfish, lack of principles.

Lies does not save them—they destroyed them. The only person who came out the winner was the one who lied the most.

Probably even Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin thought that something would save him when, after the 14th party congress very early in 1926, he was among a group of leading workers who were sent to Leningrad to complete the defeat of the Zinov'yevites, he dropped the half-affirmative and half-interrogative phrase at the plenum of the guberniya committee, "What will it cost you for the Central Committee to declare that white is black and black is white?" But in this way the all-union elder reconciled himself and others with the idea that the just cause of the Central Committee could not triumph other than with the aid of deception. And that means that Mikhail Ivanovich's consciousness was affected by an even stronger and completely incurable idea that the Central Committee personified, by its decisions and decrees, a higher truth that can be distinguished from the ordinary truth that is accessible to ordinary mortals in approximately the same way that white is distinguishable from black.

The present-day reader can imagine what all this led to. I would like to add just one line to the picture that is already very familiar to him. Once a no longer young woman stood up in the auditorium where I was speaking and she mentioned her father—a poor peasant who had been a conscientious and ardent servant in the Administrative System, and who had believed fervently in the rightness of the cause espoused by that System. When he was arrested, he said, "If the party feels that I am an enemy of the people, then that means that I really am an enemy of the people." And he left for parts unknown with lack of faith in himself and with unshakable faith in the rightness of the party and its Central Committee.

His timely disease helped Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin to survive. But for the spiritual health of the country in the administration of which he had been a participant, that

disease proved to be practically lethal. The lies "for salvation" not only cleared the path to power for the person who lied the most. They also led to a situation in which the person who lied the most would become, in the eyes of millions, the personification of the highest truth.

It is not precluded that even Red procurator Krylenko, speaking in the name of the prosecution at the fabricated trials in the early 1930's, was convinced that in order to benefit the country and the revolution it was very important to frighten the "spetses" [specialists] and the other intellectuals who had come into, or at one time had associated themselves closely with, political parties that were hostile to Bolshevism. I assume that the state prosecutor did not doubt for even a minute that the nonexistent crimes committed by parties that never existed—the Producers' Party and the Menshevik "Union Bureau"—would help to reconcile the other intelligentsia with the proletarian rates of industrialization that were beyond its professional comprehension and to mobilize the nation for that industrialization, and would become a simple and generally understandable explanation of its failures, which would not weaken people, giving rise to distrust in their own strengths and in the wisdom of the authority, but, on the contrary, would consolidate them in a mighty upsurge of labor to repel absolutely all enemies. If Krylenko thought like that, then he, together with his inspirers and fellow-thinkers, set in motion an infernal machine that, as soon became apparent, was impossible to stop.

At one time Dostoyevskiy, through the words of Ivan Karamazov, asked whether it is possible to buy the right to enter the future kingdom of universal harmony at the price of the ruined life of even a single innocent baby. Many people of the prewar era (and it was not always the worst people among them) answered that yes, it is possible. Not only mentally, but also by their fates, they attempted to experience the path that had so frightened Ivan, not to mention his brother Alesha, who had been asked that difficult question. But that "yes" cast them into a chasm which neither Ivan Karamazov nor Alesha Karamazov probably could not even imagine themselves and the fear of falling into which is now only beginning to open itself up to our view: all this is still awaiting its own Dostoyevskiy.

Having once agreed that, in order to benefit the cause, it is desirable to sentence even one innocent person, having crossed that line, we immediately enter a camp zone of death, where there are no legal or moral prohibitions, there are no people who are right or who are guilty, but only people who are serving out their punishment or are candidates for that role. Wherever it is deemed to be justified to carry out even one human sacrifice, there are no obstacles for a second one, or a third, or a hundred-thousandth, or a two-millionth: the killing machine that has been turned on cannot be stopped. Today you sign the death sentence, and tomorrow it is carried out on you, as it was carried out at one time on the very same Krylenko. And there is no apparent logic in this choice of

victims. And there is nothing that could defend you—not conviction, not your position, not your rank, your merits, your influential relatives, disease, or old age. And it was absurd to complain about the injustice or attempt to prove your innocence to anyone—all those were things from another world, and here they look like prejudices, here there are only two ways out: either confess that you were born to be a spy and saboteur, or depart from life yourself.

But this same thing applies to lies in a broader sense: when there is limited democracy, or especially when the democracy is curtailed, when the only thing that can be proclaimed as the truth is the one and only "general line," all that is needed is to begin, and then there will be a chain reaction of spiritual disintegration that no one will have any power over. This appears to be obvious, but not everyone is aware of this. Let us open Anatoliy Rybakov's famous novel "Deti Arbat" [Children of the Arbat]. It contains an interesting episode. Stalin has decided to rewrite the party history, making himself history's and the party's central figure, on a scale and with merits equal to those of Lenin. Obviously, in order to do this it was necessary to have authoritative witnesses and proof. The General Secretary suggests to Kirov that he confirm that Stalin had participated in creating an underground print shop in Baku. Kirov refuses, since he himself had not been in Baku at that time, but he knows from others that Stalin did not have anything to do with the print shop. After that Sergey Mironovich, at the will of the author, allows himself to think unhappy thoughts about how badly everything has been turning out. Yes, the party consciously raised the authority of its General Secretary. Yes, it had put his name alongside of Lenin's name—as a student and continuuer. It was necessary to demonstrate to the nation the succession of leadership. Otherwise it would not be possible to destroy the oppositions that had arisen one after the other. But now, when they had all been destroyed, the lies not only did not go out of life together with them, but, on the contrary, kept spreading and penetrating more and more deeply. Where did all that come from, and why? And who was guilty?

Kirov (and the author) does not find an answer, since he is seeking it where it cannot exist: in Stalin's personality. Possibly the author is right and at that time Kirov and any other person in his place could not think differently. But today the answer must be different. Entering into a dialogue with Sergey Mironovich and knowing everything that happened afterwards, we must tell him and ourselves that when there is a party-state monopoly on information, when there is no one to blame for an untruth, there is no intelligent limit that can be put on lies, and there can be none.

In this circumstance it is impossible to deceive "slightly" one and a half million people, to dissemble "slightly," and then to begin to play an honest game. No, this "slightly" will have time to become part of life, to sink its roots deeply into it, and people will have time to believe

it. And in order to change anything, you will have to make a public announcement that previously you had lied "slightly." But how will you prove that you are not lying again? And are we really supposed to believe that the people who, thanks to you, managed to rise to the top, will not be concerned that, as they deflect the blow from themselves, they might compromise you completely? Those who doubt this can be reminded once again about the situation with a sad outcome that Zinovyev and Kamenev were the first to bring about for themselves.

Under a totalitarian, undemocratic regime, even one drop of a lie is a very large amount. We ourselves know now how rapidly that drop becomes a sea, at the bottom of which the greatest victories prove to be sunk. We know how simple silence or what might seem to be a slight exaggeration can give rise to lies in denunciations, accusations, and admissions, lies concerning the past, present, and future, and lies about what is occurring on either side of the border.

The thing that I would like least of all is for my words to be perceived as an indictment of the old party guard. At the present time it would seem that indictments of this kind are becoming fashionable. People say that if Kamenev and Zinovyev had been persons of a different political and moral caliber, they would not have taken the step of deceiving the party or making a deal with such a person as Stalin. If the almost 300 delegates to the 17th party congress who voted against Stalin had not been faint-hearted persons, they would not only have crossed his name out of the list during the secret ballot, but would also have said what they thought, openly, rather than engaging on the rostrum in shameful eulogizing and demeaning self-abasement. And then everything allegedly would have been very, very different. I am not convinced that this quick court is the most just one. If we begin to search for the roots of the total lie only in the fact that, somewhere, someone or something had frightened Kamenev, Bukharin, or Kirov, then we take the risk of deceiving ourselves and others once again. Read! Read the history of our disease, and you will get rid of the temptation of easy answers and quick sentences! For a long time, for example, I have been given no rest by certain mysterious pages.

It is astonishing that all the anti-Stalinist oppositions (the Trotskyite opposition, the "new" Zinovyev-Kamenev opposition, the united Trotsky-Zinovyev opposition, the Bukharin opposition), despite the substantial differences in their economic and social programs, were unanimous in demanding intraparty democracy and in protesting against the omnipotence of the Stalinist party apparatus. And all of them were beaten: not only the the apparatus members, but also the rank-and-file party members, refused to rise under that banner. And something that is even more astonishing is that all the members of the opposition and all the deviationists did not become "democrats" until they proved to be in the

opposition. Having become part of the governing majority in the Politburo and the Central Committee, Zinov'yev and Kamenev threaten the champion of intra-party democracy, Trotskiy, but after becoming an opposition minority they come crashing down on the apparatus members, repeating word for word what they quite recently had branded as sedition. And, seeing all this and ridiculing lavishly the "well-principled attitude" of the members of the opposition, Bukharin and Rykov after a year or two repeat for themselves, with microscopic precision, that which they had laughed at and that had made them so indignant.

I suspect that at this place you are beginning to feel once again a sense of complete clarity and the desire, as quickly as possible, to give the final sentence. I also would like to pronounce some kind of word that sums up and explains everything. For example, "politicianism." Or maybe something a bit stronger. But let's be patient. Let us not be too hasty. We might recall that "politicians" are made, not born. There was a time when that same Bukharin could allow himself not to change his attitude toward intraparty democracy depending on whether he was a member of the Central Committee majority or its minority. But when, and why, was the spiritual organism of those persons struck and destroyed? When, and why, did there begin a completely unstoppable sliding over the smooth inclined plane of lies into the chasm on the bottom of which the grinning Koba [Stalin's party alias] had been patiently awaiting his victims for a long time? It is important to understand this, because we are talking about our own history, about our own disease, not someone else's. And therefore let us examine even more attentively its course during the period when it was only beginning, and all its strange manifestations. Let us attempt, but using the advantage of descendants, to discover its latent symptoms that are not yet felt by the patients.

The people who were part of the guiding nucleus of the Bolshevik Party were distinguished by a rare strength of their convictions. They were proud to be called rock-hard. So those people came to power—and after a few years they began demanding from one another something that was completely inconceivable, something that threw them back spiritually to the times of Galileo and that anticipated Stalinism long before it was affirmed: they began to demand the **renunciation of views**.

Anyone who, at any time, has ever had any convictions at all knows that this is absurd, since they do not arise and they do not change on the basis of someone else's order. Even in the event that you have to carry out an order not immediately and not in prison, but in the cosy solitary cell of a political prisoner, where you have the time and opportunity to think things over and to seek the advice of the classic authors of Marxism-Leninism, whose works are at your complete disposal. The intellectual leaders of the Bolsheviks could not fail to understand this. Nevertheless this is what happened in 1927 at the 15th party congress, where an additional beating was

administered to the Trotskiy and Zinov'yev who had already been expelled from the party and therefore were not present in the auditorium, and also to Kamenev, who was present there, and their fellow-thinkers:

"Stalin. We have one condition: the opposition must be completely and entirely disarmed both ideologically and organizationally. (Shouts: 'That's right!' Prolonged applause.) The opposition must renounce its anti-Bolshevik views openly and honestly, before the entire world. (Shouts: 'That's right!' Prolonged applause.) It must stigmatize the errors that it has committed, errors that developed into a crime against the party, and it must do so openly and honestly, before the entire world... They must either do this, or must leave the party. And if they won't leave, we'll throw them out. (Shouts: 'That's right!' Prolonged applause.)

"Yevdokimov (representative of the opposition). The broadest masses of the workers—99 persons out of 100—want first of all for the unity of our party to be preserved. (Loud noise. Voices: 'We don't need you!' Voice: 'We've got that unity and we're going to keep it!') But in addition to that the workers, of course, want a situation in which, within the party, both the majority and the minority are allowed to speak. (Loud noise. Voice: 'That's a Menshevik minority!') Are you telling me that this is an untruth? No, it's the truth. (Noise, voices: 'It's a lie!' Voice: 'We won't allow Menshevik freedom of speech!') The workers want to listen not only to one side, but to both sides. (Voice: 'Other than the party, they cannot be any other sides!') Ninety-nine people out of a hundred want this. (Noise. Voice: 'Is this supposed to be a Leninist view?') ... Yes, yes, we should not make demands that the working class will never be able to consider just. We must not make demands to reject ourselves, to renounce our views. (Laughter, noise... Voice: 'Just remember what you said from this rostrum about Trotskiy a couple of years ago!' Voice: 'Renegade!')

"Kirov. Yevdokimov keeps saying, by inertia: We're in favor of unity... It is of course possible, comrades, to play on many emotions, but nevertheless in our party we have things that it is admissible for anyone to malign... I am speaking about the unity of the party... All accusations of our party, all the basic paragraphs of our well-principled keynote differences of opinion... they leave all these things unshaken, they leave them so that, at the first convenient situation, they can extend again and again their opposition platform, so that, again and again, they can create heat against the party, can shake it up again... So that we can continue our job successfully, without any hindrance... it is necessary to chop off the opposition in the most decisive, the firmest, the most merciless manner. (Applause.)

"Kamenev. Comrades, our party has never made the demand to renounce one's views. If, on our part, we were to renounce the views that we defended a week or two weeks ago, that would be hypocrisy. You would not believe us... That would introduce rot into the very essence of the matter...

"Rykov. The basic factor in Comrade Kamenev's statement is his assertion that the demand to renounce one's views has never been made in our party... That is untrue. In order to refute this assertion by Comrade Kamenev, I would like to recall the resolution of the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party on the question 'Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our party'... In paragraph 6 of this resolution, after the enumeration of the erroneous views and an analysis of the ideas of the 'working opposition,' it states: 'On the basis of all of this, the RKP [Russian Communist Party], decisively rejecting these ideas...', decrees that:

"1) it is to be deemed necessary to wage a steady and systematic struggle against these ideas";

"2) the propagandizing of these ideas is to be deemed incompatible with a person's belonging to the RKP(b)."

"Kamenev is not a young member of our party, but nevertheless, speaking here with regard to the question of the 'freedom of conscience' in the VKP(b), he forgot one small detail—the decree of the 10th Congress, which was enacted with his active participation.

"Stalin. Kamenev assures us that it is impossible to require members of the opposition to reject certain of their views... But let us assume for a moment that Comrade Kamenev is correct. What happens then?... Among the party there has formed a definite conviction that the opposition must reject its anti-Leninist views, that otherwise it will be forced to fly out of the party. If it is impossible to require the opposition to reject its convictions, then why is it possible to require the party to reject its views and convictions with regard to the opposition?.. Comrade Kamenev assures us that the members of the opposition are brave individuals who are defending their convictions to the end... I... have little faith in the bravery, for example of Zinovyev or Kamenev (laughter), who yesterday chased after Trotsky, but who today are slobbering all over him. (Voice: 'They've got used to playing leap-frog!') But let us assume for a moment that the leaders of our opposition still retain a certain share of bravery and well-principled restraint. What justification exists for assuming that the party has less bravery or well-principled restraint than, say, Zinovyev, Kamenev, or Trotsky? What justification is there for assuming that it will be easier for the party to reject its convictions with respect to the opposition, with respect the incompatibility of its Menshevik views with the party's ideology and program than for the leaders of the opposition who are constantly changing their views the way they change gloves? (Laughter.)"

You read all this and you cannot get rid of the sense that the argument is taking place between people belonging to two different cultures and therefore the words spoken by some of them are not entering the consciousness of the others, but are being pushed out of it, are being heard, but not perceived, as though they are sounds in an unfamiliar language. That which seems to some to be an

absurdity is the norm for others. But the most frightening thing in all this is that we are dealing with people of just one culture, rather than of different cultures. The most frightening thing is that today they can consider something to be an absurdity, and tomorrow the norm. Or vice versa.

For the first time the idea that Kamenev justifiably considered to be fraught with hypocrisy was publicly announced in 1924 at the 13th party congress. This had never occurred while Lenin was alive—Rykov to no avail cited the well-known resolution, and it mentioned something else, or, rather, not exactly this. Banning the propagandizing of views and demanding the public renunciation of them are, so to speak, two big differences. It is one thing to remain silent, knowing (or thinking) that you are right, and it is another think, knowing (or thinking) that you are right, to declare to the entire world that you are wrong. No, the open sermon calling for hypocrisy was given for the first time not in 1921, but in 1924, and it was pronounced by no else than Kamenev's closest associate and fellow-thinker, Grigoriy Zinovyev, and then it did not seem either dubious or false to either of them. At that time the Zinov'yevites were still traveling in the same harness with Stalin against Trotsky, whose game was already lost, and it was then, in order to consolidate the victory, that Zinovyev suggested to him that he take the rostrum and admit that he, Trotsky, had made a mistake and that the party, in the argument with him, had proved to be correct. But Zinovyev knew, and he knew perfectly, that his opponent would keep his previous views!

Yes, the changeover from one culture to another was an ordinary matter. The foreign language rapidly became one's native language and then was quickly forgotten. Just one thing remained constant and unshakable: the dependence of one's thoughts and actions on whether one belonged to the majority or the minority. It was here, at this point, that a very deep cultural chasm was formed, and if one and the same people could change so strikingly and find themselves in the other camp, then that was a symptom of the spiritual break with civilization, a break that was fraught with catastrophe and with return to barbarism. This is self-exclusion from conclusion, because there is no culture and there can be no culture where there is no stability of tradition or of individual convictions.

Only one person attempted—and he did so only once—to throw a bridge over the chasm. Only one time in the camp of the majority did one hear a quiet appeal to stop, to refrain from crossing the line that separates intelligence from madness. That was at the same 13th congress, where Krupskaya spoke against Zinovyev. She said that "psychologically this (rejection of convictions) is impossible," and therefore "it is sufficient to have the opposition declare its desire to work jointly..." But that voice, that warning, was not heard. Zinovyev immediately objected: the admission of errors would assuage the congress and the entire party. Everyone would believe

that the Trotskiyites had finally stopped, they had "ceased causing a commotion." But the feeling was that there was no conviction, that the tension was preserved, and that, of course, it was not to the benefit of the matter at hand.

This was the first open appeal to lies "for salvation" (to save the party and its cause) after Lenin's "Will and Testament" was concealed and it was reconciled to its own conscience and that conscience had withstood. That was the root of the hypocrisy and lackey attitude of the subsequent decades.

I think that the voice of Nadezhda Konstantinovna could not be heard at that time. But not because the old party guard had got dirtied in politicianism, allegedly forgetting the principles concerning "in whose name." And not because each of the persons who were included in it allegedly thought out about personal power and its advantages. Nor because they were all not cut from the same cloth, as people sometimes say today, putting them in the same category as Stalin. I am convinced that practically all of them remained servants and zealots of the idea and, with regard to their own spiritual and moral development, belonged to a different category of people than Stalin did. For him, the source of lies was located within. For such figures of that era as Kamenev, Bukharin, or Rykov, the lies were worked out or constantly fed by the falsity or ambiguity of the situation in which, after the end of the civil war, the old party guard found itself.

The falsity and ambiguity lay in the fact that the majority, whoever it included, was doomed to curtail the intraparty democracy and to encroach upon the minority. That was noted even while Lenin was alive. The party considered itself to be a democratic organization, and democratism is the guarantee of the minority's right to criticize and to express its views freely, but that guarantee, it became apparent, could not be supported. It was discovered that democracy in a mass party without democracy in society comes up against insurmountable obstacles. It was discovered that the nonhomogeneous and conflicting interests and moods of various social segments, failing to receive any political expression, find a response in the organization that is in power, including among its leadership. It was discovered, finally, that when there are any serious differences of opinion in leadership, the party is incapable of existing or governing: at the top the crack immediately began to creep downward, and there, with the lack of democratic culture, everything instantaneously came crashing down and found itself beset by insoluble problems, the blame for which, as always happens when democracy has not been inculcated, was put on the "leadership," on the leaders who cannot come to an understanding and establish order. It is obvious that that struck at the authority of the governing segment, on which authority at that time, to use Lenin's words, everything held fast.

Democracy and party unity are two ideas, two fundamental principles, which life pushed together in the sharpest struggle. The resolution of the 10th congress that Rykov quoted to Kamenev was an attempt to mollify the combatant sides, appealing to one of them to come to order. It openly gave the preference to unity, while substantially limiting democracy.

But the conflict between the two principles was not eliminated for the simple reason that it could not be eliminated. It kept making itself known both at the Politburo and the Central Committee, and manifested itself in the aggravation of the personal relations with regard to the slightest differences of opinion, and there probably was not a question that troubled Lenin more than this one, and it was with an ulterior motive that he noted in his "Will and Testament" the expansion of the Central Committee makeup at the expense of the workers, and what motivated him, I think, was not the idea of democracy, as many people think today, but the idea of unity, the thought of preventing a split among the leaders with the aid of people who place unity higher than democracy, rather than vice versa.

After Lenin's death, the conflict between the two principles developed rapidly into a war of annihilation. No one could yet see that. Everyone was hoping to combine them, but democracy was already being understood in a dissimilar way. For some, democracy lay in the unconditional subordination of the minority to the majority (is it possible to do anything together if different things are done, and in different ways?); for others it lay in the minority's right to express its position freely (how can you subordinate yourself and defend to people something with which you do not agree?). But wherever people cannot come to a peaceful understanding, force becomes the decisive factor. And force, as one can easily guess, while formal democratic procedures are preserved in the party, is always on the side of the majority. And on that day and at that hour when Zinov'yev called upon Trotskiy to renounce his convictions, the meaning of the word "subordination" (of the minority to the majority) began to change, coming sharply similar to the content of the word "pressure."

But it would seem that, even at the 15th Congress, that is, three years later (reread the excerpts from the stenographic record that I have quoted), the people who were demanding the "renunciation" do not yet understand what is happening to them, what border they have crossed over. And it is only Stalin, apparently, who looks farther ahead and sees more, realizing that the struggle is finally shifting onto a territory where there are no moral limitations, where he, Stalin, is therefore invincible, where no rivals can frighten him. In an atmosphere of universal hypocrisy, they had to be suffocated. He could only dream of this. Was Stalin supposed to fear hypocrisy if he already considered everyone to be hypocrites?

He came to his senses. Those who went along with him lost theirs.

I understand that this is conjecture. But I know much of what happened later. Therefore I see Stalin and his adherents at that congress the way I see them, and I read into their speeches what I read into them.

In the ambiguous situation in which, without noticing this, Rykov, Kirov, and their fellow-thinkers proved to be, they were all identically serious in their demands, they were all troubled by the fate of the party, and they were all convinced that it was only in this way, only by insisting on "renunciation," that it would be possible to prevent a split in the party and its disintegration, and to prevent the struggle that had already flared up in the low-level cells. But in this seriousness, as in any other monotonous and one-toned seriousness, one senses an inner constraint. And it is only Stalin who looks absolutely free in the kingdom of ambiguity. Here he is the king. He is both within the situation and above it, and he can allow himself the sly, almost amiable Mephistophelean casuistry (see stenographic record) in which one discerns ridicule not only of vanquished opponents, but also of short-sighted fellow-comrades. They do not yet suspect that, together with Stalin, they have legalized the majority's right to suppress any intraparty heterodoxy, including their own. And they especially do not know that wherever obvious heterodoxy is declared to be dangerous and inadmissible, it is also possible to declare concealed heterodoxy to be such, and since the special [intelligence] services do not yet know how to read what is in people's hearts, any thought or even the lack of any thought can become heterodoxy.

If an organization that has the monopoly on power allows the suppression of the minority, then it opens the way to personal dictatorship, in the face of which it proves to be unarmed. The suppression of the minority is the beginning of the end for democracy. The end of democracy is the beginning of tyranny.

The vote against Stalin seven years later, at the 17th Congress, is already the death pangs of the dying intraparty democracy. It was an awkward transition of that democracy into something quite different, into a kind of secret plot against the regime that had killed it, and was an especially pitiful plot in that the hope was placed on a means that was so hopeless and so unsuitable for an antidictatorial plot as the election ballot. Stalin popularly explained to plotters the power of a lie that had finally been victorious—he ordered the falsification of the voting results. But, as we recall with a painful sense that last desperate attempt to bring down from the party Olympus the already unattainable terrifying creation of their own hands, let us refrain from any awkward accusations against anyone for not taking the rostrum or making a denunciatory speech. I do not think that the "congress of victors" would have listened to him, or that he would have been allowed to speak at all. But even if he had spoken, they would not have heard him, just as, for a long time, no one in the party had heard anyone who proved to be in the minority. But at the 17th Congress

Stalin's opponents could not be in the majority: those 292 persons who decided to come out against him secretly did not constitute even one-seventh of the delegates.

Intraparty democracy died, and the dictatorship was confirmed. But there were still people with a democratic conscience, who were capable of having independent convictions, and who preserved their inner resistance to lackeyism. There is no need to be especially perspicacious to guess that the people of that way of thinking had indeed voted against Stalin. I think that the striving to make oneself secure against the only remaining democratic procedure (the secret vote during elections to the Central Committee) played certainly not the last role in Stalin decision to organize monstrous mass carnage. Kamenev, who had warned about the hypocrisy that would grow from the enforced denunciation of convictions, could not, however, assume that that hypocrisy would be declared to be the chief enemy or that the process of eliminating it by means of red-hot iron would be begun. How short the road turned out to be—the road from the lie that had provoked hypocrisy to the lie that declared that everyone that you wanted was a hypocrite!

It was not possible to find any "democrats," since all of them had long since been forced to remain silent. Therefore the hunt was announced—the hunt for "hypocrites" and "double-dealers," who hid behind the mask of friends the bestial grin of an enemy. The zone of legal blame became unlimited—the slaughter extended not to the opponents of the regime, but to an entire human generation that included everyone who could have been suspected of not having a predisposition to lackeyism and of having even the slightest hint of individuality.

Mass repressions were the completely natural result of the Stalin dictatorship. Stalin's dictatorship was the completely natural result of the victory achieved by the principle of unity over the principle of democracy. The victory of the principle of unity was the completely natural result of the ailment that affected people's consciousness, an ailment which, one fine day, begins to interpret the democratic subordination of the minority to the majority as the majority's right to suppress the minority. In order to use that right to establish a personal dictatorship, not too many things are needed: the desire, the will, and... membership in the majority.

It would seem that Stalin was well aware of this. He was the only person who had been part of the Lenin Politburo who, after Lenin's death, never remained in the minority. He did not enter into open struggle until he had consolidated a majority in the party's highest agencies, but, having achieved that, he no longer waited for his opponents to become organized. Instead, he nudged them, and at times simply provoked the maturation of oppositions and deviations in order to defeat them more rapidly.

Stalin took the step toward dictatorship by posing as the most convinced and most consistent democrat. Therefore he always won. Therefore he received support in the party regardless of what program he proposed. He was able to change his view even more often than his rivals could. He could lie and make contradictory statements as much as he wanted, but he did so in an offhand manner, because a rank-and-file or even a medium-level party member could not keep track of the content of the political struggle, and the rules of arithmetic led him to the thought that the only person who could be in the minority was a Menshevik (once again I am quoting from excerpts taken from the stenographic record of the 15th Congress).

Of course, Stalin had working for him a gigantic party apparatus that was in skillful control of the mechanism of intraparty democracy. But it is not just a matter of this. I spoke to old party members who, during the 1920's, had consciously supported Stalin and then had spent time in Stalinist camps. It was important for me to understand why they had preferred specifically him to authoritarian, popular leaders, even to such a "party darling" as Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin. And the answer I got was: it was not because he was the General Secretary, and it was not because people loved him so much (because they didn't), but because he was always in the majority, belonging to which was considered to be a symbol of rightness and a completely sufficient basis for speaking in the name of the party.

I hope that the reader has formed for himself both an idea of the role played by lies in the undemocratically-minded society, and an idea of why those lies, sooner or later, become practically total ones. And this means that democracy itself (the word is too popular to be crossed out of the dictionaries) inevitably turns into a lie. As one would expect when there is total deception, democracy can also be proclaimed to be not a victim, but the victor: after being emasculated and adapted for the purpose of graphically demonstrating "indestructible unity," it is declared to be "democracy of the highest type."

Today we have apparently understood a few things, and it is no longer so simple to lead us around. But it would seem that we have not yet become aware that the rehabilitation of the downcast principle of democracy (in the party and in society) restores its old conflict with the victorious principle of unity.

It only seems that intraparty democracy will not encounter any difficulties if there is no freedom to form factions (it was overthrown by a resolution of the 10th Congress) or to promote political platforms (it was eliminated in the mid-1920's). One recalls the recent arguments with Nina Andreyeva and those who inspired her: nothing was said about factions or platforms, just as nothing is being said today, and the differences of opinion among

the leaders were reduced to outwardly not very substantial divergences in understanding the "principles" and in evaluating the way of life yesterday and the day before yesterday, but what a commotion there was, what passions boiled up!

Yes, even a hint of intraparty democracy is sufficient to discern once again: it is not really so simple to deal with it wherever there is just one party, and that party is also the only one that governs. I cannot forget who people with completely liberal views called upon the leaders for "unity." But I would like to know on what basis they could unite. On a basis of perestroika? But what if they understood perestroika itself not in a completely similar way? But the most important thing is: can the leaders' "monolithic unity" be combined—and if so, for how long—with the democratic high water among subordinates? It is necessary to be completely aware of the fact that, throughout the postrevolutionary history, we did not have pluralism at the lower stages of the party without pluralism at the upper stages. And there, at the top, even during the lifetime of Lenin, with his tremendous authority, pluralism (democracy) did not get along too well with unity. And currently it gets along only so long as democracy, with respect to unity, is in the position of a domestic servant who has been hired to sweep out the trash. But when she raises her head and allows herself to talk about the master and mistress of the house, and how they are running the household, she is told to stand in the corner.

The "Yeltsin case" is the first major victory (but not the last) after the beginning of perestroika, a victory of the principle of unity over the principle of democracy. And the dense smoke screen of untruth around that case is a painfully familiar manifestation of their old and still unresolved conflict.

The second victory was the procedure and results of the election to the 19th Party Conference.

The third was the opening up of the question of privileges, that is, the question of the material foundation of the "unity" that was laid at one time by such an expert in consolidating the party ranks as Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin.

I have no intention of writing out yet another hasty prescription that could help us, once and for all, to cure us of lies. My task is more modest. It is to reveal, as I view it, the sources of the disease, its vital—or, to use scientific language, systemic—roots. This, obviously, is not yet a cure. But this perhaps will help to imbue in some people a salutary distrust of political quackery that promises an instantaneous cure by means of the magic word "democratization" and that evokes, after a short-term euphoria, lethal anguish.

Slipping into lies is inevitable if its systemic source is in action. And it is. So it is better to admit that this is so, than to conceal it from ourselves or others. This, of

course, will give us additional doubts, of which we already have plenty, but it will also get rid of the illusions of which there probably are fewer, but which cause much more harm.

Brief Digression Concerning the Division of Labor Between the Two Apparatuses

People talk not only of democracy in the party and society. They talk about how its relations with society, with other organizations, must become democratic. They say that it must be put under the supervision of the law, that it must be "brought" out of the economy, and that it is necessary for it to engage in its own business, without taking the place of the state and the economic agencies.

Everything seemed to be logical and sensible. But for some reason not a single ruling party in any of the socialist countries is hastening to impose upon itself the legal responsibility for its activity. For some reason they are all also avoiding any explanations on the topic of wherein their "guiding role" lies, if one attempts to express it in the language of concrete truths and duties, rather than in overall ideological declarations. Does this confuse you? It confuses me too. I assume that this might conceal a loophole for deceit. And without waiting for someone to rush into it, I shall begin to look for the systemic source of this future unrestrainable striving.

Or take this "does not replace the state" ... To this day there appear before our eyes the television images of the perplexed faces of certain delegates to the party conference of the majority of those with whom at that time they had to exchange opinions. How can it be that people were confused, since the party agencies have taken the place of everything and trample everything, and have come to an understanding that it is necessary to put an end to this, but what is proposed? It is proposed that their powers be expanded! They are to be given not only "telephone" power, but also legalized power in the soviets!

But only a few days passed and wise people began to come to their senses: how could we not have guessed immediately? And they began to ram heatedly into people near and far how all this had been remarkably invented. Finally, they said, a real method, rather a utopian one, had been found for democratizing both the party and society as a whole. Finally it would be possible to put party leaders under the supervision of the soviets, and, consequently, of all of us, since the persons elected to the soviets also include non-party members, and it is also for us to decide whom to elect. If our representatives (that is, once again we ourselves) do not want to have a party secretary as a soviet chairman, then he should not be a party secretary either!

I shall not argue: there is certainly logic in these judgments. But why does any guiding decision evoke in our a premonition of the latest in a series of miracles, rather

than a preliminary sensation of new problems? Let's have less jubilation and more sobriety. Let's have less cheerful optimism and more common sense and well thought-out, efficient forecasts. Let's have fewer fears that these forecasts might kill people's faith in perestroika, and more clarity in the question of what perestroika needs is not faith in it, but knowledge and the ability to think, and that otherwise it is absolutely no kind of perestroika and that, in the place of faith that has been deceived even once, there usually arises not thought, but emptiness.

But the danger of again being deceived (and deceiving) exists. Because, in addition to the logic that you and I have, there exists the logic of the Administrative System, which system has been replaced for the time being only in our imagination, and which logic will bring us surprises until we learn how to understand it.

Chronic lack of self-understanding is yet another noticeable manifestation of the disease that we have in common. And it may be that we have comprehended worst of all the meaning of what has been drilled into our heads best of all—I have in mind such ordinary and such customary, almost smoothly worn-out, words as "guiding role." It is surprising: so much has been said about bureaucratism, the omnipotence of the apparatus members, and the Administrative System in general, but up until now, so far as I can judge, the question has not been asked: why does that system have two organizations and two apparatuses—the state and the party? And why has one organization taken upon itself the guiding role, without explaining exactly what that means, and without burdening itself with any real responsibility for executing it, while the other organization has agreed not only to subordinate itself, but also to be responsible for certain things? Obviously for the simple reason that the rules of the game are in certain respects to its liking.

Administrative planning and administration arose and was confirmed under the flag of consciousness that opposes the anarchical "uncontrollable market situation." But very rapidly it became clear that this system—in which, thanks to the conscious purposefulness of actions, everything is supposed to be administratable and one-hundred percent predictable—is still less insured against uncontrollable situations and unpredictable consequences than any other. And that no bureaucracy—even if one recruits into it the entire adult population and arms it not only with the most advanced ideology, but also with the state-of-the-art computers (we imagine that they were purchased a half-century earlier)—is capable of taking into consideration the varied and continuously changing social and personal needs.

But if everyone has been convinced that economic life not only must, but also can, be regulated consciously, and as a result of the regulation things still turn out badly, then I would like to know what kind of conclusion you will make. You will probably say that everything was

very well thought-out, but the people doing the regulating, unfortunately, were insufficiently aware to carry out conscious regulation. Therefore each decision that failed to justify itself must be called bungling, for which someone must be strictly punished.

But even an official doing the regulation, you may be assured, is no more stupid than you or I. There is no power that could force him to place according to these rules. He would run off the administrative stage and become a janitor or even a beggar if he could not find a means of avoiding the making of well-principled decisions and of not being responsible for their consequences that are impossible to predict. He would run away in an instance if our reproachful accusations of "irresponsibility" threatened him with any serious unpleasantnesses.

Yes, but who will assume the burden of decisions? As one can easily guess, this requires other officials who are part of another apparatus, which differs from the state and economic agencies in that it has the right to make the most responsible decisions without bearing any legal responsibility for them, while the blame for their consequences can be heaped on the poor executors who have "become bureaucratized," "have become divorced from the nation," "have lagged behind life," or are capable, at the most inappropriate moment, to experience "dizziness from success."

Often a small detail, a small line, will throw light more clearly on the essence of a situation than the most convincing judgments. We might recall that a Communist who has been called to criminal responsibility is expelled from the party until the case comes to court. This appears to be strange and senseless; because it is only the court that can determine the extent to which a person is guilty or whether he is guilty at all. Nevertheless I myself know several instances when people were expelled from the party and then, during the course of the investigation, it was ascertained that there was no reason to censure them. Nonetheless, if you think carefully about it, for the Administrative System this awkwardness is even very logical. In the lack of coincidence between the law and the organization's rules there was an expression of the fact that fundamentally that organization was not subject to the law, it had legal privileges, and was under no one's supervision.

Life has shown us that the division of labor between the party agencies and the state agencies, although it does not guarantee complete calm to anyone, is completely to the liking of both sides, providing that minimum of mutual understanding and mutual assistance that is necessary for any joint work.

But now is the very time to recall what we have said about the conflict between the two principles, and to make an important conclusion. In the party, as it was formed during the Stalin era, the principle of democracy was trampled by the principle of unity, including and

because of the fact that that enabled the party apparatus to appropriate for itself a double monopoly right: to make decisions and not to be responsible for them to anyone other than themselves and their party leader. As we now know, the rehabilitation of repressed democracy while retaining the foundation of the Administrative System leads to all kinds of unplanned actions not only at the bottom, but also at the very top, which are perceived morbidly, are evaluated as an encroachment on unity, and even likeable and decent people are pushed onto the path of bureaucratic deception. But those are only the first and still very shy steps because, for the time being, only the word has been rehabilitated and no real rights, other than the right to have a voice, have been returned to the person who had been repressed! But what will occur if one deprives the party agencies of their main privilege, that is, if one puts them under the supervision of the public that forces them to be accountable for everything that they do and that they do not do? I think that they will never agree to this, and if we can find a power capable of forcing them, expressing in this way the democratic maturity of our entire society, then, it will also have to be concerned about finding new jobs for the apparatus workers—they will not want to wait for any unpleasantnesses, but will leave immediately "at their own request." But for the time being it would seem that nothing of this sort threatens them. Most likely they will be able to turn their old boat onto a new course. This is not really so complicated, because, for the time being, there is no law governing the party, and its powers or lack of powers have not been clearly delineated. I am not convinced that the combining of the positions of soviet chairman and first secretary of a party committee affects the previous division of labor between the state and party agencies. It may be that the center for decision-making will shift slightly in the direction of the former agencies, but that means that they will receive increased pressure on the part of the latter, the real responsibility of which not only will not increase, but will even decrease. But if it happens that a particular soviet will not elect a party secretary as its chairman, that will be an ordinary personal replacement that does not have, and cannot have, any fundamental importance. So long as the Administrative System exists and prospers, so long as the reforms and shifts occur within it, while leaving its foundation untouched, there can be no fundamental shifts. Whoever is elected, to whatever position, or whatever positions are created or combined, people will do only what the system allows them to do, and it allows them to do not very much, and it is for that reason that, for the time being, perestroika has not had too many successes.

True, one can assume that, when free elections to the soviets are allowed, there will be a sharp increase in the democratic pressure exerted on the party and state apparatus. And this could only be welcomed. But for the time being there are no free elections, and I am not convinced that there will be any soon. That is first of all. Secondly, if the party agencies feel a threat to their being above the law and being under no one's supervision, if

they see that they are proving to be under the supervision of society, then they will attempt to eliminate this position, stating that it favors an encroachment (obviously, on the part of "individual extremists" and "anti-perestroika groups") upon the holy of holies—the "guiding role."

Do you think that I am exaggerating? Or fantasizing? Well, you might recall how many of the party functionaries welcomed glasnost, the commotion they raised, the concern they expressed, when they found themselves unprotected against the crossfire from the press. How many words were said about the "undermining of authority," about the irresponsible statements made by irresponsible journalists in irresponsible agencies of the press! And how many have not yet been expressed! Because criticism in the press is a bee-sting and nothing more. Because, even if people write poorly, it is somewhere in a central or republic newspaper and that misfortune will not be dumped on you every day, or, if you are lucky, you may even avoid it, and right here, on the spoke, no one will touch you, because you have your own press in your pocket: any editor is well aware of what "party responsibility" is, and if he has forgotten, you can remind him. But what will happen when the party agencies begin not sometime, but constantly and every hour, to be supervised not by "other people," but by "their own people," and not only by journalists, but by the entire population, by its elected agencies, and you will have to be responsible for every step that you take? I am not convinced that this will not lead to the appearance of new Yeltsins, but this time it will not be on the left flank, but on the right, and they will prove to be a bit wiser and a bit more decisive than the slightly old-fashioned, albeit terrible-looking conservatives of the 1988 model. Nor am I convinced that even the most likeable and most decent people will remain in their high position at such time and will not renew their movement along the inclined plane of lies.

One must be ready for such turns of fate. And being ready means, among other things, assimilating the fact, one and for all, that the Administrative System cannot now resolve and never will be able to resolve a single serious problem and, until it is broken, the source of lies is preserved. Therefore, while being located within it, it is very difficult to speak the truth, and during the minutes that are complicated for the system it is simply impossible to do so. Explaining that the complete truth cannot issue from it or its servants means speaking the truth. This, then, is the only way to proceed ahead, looking beyond those borders within which a reformer of the Administrative System is allowed to operate.

But at this point I am approaching probably the most important thing. In order for the truth to be heard, it is necessary to say it aloud. It is also necessary for people to want to hear it. And yet, not only in the corridors of power, but also in the corridors of dormitories and of communal and separate apartments, people are not

always predisposed to this. Therefore it is difficult for people to speak the truth even if they have sufficient bravery and inner freedom for that purpose.

Someone (an individual person or an entire nation) can be deceived only when that someone is ready to accept lies as the truth. This occurs not always because that someone is kept in ignorance. It even happens that ignorance is more to his liking than being informed is. The question is too serious—one might say, a root question—and therefore the discussion about it must be special and unhurried.

The Benefit and Harm of Self-Deception

The deception of nations is preceded by their self-deception. Self-deception is preceded by adversity in life and the desire to reshape life.

Two of my acquaintances—both are serious researchers—at different times and independently of one another made a curious observation. They compared the situation in which we are living with socialism as imagined by Engels, who had written the famous book "Anti-Duehring," and by its main hero, who had been severely criticized and maliciously ridiculed by Engels, that is, Eugen Duehring himself. They made the comparison and they were flabbergasted by their discovery: our socialism is constructed according to Duehring, rather than according to Engels! (Quite recently this was also noted by G. Lisichkin, who compared Duehring's ideas with Stalin's ideas concerning socialism and their practical embodiment—see NOVYY MIR, No 11, 1988.) Duehring did not promise his contemporaries or descendants liberation either from money or from such things as the army, the police, courts, and gendarmes. Everything would remain, he said—there are no miracles in life. But that seemed ridiculous to Engels. In his eyes Duehring probably looked like a person who, sitting in a swamp, is incapable of imagining that there can be other places to live and that people who finally make their way to them can wash the stinking swamp mud off themselves.

So, were we doing the wrong thing when, for so long after Engels, we railed at the poor Eugen who did not want to say pretty things about the future? Does it turn out that he was right? I would like to answer that question with another question: would you build barricades and assail inaccessible fortresses and palaces if you knew that the new life to which you were rushing would be cut out of the same old pattern? Yes, our society was constructed more in accordance with Duehring's plan than with Engels', but it could not be constructed in accordance with that boring plan—there would not have been any builders, or any volunteers to clear the old rubbish from the ground. Therefore we remember Duehring only because, at one time, he was criticized by the author of "Anti-Duehring."

It is a bad thing when entire nations are deceived concerning what they are doing and what can happen from that. It is sad to look back if one sees there that people want to erect a beautiful temple, and the bright dream about it warms their frozen souls, when they, going without sleep and disregarding their fatigue, dig out stumps, dig the foundation pits, drag stones, and erect walls, and then, having finished the work, suddenly discover that instead of a temple they have built a barracks. It is sad, but it is approximately in this way that mankind has basically developed up until now: the ideals that inspired him, when they become a reality, are caricatured to the point of being unrecognizable, but without this self-deception, which is repeated from time to time and from country to country, and which Hegel very accurately called the irony of history, there would be no modern civilization. The ideals did not become reality, but with the passage of time it was nevertheless discovered that the new reality has substantial and indisputable advantages over the old.

Yes, self-deception is a fate that is shared by almost all the nations which, during the past three centuries, have had to live through the revolutionary tremors and the renovation of life. First the universal inspiration, when it seems that the road leading to the magic kingdom of liberty, equality, and fraternity has finally been found and all that remains is to travel along that road quickly and decisively, without looking off to the sides or looking back. Then the just as universal sobering up when one sees the picture that opens up to view after the gate to the desired kingdom has been smashed or torn off its hinges, leaving on the approaches to it a mountain of corpses and a sea of blood. Instead of Charles or Ludwig, the people found waiting for them a Cromwell or a Napoleon who was ready to replace the executed monarchs. Instead of the former nobility, there were the moneyed bigshots who had jumped into the foreground. Feudal tribute had been abolished, but soon it began to seem to some people to be paradise when compared with the "cancers of proletarianism." The insults and debasements that the former bosses of life had allowed themselves with respect to their servants and workers were becoming a thing of the past, but those old injustices looked like children's games against the background of universal mercenariness, mutual estrangement, and callousness that had sprung up. Later on, life would become better, more prosperous, freer, but at first everything caused disappointment and depression, and the sense of a stupendous and uncorrectable catastrophe.

Therefore another ideal—the socialist ideal—began to look so attractive and so alluring in the eyes of many people. It seemed that now there would be no more deception. It was necessary only to be concerned about promptly eliminating the chief deceivers—property-owners, with their property and money—and in a single swoop property and money in general, and together with them the market with its uncontrollable nature and its ungovernability, for which, in turn, it was necessary to rest on people who had neither property nor

money, but who did have the organizational spirit, discipline, and solidarity that were sufficient to pull mankind out of its blind alley—it was necessary to rest on hired workers. That was a great dream, a great faith in the nation's strengths, and the people who accepted that dream could not fail to cast aside anyone who, like Eugen Duehring, saw on the horizon not the star of freedom and happiness, not a workshop and laboratory where the nation itself, without anyone else's help and without any interference, could create its own life in accordance with a precise plan, or, the same thing, that around themselves things were only a little bit better.

But the fate of the socialist ideal proved to be even more tragic than for its predecessors. According to the plan, that idea was supposed to become a reality first in those countries that had moved farther ahead than the others along the path of progress and where capitalism had extracted its creative energy. That did not happen. The ideal lived, it attracted the workers, it inspired them to struggle to improve and change their life, but it somehow turned out that capitalism, while frequently receding and making concessions, was not becoming weaker, but was becoming stronger, accumulating strength and wealth, it was taming the proletarians, gradually poisoning their revolutionary ardor, creating unprecedented productive forces, and now, at the next twist in the technological revolution, was crowding out industrial production and industrial workers onto the shoulder of the economy and was ready to part with them, once and for all.

But, under the socialist banner, victory had been won in backward Russia, and then in other countries that had not had time to break into bourgeois civilization and where capital had not only not completed, but had scarcely begun its historic work. "Real socialism" proclaimed itself a more nearly perfect human community than that civilization. "Real socialism" was a community that left in the past all that civilization's contradictions and flaws, that considered that civilization's capabilities to be exhausted and its own to be inexhaustible:

Our cabbages
and our carrots
will be
as high as a monument,
Our
cows
and horses
Will be the best in the world.

Actually, however, everything proved to be more complicated than that. Instead of looking back condescendingly at the rivals who were left behind or who were hopelessly lagging behind and falling out of the race, it was necessary to keep running, straining all one's efforts and forcing one's body to perform, it was necessary to pay a price no one had ever paid for anything and a price that one could not recall without shuddering. It was necessary to keep running, regardless of what happened because at the critical moments our rivals always got

their second wind, and we always had difficulty getting ours, and most frequently we were gasping for breath in this mad race along the roads of the twentieth century.

The irony of historical fate also lay in the fact that people used to sing songs about a country where they can breathe more freely than anywhere else in the world, and many people felt that that really was so, but at that time millions were suffering from mockeries and debasements in Stalinist camps, and thousands or tens of thousands among them maintained the faith in their dream and were convinced that they were coming closer to it as their legs gave way under them at the distant Siberian lumber camps, they were proving to themselves and to others, by their honest labor, their undying devotion to the great cause of their own life and their nation's life, and then... then everyone learned what they had learned: the dream had not come any closer, but had receded into the completely undiscernible distance.

Yes, we did not succeed in avoiding the tragic self-deception. But it was nevertheless different from the self-deception among the nations that had traveled along another historic path. They had been inspired by the bright image of the kingdom of reason only until all the Bastilles and their defenders had been crushed. The new life that began then disappointed them by its sharp lack of coincidence with the ideal, but people quickly forgot about that, at least until the next revolutionary outburst, and everyone got by any way that he could, submerging himself in prosaic everyday concerns. People had worked together to pull out the stumps, but they did not sound the trumpet call to assemble and dig out the foundation pit for the temple of their future happiness. No one, prior to us, attempted to hold onto the dream of the future life after the shots died down, the gunpowder smoke cleared, and the last signs of the bloody brawls were swept off the streets. No one, prior to us, attempted to build that life while being inspired not by earning, not by prosperity, not by the acquisition of individual independence, but by the beckoning lights at the end of the tunnel, where everyone would have a good and carefree life, but to which it was first necessary to make one's way, and in order to make one's way there, it was necessary to sacrifice everything and to want nothing. In no country, prior to ours, were there people who could believe in this. And therefore in no country, prior to ours, were there poets who could write... well, for example, the following:

Night that is dark as lead,
and rain
that is as thick as a whip,
and workers
sitting
in the mud,
sitting,
burning kindling.
Lips
turn creamy-white
from the cold,

but the lips
whisper in unison:
"In four
years
there will be
a garden-city
here!"

The cities were being built. We were proud of them—one more step closer to the dream. But the gardens did not flourish there. After the building of the future was erected and it was announced to us that what we had been told was just a fairy tale, after that it was learned that the building could be used for any purpose except for life.

Other nations had self-deception. But our self-deception was to the second power. Therefore we produced deceivers such as the world had never previously seen. In order to get rid of them, it is necessary, once and for all, to cure ourselves of self-deception. This is our chief ailment, and what is all the more dangerous is that it seems to be the manifestation of exceptional health. But in order to cure ourselves, it is necessary once again to return to the roots, to see how everything began. Where, when, and at what point in our historic path people got the idea that coercion and fear can lead to freedom, or that persons who are unaware and who have not grown to the point of getting that idea can be forced to accept it by such "friends" and "servants" of it as Yezhov and Beriya? Why could there arise the sensation that the gigantic Stalinist prison is the kingdom of reason? Or that, having become the jailers there, we had finally shaken off ourselves the dust of the old world and had learned how to love and laugh like no one else on earth?

Karl Kautsky Against Lev Tolstoy

It seems to me that we have not yet become completely aware of the role that was played in our tragedy by the brief period that is known by the name of War Communism. Of course, its ideological roots can be sought also in more remote times. But that is a matter for theory, and War Communism is, for the first time, practice. And it precisely for that reason that I see there the philosophical root and ideological seed of Stalinism, a seed that was unable at that time to sprout and give off shoots, since the necessary conditions did not yet exist for that.

Many people continue to feel that the policy of those years was perceived by its initiators as a temporary one that was forced by the civil war. But if that were so, then Lenin would not have begun calling War Communism a mistake. No, it was a conscious long-term line. It was an unprecedented attempt to transplant the organs of war to the tissue of peacetime life. Yes, rejection occurred then, and the operation failed, but, fortunately, it did not end with the patient's death, but with the termination of the experiment, with the decisive rejection of that entire

ruinous undertaking. But the ideology of War Communism did not disappear. Rather, it remained in people's heads, waiting for its time to come. What, then, was that ideology?

The ideology of transplantation and the practical line corresponding to that ideology were developed in detail for the first time at the end of the civil war by Trotsky, who was then the people's commissar for military affairs. That is a well-known fact. When people remember that, they often make the conclusion: Trotsky, then, is the chief ideological inspirer and initiator of Stalinism. If that is true, then it is only partially so. First, Trotsky's program was shared by the party leadership and was approved at the party's 9th Congress in the presence of, and with the support of, Lenin. Secondly, during the NEP [New Economic Policy] years, although Trotsky's views continued to smack of leftishness, he never went as far as Stalin did, and the idea of forced collectivization simply never entered his head. On the contrary, he was an irreconcilable opponent of forced collectivization. But fact remains fact: the chief ideology of transplantation was the people's commissar for military affairs. He thought up the forthcoming experiment, down to the smallest details. He completely substantiated it and was convinced that it could be carried out successfully. He felt that the program that he was proposing corresponded completely to the basic principles of socialism, and he passionately defended his convictions in arguments with his numerous opponents. Therefore, when studying the history of our disease, we cannot avoid dealing with Trotsky. The ideology of the incipient tragic self-deception was expounded by him with military precision, in simple terms, with almost transparent clarity. That position was probably represented most completely in something that is today completely forgotten, but that at one time caused a commotion and attracted the attention of world public opinion—the polemics between Trotsky and Kautsky, the major theoretician of German and international social democracy.

In 1919 Kautsky published the book "Terrorism and Communism," in which he sharply criticized the Bolshevik regime, including its management methods. A year later Trotsky responded by a book with the same title, in which he attempted to deflect the criticism and substantiate the correctness of the policy of War Communism, and to prove its correspondence to the principles of socialism. After yet another year, Kautsky's reply appeared, under the title "From Democracy to State Slavery."

It seems to me that the present-day reader could have a self-interest in both positions. Kautsky's criticism reveals both the obvious weaknesses and incongruities of the doctrine of War Communism and the weaknesses of the position of the person himself who is doing the criticizing, and the historical limitation of that "democratic" variety of the socialist ideology that Trotsky's opponent represented. In the argument it was not truth

and self-deception that collided, but two types of self-deception, and both types continue to this day to be instructive, since neither one of them can serve as the medicine to cure the other, because they both are a disease. In order not to speak without substantiating my remarks, I would like to give the floor both to Trotsky and to Kautsky. For this purpose I shall attempt to make use of the method of a kind of literary montage that I have already used in my article in NOVYY MIR (No 11, 1987) when setting forth the views of supporters of the "Change of Landmarks." I shall attempt to take excerpts from books written by Trotsky and Kautsky and combine them into connected texts and have them engage in a direct dialogue. Obviously, this kind of publication will not have any academic value, but I can assure you that the information that you will receive about the two opposing positions is not distorted. To prevent any difficulties from arising during the reading, I shall explain, just in case, that Trotsky is arguing not only with Kautsky, but also with the Russian Mensheviks who share his views, and with one of their leaders, Abramovich. And so we give the floor to the participants in the argument, from which I have chosen only the topic of discussion that pertains to War Communism, that is, the forced organization of labor, and the evaluation of such a measure as universal compulsory labor.

Trotsky. As soon as we saw the dawning of peace—after Kolchak, Yudenich, and Denikin had been defeated—we gave ourselves the task of resolving in full volume the questions of organizing the economy... At such time we were confronted by completely new questions and new difficulties in the sphere of organizing labor. Socialist theory did not have any ready answers to those questions and could not have them. We had to find the resolutions in our own experience and to verify them by experience. Kautsky theory was an entire era behind the tasks to be resolved by the Soviet authority. In the form of Mensheviks, Kautsky theory was getting under our feet, opposing to the practical measures of our economic construction their philistine prejudices and intellectual bureaucratic skepticism.

The organizing of labor is, in essence, the organizing of a new society: every historic society is, basically, its own organization of labor. Whereas every previous society was an organization of labor in the interests of the minority..., we are making the first attempt in world history to organize labor in the interests of the working majority itself. This, however, does not preclude the element of coercion in all its types, including the mildest and the extremely cruel ones.

According to the general rule, man attempts to avoid labor. Industriousness is by no means an inborn trait: it is created by economic pressure and social indoctrination. It can be said that man is a rather lazy animal. Essentially speaking, it is upon this quality of man that, to a considerable degree, human progress is based, because if man did not attempt to expend his strength economically, if he did not attempt, by expending a small

amount of energy, to obtain as many products as possible, there would have been no development of technology or social culture... It is not necessary, however, to derive from this the conclusion that the party and the trade unions in their agitation work must preach that quality as a moral duty. Definitely not! We already have more than enough of this. It is, rather, the task of the social organizations to put the "laziness" within definite limits, in order to discipline it, in order to give the person some incentive...

The key to the economy is manpower... It would seem that there is a lot of it. But where are the paths to it? How does one attract that manpower to do the job? How does one organize it productively? When clearing the railroad bed of snowdrifts, we encountered large difficulties. Resolving them by means by acquiring manpower in the mark is absolutely impossible, given the current insignificant purchasing power of money, and given the almost complete lack of products produced by the processing industry... The sole means of attracting the necessary manpower for economic tasks is the carrying out of **compulsory labor**.

The very principle of compulsory labor is, for the Communist, completely indisputable: "He who does not work, does not eat." And since everyone must eat, everyone is required to work... Our economic workers, and the occupational-production organizations together with them, have to right to require their members to display the same selflessness, discipline, and readiness to execute orders that, up to now, only the army has required... The worker does not simply trade with the Soviet state—no, he is obliged to the state, he is completely subordinate to it, since it is **his** state... The workers' state considers itself to have the right to send every worker to wherever his work is necessary.

The Mensheviks are opposed... to compulsory labor. They reject these methods as being "forced." They preach that compulsory labor is equivalent to low labor productivity... This assertion leads us to the very essence of the question. Because, as we see it, the crux of the matter is by no means whether it is reasonable or unreasonable to declare that a particular plant is on a wartime basis, or whether it is desirable to grant to a military-revolutionary tribunal the right to punish corrupt workers who have been stealing the materials and tools that are so precious to us or who have been sabotaging the work. No, the question posed by the Mensheviks is much deeper. Asserting that forced labor is **always** relatively unproductive, they thus attempt to undermine the soil from under our economic construction... Because, without a revolutionary dictatorship or without coercive forms of organizing labor, there can be no thought of crossing over from bourgeois anarchy to a socialist economy... A planned economy is inconceivable without compulsory labor...

It is completely true that free labor is more productive than forced labor, with respect to the era of the changeover from feudal society to the bourgeois. But it is

necessary to be a liberal or—in our time—a Kautskyite—to perpetuate that truth and to transfer it to the era of changeover from the bourgeois system to socialism... The entire question lies in who applies the coercion, on whom, and for what purpose.

Compulsory labor is of a coercive nature, but that certainly does not mean that it is violence directed against the working class. If compulsory labor met the counteraction of the majority of the workers, it would prove to be ruined, and so would the Soviet system... The fact that compulsory labor... does not violate the will of the workers as "free" labor has done is best attested to by the flourishing of volunteer labor in the form of **subbotniks** [volunteer social-labor days]—a flourishing that is unprecedented in the history of mankind. A phenomenon such as this has never occurred anywhere... **Subbotniks** are not only a superior manifestation of communist solidarity, but also a very reliable pledge of the successful carrying out of compulsory labor.

Russian capitalism, by virtue of its lateness and lack of independence, and the resultant parasitical features, succeeded to a much lesser degree than European capitalism in instructing and technically indoctrinating the working masses and establishing their production discipline. That task now lies entirely on the professional organizations of the proletariat. A good engineer, a good machine operator, a good fitter must have in the Soviet Republic the same kind of renown and fame that previously were given to outstanding agitators and revolutionary fighters, and during the present period, to the bravest and most capable commanders and commissars... Our labor mobilizations will not be implemented, will not set out roots, if we do not grasp onto everything that is honest, conscientious, and inspired in the working class.

The deeper strata... that have emerged from deep within the peasantry... are still too poor in initiative. The ailment that our Russian **muzhik** suffers from is herd instinct, the lack of individuality, that is, the quality that was eulogized by our reactionary **Narodnichestvo** [populist movement], that was praised by Lev Tolstoy in the character of Platon Karatayev: the peasant dissolves in his commune, he becomes subordinate to the land. It is completely obvious that the socialist economy is based not on Platon Karatayev, but upon a thinking, initiatory, responsible worker. It is necessary to indoctrinate that personal initiative in the worker. The personal principle in the bourgeoisie is selfish individualism, competition. The personal principle in the working class does not contradict either solidarity or fraternal cooperation. Socialist solidarity cannot rest upon lack of personality, upon the herd instinct.

Abramovich attempted thoughtfully to convince us that, under socialism, there would be no coercion, that the principle of coercion contradicts socialism, that, under socialism, there would operate a sense of duty, a habit of working, an attractiveness toward labor... That is indisputable. But it is necessary to expand that indisputable

truth. The fact of the matter is that, under socialism, the very apparatus of coercion—the state—will not exist. It will dissolve entirely in the production and consumer commune. Nevertheless the path to socialism lies through the highest straining of the state. And you and I are passing specifically through that period... No other organization, other than the army, in the past has encompassed man with such stern coercion as the state organization of the working class during this very difficult transitional era. It is precisely for that reason that we speak about the **militarization** of labor.

"But how," Abramovich exclaims, "does your socialism differ from Egyptian slavery? It was by approximately the same method that the pharaohs built the pyramids, by forcing the masses to work." That is an analogy that is inimitable for a "socialist"! Because the very same detail has been omitted: the class nature of the power! Abramovich does not see the difference between the Egyptian regime and ours... It was not the Egyptian peasants, through their Soviets, that decided to build the pyramids—a hierarchical-caste social system existed there—but, rather, the workers were forced to work by a class that has hostile to them. In our society the coercion is carried out by the worker and peasant power, in the name of the interests of the working masses. That is what Abramovich failed to notice.

Kautsky. If Trotsky was correct when he asserted that socialism cannot be carried out without the labor coercion that he mentions, the affairs of socialism would be very sad. But this is not so... Trotsky errs in assuming that human progress is based on inborn laziness, since the development of technology evolves, in his opinion, from the attempt to decrease the amount of work.

One cannot say this in such a general form. Machines that conserve labor did not appear until a rather high stage in technical development. The beginning of technical progress evolves from a need for more reliable protection against the dangers and randomnesses of life, from the striving for the more regular obtaining of food, for the more solid protection against bad weather and enemies, and, finally, from the need to intensify the already known delights or to discover new ones... When people discovered that roasted gruel made from pulverized grain is tastier than the raw grains, that discovery meant for them a tremendous increase in the amount of work, thanks to the need to grind or pulverize the cereal grains in a mortar or with the aid of a millstone. (People did not learn how to rid themselves of this work with the aid of water mills until later times.)... If people actually were innately lazy, they would have avoided all this work like the plague, and would never have got to the point of acquiring or manufacturing tools and utensils.

True, with the development of technology, a certain difference does form gradually. Work is subdivided into two categories: work which, in and of itself, is a satisfaction or a passion, and labor which, in and of itself, is unpleasant and in which it is necessary to engage only because of its final result.

Slavery and serf labor, rather than work-saving machines, are the means by which the strong segment of mankind succeeded in providing for themselves the necessary products of labor without burdening themselves with unpleasant work... That leads to a situation in which the slave and the serf worker hate their work and sabotage it, they attempt to dodge it wherever possible, so that the only way they can be kept on the job is by means of the whip and cruel punishments.

The slave at one end of the scale and the exploiter at the other end who does nothing—those are the real lazy individuals: one is actuality, and the other in his dreams. But this does not have anything in common with Trotsky's assertion that man is lazy by nature and therefore needs to be forced to work. Rather, just the opposite is true. Human laziness is a consequence of forced labor.

The laziness of a forced workers also explains the insignificant productivity of his labor. He not only works unwillingly and half-heartedly, but is also inattentive and takes a careless attitude toward the work animals and the tools. He can be trusted only with the crudest and simplest tools and instruments.

This principle has not changed until the present time. And the forced workers in the Soviet Republic can be employed for only the most primitive operations, such as the chopping down of the forest, work in peat bogs, the clearing of railroad tracks, etc.

If the West European workers were told that when socialism arrived the government would be able to tear away from his family every worker that the government needed, to put him in a military train, and send him away to administrative exile for an indefinite period of time, there is not the slightest doubt that the workers would give a completely unambiguous answer to the Moscow theoreticians of socialism.

Of course, the freedom of movement, the freedom to choose an occupation and a factory, are "liberal" freedoms, as are the freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, etc. But that does not mean that the workers must renounce those freedoms, but means only that there is an **insufficient** quantity of them for the working class... Trotsky errs considerably if he thinks that the worker will agree in the socialist state to renounce that freedom which he is currently attempting to achieve in the bourgeois state, on the basis that this is "his" state. And that, therefore, he will "subordinate himself in every way" to it.

We understand perfectly that the worker will not be able to be victorious over capital simply by using means of economic struggle, and that in order to do this the workers must possess state power. But we need strong power only to eradicate the **sway** of capital. The construction of socialist production should not be put in the hands of the state bureaucracy. On the contrary, the less

the state bureaucracy interferes in this matter and the greater the participation that both the workers in the individual production entities and the working class as a whole take in it by means of their freedom of action within it, the better it will be for that production.

When the proletariat expects everything from the "state," ascribing to the latter a miracle-working ability to cure all ailments, and forgetting that the state... cannot have any more than the working class creates **in excess of** what is necessary for its own existence, then that attests only to the immaturity of the proletariat.

Of all the European nations, the English in this respect have matured more than any others for socialism... Nowhere else in world have respect for the individual, independence, and energy been as developed in the proletariat to such a degree as in England... In Russia, on the contrary, the population, more than the population in any other of the major European states, have become accustomed to waiting for deliverance from all their evils **from above**, from the state power.

It is necessary to be surprised only at the fact that Trotzkiy... is planning to construct a socialist society on the Russian herd instinct. From our point of view this herd instinct not only explains the **failure of Bolshevik socialism** (Kautsky has in mind the transition that had begun from "War Communism" to the NEP), but also the **success of the Bolshevik dictatorship** and the conception of the idea of compulsory labor. "The thinking workers, rich in initiative and strong in the awareness of their responsibility" would not allow either to be forced on themselves.

Trotzkiy is right when he says that you cannot build socialism on herd instinct, but are we really to believe that a dictatorship is a suitable means for converting herd natures into free and strong personalities? On the contrary. A dictatorship does not tolerate such personalities. It needs only obedient tools. Whoever manifests an independent nature becomes inconvenient and must be removed from the road, or his will must be broken.

But are we really to believe that forcing a person to engage in labor does not evolve from the very essence of socialism, an essence that says that whoever does not work must not eat? Let us consider that question. The principle that was stated above evolves from the worker's striving not to work for someone else and not to allow him the opportunity to live without working... The rule "whoever does not work does not eat" cannot in any instance be interpreted in such a way that whoever does not work where the **minister of war orders** him to work must not eat. Especially since it is possible to make the conclusion from this rule that whoever does not fulfill such operations must be not only deprived of his food, but must also be subjected to military punishment for having violated discipline.

The question of compulsory labor as a means for the correct distribution of manpower throughout the country is not a very important problem for socialism... A question that is much more important is the problem linked with the question of compulsory labor. This is a question not of how to provide manpower for various enterprises, but of how to achieve a situation in which the workers who are employed at the enterprise work zealously and conscientiously.

What means are available for this purpose for a socialist society that is attempting to preserve respect for the individuality of the worker and that therefore does not want to resort to outward coercion? This, then, is the problem—the question of **with what to replace** coercion to perform labor (rather than **how to organize it**)—that has greatly occupied many specialists...

The strongest incentive that encourages a person to show the greatest eagerness to perform labor is, of course, the awareness that the person is working for himself, that the result of his labor will be to his own benefit. This incentive, which existed for the free worker prior to the capitalist era, obviously cannot exist in full volume in socialist society.

In order to restore that incentive, it would be necessary to renounce all the tremendous technical advantages of large-scale machine production. Therefore socialism can put in place of the individual worker only the collective worker, who then fuses together with society as a whole, and can make him the owner of the entire totality of the means and products of production... In socialist production it is not the capitalist who suffers from the laziness or sloppiness of individual workers is not the capitalist, but the workers' own coworkers, who, thanks to their behavior, receive fewer products and more work.

In view of this fact, everyone who will deliberately work poorly at a factory will enjoy the same infamy among his coworkers that is enjoyed today by the strikebreaker, and that moral pressure will operate on him all the more strongly in that he cannot even give as his justification, as the strikebreaker does, his hunger.

I think that any reader, even the least trained one, upon becoming acquainted with these excerpts will quickly realize that Kautskiy, although at that time he was far from the Bolsheviks, in evaluating War Communism was considerably closer to the truth than his ideologue Trotzkiy. And it is not only because it was necessary to replace that policy, but also because it was that policy's second edition—the corrected and expanded Stalinist edition—and it was that edition that left absolutely no doubts: it is impossible to force either a person or a nation to be free, even if the people doing the forcing are not the Egyptian pharaohs, but people acting in the name of the most advanced class and people genuinely believing that all other classes have already finished playing their role; it is impossible, by means of force, to indoctrinate in a person a conscientious attitude toward labor.

Force can only cause aversion to it. Fear is capable of bridling a vice. But it does not have the ability to convert a vice into a virtue. Fear can force a lazy person to work. But it cannot make laziness industriousness. All these things today are obvious things that are as indisputable as ABC's. But the trained reader, having read the old dialogue between Kautsky and Trotsky, will certainly notice something else. He will discover that the opposing sides, for all their irreconcilable attitude toward one another, are, in some substantial respect, very close and also unmodern. And this is actually so.

Notice that their argument is not about socialism, not about what it is, but about how to move toward it, from what point to begin (the Russian or the English) and what road to choose. Concerning the point of destination there is complete unanimity. Neither the "dictator" Trotsky nor the "democrat" Kautsky doubts that socialism is a society without commodity-monetary relations or a market, that the people living in it will display labor zeal not for the sake of filthy lucre, but because of considerations that are higher and nobler. In this respect both of them were mistaken. Obviously, not in the sense that the noncommodity conducting of the economy is impossible in general, in principle. People can even have arguments about that today, because in this regard history has not yet said the last word. But history has said in a completely definite manner that an industrial society cannot develop successfully on a noncommodity basis, and it even less capable of creating the motivating forces of the scientific-technical revolution. History has said in no less definite a manner that the industrial worker with whom both Trotsky and Kautsky linked their hopes—and not only Trotsky and Kautsky—is incapable of carrying out a breakthrough into a fundamental new civilization—either in England or in other Western countries where he has not yet succeeded in being victorious, or in Russia or the countries that followed her example, where, after proletarian revolutions, military-bureaucratic regimes of the Stalinist types arose. As he leaves the stage of history, yielding his place to the new worker of the age of NTR [scientific-technical revolution], he transfers to his successors his ideal, and they, if they accept the heritage, they will certainly reject certain things in it and will multiply other things in it and will enrich it. But that is another topic and a special one. For the time being, I would like once again to direct your attention to the coincidence in the views of Trotsky and Kautsky. This is important for me, since it enable me to ascertain the degree of scientific conscientiousness and civic honesty on the part of certain authors in popular-science magazines who suggest to us that the roots of all our misfortunes must continue to be sought beyond the confines of our homeland, that is, in ideas of the noncommodity economy that were imported from abroad, and who are attempting, by their overly relaxed tone, to kill within themselves and in their reader such a natural question that is so necessary for our spiritual rebirth: why did their foreign ideals not take root in their own homeland and why did they fail to triumph not only during Kautsky's time, but also to the present time, but

in our country they have set down deep roots and have managed to inflict so many misfortunes?

I would like once again to point out the coincidence between the views of Trotsky and Kautsky in order to set off the deep meaning of the Lenin rejoinder that is quoted so frequently today: the changeover to the NEP, that is, to the commodity economy, means "the fundamental changing of our entire point of view concerning socialism."

What was this? Brilliant delusion? Or was it a breakthrough into a new and unknown reality, a breakthrough that required unique maneuvering and that no one could support or head when Lenin was no more? These question marks will continue to trouble our mind and imagination. It is possible to state just one thing definitely: it turned out that the NEP, which was supposed to replace War Communism, created the conditions for its rebirth and its firm establishment. In 1920 the operation to transplant the organs of war into the world failed completely both in the countryside (peasant uprisings) and in the city (worker strikes in Petrograd and Moscow, Kronstadt mutiny). In 1929 the operation was carried out—for the authorities—completely successfully. The city withstood it favorably and even felt—despite the empty stores and the ration cards—an influx of new forces, and although the countryside shuddered and howled from fear and from the terrible, intolerable pain, it rapidly was calmed down by Stalin's surgeons. Ascertaining and explaining to others why that became possible would require the writing not of articles, but of entire volumes.

It is obvious that Stalin succeeded in carrying out his bloody experiment on the nation not only thanks to the cruelty and decisiveness of those who were executing his will. And it is not only because he made certain corrections into Trotsky's old program: whereas for the peasants they meant the intensification of oppression even as compared with the days of the food requisitions, Stalin did not revive the War Communism attempts to transfer workers from place to place, but for massive labor assaults he used his second unique invention, which in all respects does not yield to collectivization—the labor armies of the camps.

The fact of the matter is that, in addition to coercion and barbaric inventions, there was yet another ideological psychotherapy that confused the nation's soul.

Once More About Those Who Are Outside of Culture—"On the Bottom" and "On the Top"

The city believed that collectivization was the victory of a great idea, a bright holiday celebrating the liberation of the countryside, which was voluntarily rushing into the "new prosperous life." The city did not know, or did not want to know, that the bread that it was receiving on ration cards, and then without them, had been seized

from the mouths of rural children. It did not know, or did not want to know, that the ration cards and other inconveniences were the result not of the perniciousness of the "kulaks" and other enemies, but of that policy whose fruits were called in the newspapers the victory of the kolkhoz system. That psychotherapy caused a split not only between the countryside and the city, removing the threat of the workers' demonstrations that had disrupted the War Communism plans in the early 1920's. It also caused a split within the countryside itself, where success was achieved in inspiring the poor farmers who lacked horses (approximately one-third of the rural inhabitants) with the idea that collectivization was voluntary for them, and coercive for those who, in accordance with the ideological diagnosis, suffered from the ailment of possessiveness and required forced treatment.

Yes, this was deception that was unprecedented in history. But I have already said that you cannot deceive anything who is not ready to be deceived. Hypnosis does not work on a person who does not want to be hypnotized. Trotsky was a skilled ideologue of War Communism and he understood this. You will recall his thought: coercion is impossible if the nation opposes it. Putting it another way, coercion can be successful if it is accompanied by inspiration, enthusiasm, and voluntary action: it was not accidental that the people's commissar for military affairs mentioned the *subbotniks* since they were the point on which his entire ideological construct rested.

It is interesting that Kautsky did not notice that "point" and therefore his criticism was insufficient. It was not from within, but seemingly from the side, and that would have an effect later on, when he would be unable to explain the reasons for the stability of the Stalinist regime, when he would be constantly waiting for it to collapse at any moment, hastening that collapse, and predicting it in books and articles, but he would never live long enough to see it. But he would not agree to discuss seriously such matters as "mass enthusiasm" and "heroic labor" that are so unfamiliar to the Western reader.

And yet the very reason why the first draft of War Communism failed was that the amount of enthusiasm and heroism proved to be insufficient. People were ready to give their free hours to the state without compensation in order to bring closer the victory over the enemy. But when the victory was won and there were no longer any enemies around, and the desired peace turned out to be so hungry and so cold, the well of inspiration dried up. And immediately the light at the end of the tunnel went out: the enticing image of the future disappeared. It dissolved in workdays without any way out. The excessive, inhuman fatigue bent them over, preventing them from straightening themselves up. And so the entire system of coercion immediately stopped working.

Yes, the transplanting of the organs of war into peaceful economic life is impossible if there is no external threat (real or invented), and an internal threat does not

consolidate or mobilize people if its carriers live somewhere far across the border and it is completely possible to discover one's own plans if one is not constantly reminded that there are those who are sabotaging, spying, and hatching their own plots. In 1920 almost all the real enemies had been chased out, and no one—either Trotsky, the main ideologue of War Communism, or anyone else—was able to hit upon the idea that they could be raised artificially. It would take some ten years before Stalin would fill in that gap in the concept, would add the missing link, would create a gigantic piece of equipment for the mass production of enemies, and would turn it on not only to grind down his possible and impossible rivals, but also to keep pumping in vigilance and solidarity, and to encourage labor zeal.

There is no end
to the evil
and class
fight,
fight,
fight.

(The reader obviously knows that all the lines of poetry used in this article were taken from the works of Mayakovsky. But perhaps not everyone remembers that those works were written in the same year, 1929; that is known as the year of the "great breaking point.")

Today one hears the argument: can one separate the pluses of the Administrative System from its minuses? Some people say that this is possible. And they put in the "plus" column Magnitka and enthusiasm, and in the "minus" column the repressions and other "mistakes." Others object: it is impossible even to ask that question, because there cannot be any division at all into "good" and "bad" with respect to the Stalin administration—everything was "good" not thanks to the system, but despite it.

I cannot agree either with the first group or the second. I would not take the risk of saying that enthusiasm developed apart from the Administrative System and completely independently of it. But the Administrative System is a system of War Communism. And War Communism is a system that develops enthusiasm and heroism only to the extent that they serve (or seem to serve) the attainment of victory over an obvious or imaginary enemy. But if that is so, is it possible unconditionally to consider them to be a plus?

However, even this is not everything. If we want to leave War Communism in the past, if we want to overcome it and replace it with a new economic organization of life, then it would be better to admit: not only the methods that evoked and whipped up enthusiasm have become hopelessly obsolete, but also the War Communism enthusiasm itself. It is ineffective and unprofitable, it is shackled by a historic chain to the word "more" and separated by a historic precipice from the word "better," it dissolved "I" into "we," and creativity is replaced by

the reproduction, the multiple production of quantitative (not qualitative) models that were achieved by someone somewhere, which models are called the spreading of advanced experience. Is this sad? Yes, it is. But this has been mankind's fate: to be sad when parting with the past, rather than remaining there in order not to be sad. Therefore mankind moves on ahead. Therefore it preserves the memory of what had been. Isn't this why, in this respect, we should not be similar to anyone else?

But I seem to have strayed from the question that I myself asked. Because invented enemies can evoke labor enthusiasm in me only in the event that I believe that they are noninvented enemies. Therefore, once again: why had it been possible to deceive people? And, once again: because, and only because, they were ready to be deceived.

Not all of them. But the number of those who were ready proved to be sufficiently large. And however strange this seems, they had been prepared by the NEP: under the first edition of War Communism they did not exist, or, rather, they had not yet been defined, they had not yet become completely aware of who they were or what they wanted. The war and the food requisitions brought everyone to the same level: the prosperous and the poor farmer, the industrious and the loafer, the skilled worker and the almost complete incompetent. The NEP restored the differences. That could not fail to please either the city workers who had looked discontentedly at the private restaurants that were inaccessible to them, or the poor inhabitants of the countryside who had received land but who had been unable to adapt to economical management methods and had become dependent upon their energetic and lucky neighbors. Putting it another way, it was precisely under the NEP that there formed in the city and in the countryside large groups of people who could feel that they had been cheated out of their fair share by the revolution and in whom, for that reason, there was an intensification of the hatred toward those whom the NEP had economically raised to the top. So it was not necessary to invent the word "enemy." It was already in the air and, for many, it was already on their tongue, and the only thing left was to pronounce it aloud.

And it was pronounced. In the upper echelons of the political power there could not fail to be people who would not understand, sooner or later, what a convenient word that was. Because if someone down below is dissatisfied about something, if he is inclined to blame everything not only himself or on the authority, but on his neighbor, then why not meet him half-way? That would be so simple: everything that is good was achieved by the regime, and everything that is bad is "enemy intrigues."

And that is how the Stalinist logic, a logic in which he did not have any predecessors, was asserted, became firmly established in life, feeding upon and intensified by the impulses emerging from life. That logic was close and understandable to the very large segment of people at the

upper and medium stages of the system, who had been promoted thanks to their services in the civil war and who were convinced that if Perekop could be taken by storm, then all other problems were certainly no more complicated, and if they could not be resolved, it was only as a result of the existence of the "kontra" [counterrevolutionaries]. But the most important thing is that that logic had found a live response among the even larger groups of the working class, and primarily among its new recruits who were rushing into the industrialized city from the NEP countryside to which they had been unable to adapt, where they were doomed to a miserable and dependent existence. There was a tremendous demand for them. They quickly filled the plants and construction sites and very soon began to establish the tone there. All the political leaders of the 1920's took them into consideration and kept glancing at them. But the only person who staked his claim on them was Stalin.

He did not idealize them the way that Trottskiy, Zinov'yev, and Kamenev had done. They had adjusted those person's moods to their own bookishly romantic ideas concerning the working class. But he, unlike Bukharin, did not blunder with regard to the possibility of adapting them to the NEP, to the market economy. He proved to be an outstanding exploiter of their illusions and prejudices, and of their historic self-deception.

They were people who had been rejected from one culture and not accepted in any other one, but who had not created any new one. They were ready to sacrifice everything, to give up everything. They could work as much as was necessary, and much more, if they were told that it was they who were the real owners of the country, that the power belonged to them, and not to anyone else, and the reward for their labor would be a life such as they had never had. They could blend into the "common cause," could dissolve in it, could forget about themselves, dreaming about the "garden city," but today, giving due respect to their selfless devotion and their integrity, we still must admit that it was easy for them to give up everything that they had, because they had almost nothing. There was no personal life. It had been replaced by government-issue cots in barracks, dormitories, and house trailers. They had no possessions, no knowledge, no well-developed individual needs. They had neither a past that they disdained, nor a present that they sensed as being somehow temporary, transitory, or preparatory for something that was the most important thing. They could live only in the future, only by dreaming about that happy condition that was expressed by the word "socialism," and therefore they kept urging on their leaders: let's keep moving ahead faster! And they looked disapprovingly at those who had something of their own, who had something to treasure, whether it be prosperity or their own opinion, who stood out from the crowd, who wanted to live and work for themselves, rather than only for the "common welfare" and the "liberation of humanity." They called this philistinism and social irresponsibility, but they were ready to include those who were socially irresponsible in the lists

of enemies. It is easy to guess that, for these people, combining the NEP with socialism meant approximately the same thing as combining the future with the past.

Therefore the repeal of the NEP did not disturb or distress them, but delighted them. Things became worse, but for others (the "enemies") doubly so, and consequently, things became closer to equality. They were ready for a great campaign and a great leap forward. They were ready to launch an assault on history. They succeeded in building cities, plants, and electric power plants. But they were deceived concerning their strengths and capabilities. Therefore they needed deception concerning their successes. And they were met half-way. They were told that the unfulfilled plans were being overfulfilled, that the entire world was looking at them with admiration and hope, and that at any moment the world would begin to follow their example. It was indeed looking, but it was in no hurry to follow their example. They waited and believed, until they got tired. But even after they got tired, they continued to believe their leader, the chief enemy of their enemies, who had replaced their cultural traditions, which they had truncated, and the awareness of their own personality, which they had not yet had time to acquire. He replaced for them everything that they did not have, and presented them with the sensation that they could do everything. Therefore many of them continue to this day to believe in him and think that, if he were still alive, everything would have been good long ago. Therefore the truth concerning the Administrative System seems to them to be a lie, and the discussions about democratizing it seem to be undermining everything that they have worshiped, everything that they fought for without sparing either themselves or others, everything that they had created, sacrificing everything and demanding no rewards.

At that time they listened only to themselves and therefore they understood democracy as the right to be heard and not to listen to anyone around, or, what is the same thing, as the right to threaten those who undermine unity, by which they meant unity with them and not with anyone else. I hasten to maintain the reader, to whom these lines might sound somewhat familiar: his memory has not tricked him. He and I have already observed all this at the upper echelons and in the corridors of power, the walls of which, of course, were not soundproofed, so that from the street the voices there could be heard very well.

Yes, the moods of that segment were present, visibly or invisibly, in the ideological and political conflicts of the 1920's. And Stalin took them into consideration better than his rivals did. I have said that he was supported by the people at the lower levels in the party, since he always had the majority on the top, whatever platform he defended. But nevertheless he received the majority not only thanks to intrigues and political resourcefulness. No, his intrigues and maneuverings were successful only

because he never soared too high above the rank-and-file worker of that time, did not attempt to rise above his "socialist" rectilinearity or naivete.

Even when, together with Bukharin, he came out in favor of the deepening of the NEP, the development of economic relations in the countryside, and the establishment of market ties between the countryside and the city, while Zinovyev and Kamenev attempted to become the loudspeaker of the anti-NEP moods among the workers—even in that instance Stalin took more precise consideration of those moods. He understood that the rank-and-file worker was upset not by the NEP, but by how it would end. He was worried about whether it would be replaced by socialism, which, obviously, was not the NEP. And so Stalin preserved the dream: the light at the end of the tunnel must not be extinguished. And he represented his critics as the murderers of that dream.

He knew that Zinovyev's theoretical conscience, like that of Trotsky, could not be reconciled with the idea of "socialism in one country," and also Zinovyev, who was not the most advanced person, true, did not set himself off from Trotsky, because he understood: once the power is in the hands of the socialist party, that party must justify its name, must see and must point out to the nation the future prospect, which depends upon that nation itself, rather than on Trotsky's "world revolution," which no one knew when it would occur. But Stalin's rival—the leader of the Comintern and the only person who, after Lenin's death, openly laid claim to the first role—was probably afraid that he might be removed from Marxist tradition. So he proposed a compromise: since we have the power, let's build socialism, but let's also be aware that we will not be able to build it by ourselves.

That was enough to represent Zinovyev as the murderer of the ideal. The construction of socialism, which does not lead to the construction of socialism! Construction "just in case"! Construction without a future prospect! Building while knowing that you will not finish the process! Stalin waged not a theoretical, but an ideological argument: by pressing the most sensitive key in the consciousness of the rank-and-file party member, he put his rival face to face with the expectations of the masses, and that rival was crushed, and everything that he said later on concerning the danger of the deepening of the NEP no longer had almost no significance any more: it shook up the upper working segment, but did not go downward, did not penetrate into the depth.

I think that Stalin was brought closer to Bukharin not by adherence to the NEP (in the mid-1920's no one made any serious attempts against it or called for its curtailment), but the idea of "socialism in one country." They were victorious because that idea was close to the majority of the workers. But Bukharin was shunted to the side easily, almost without a struggle, when life came up against the question of what kind of socialism that could

and must be. Stalin was victorious because the War Communism ideology was more understandable and closer to millions of the new recruits of industrialization than the ideology of the market and commodity-money relations.

Stalin's victory meant that the War Communism moods had become an official directive and doctrine that prescribed a definite way of thinking, feeling, and existing. The self-deception of the new recruits at the plants and construction sites was proclaimed to be the ideological norm and the highest manifestation of consciousness. Its triumph was written into the political documents and textbooks as the triumph of the "socialist and cultural revolution."

There began a life in which no one had a present or was supposed to have one: the present was sacrificed to the future. That means that the word "live" [zhit] had come closer in meaning and had almost fused together with the word "experience" [perezhit] (difficulties, deprivations, the war, its consequences, the Cold War—it would be impossible to list everything). And it is only now, it would seem, that we are beginning to understand what kind of self-deception that was, what a dangerous disease it was, and especially dangerous in that it is still recalled to this day by many people as the state of departed mental health: "Life was difficult, but we lived well. And we had faith that things would be even better."

Because if everything that happens to me today is devoid of independent moral significance, if all this is only a means of achieving a great goal, then in the present it is not only everyday inconveniences that become justified, but also other things—betrayals of one's relatives and friends, crimes, universal fear, suspiciousness (also universal), which considers itself to be vigilance, lies, and the tears of small children who were guilty only of having parents who did not suit other people for some reason. Because all this seems not completely to be life, but only preparation for life. The real life lies ahead and when one gets there, in that future wonderful kingdom, everything will be forgotten, written off, and forgiven.

Once I happened to watch a television program about anesthesia by hypnosis. The person was lying on an operating table. The hypnotist-doctor gave him the suggestion, "You will not feel anything. You will only hear my voice." And he actually did not feel anything. An incision was made and he did not feel it. The self-deception of the Stalin era is like moral anesthesia by ideological hypnosis and self-hypnosis. The operation was performed with hatchets on the people's soul that had lost sensitivity, and that soul was hacked out to the point where, to this day, everything in it is hemorrhaging and failing to knit together. And no one feels any pain. Or it is already beginning to hurt?

That was the time of universal, total "temporary living conditions," which everyone felt would lead to perpetuity. Everything was as though in wartime. Government-issue cots not only in the barracks dormitories, but also

government-issue furniture in the government apartments of officers and generals, as A. Bek described so well in "New Assignment." No one has anything of his own. Everyone is a "temporary." No one is living, but almost everyone believes that life lies ahead. And therefore it seems to everyone that they are living.

Perhaps the most bitter and most difficult truth that we have to learn is that wherever there is no present, wherever it has been deprived of its moral meaning, there is also no "bright future" (and there can be none). Wherever construction pits are dug and plant buildings are erected not for the sake of people, not for the sake of assuring that they will now live better and more freely, but in the name of some distant goals, sooner or later that which was built there will have to be rebuilt.

Ponder this, although it is very simple: if you have deprived yourself of the present, if you are not living in it, but are "experiencing" it, then what will you carry into the future? Only that which you have. And nothing more. If you are no longer have everything in you that was your very own, individual, unique, that you had time to reveal or did not have time to reveal, that was born in you, if you have drowned all that in the ocean of the "common cause," how will you get back what was drowned. What kind of net will you use to catch all this when the "common cause" triumphs? Or will it be necessary for you to hire an orchestra to play funeral music?

Well, whoever is not convinced by experience and logic should remember the artistic insight of Andrey Platonov: ditch-diggers are digging a construction pit and are dreaming about something vaguely pretty that will give meaning to their work, but all around them things are far from pretty, and then they take care of an orphan girl who is like nothing else in the world. They see in her a symbol of the future universal cleanliness and innocence. But the girl dies and the strongest ditch-digger, whose cast-iron fist has knocked unconscious everyone who could have been suspected of being an enemy, buries her in a "sepulchre" that has been chiseled out of the "permanent rock," in order to hold onto the meaning that is slipping away, in order to preserve the future. But she has already been killed by the nightmare of the present. She is a corpse, and nothing will ever bring her to life again.

Life without a present is life in a spiritual desert. It is the conversion of an ideal into an abstraction and a myth. It is a spiritual existence which, considering itself to be above religious existence, actually is considerably beneath it, and their outer similarity must not confuse anyone. Although religion carries the meaning of human existence beyond its boundaries, it nevertheless preserves that meaning also in the present. Religion knows what sin, shame, and blame are, as well as indulgence (the forgiveness of sins in exchange for money). But despite all its hypocrisy, religion cannot be compared in any way with the Stalinist "in the name of the future."

Whatever you say, an indulgence that permits a person to sin does not kill the capability of perceiving sin as a sin, but Stalinism permits and justifies everything.

Today we are faced with the difficult return to civilization. But in order to return, it is necessary to understand not only that we were deceived, but also that we deceived ourselves. The deception encompassed those millions of people "on the bottom" who believed that it is possible to leap into the future by killing the present. It encompassed those intellectuals "on the top" who, heeding their voices, believed that for the sake of the future it is possible to return to the past, and, for the sake of higher culture, dive down into the abyss of "nonculture." Read and then reread the stenographic record of the 15th Congress, try to understand why intellectual politicians with a European education took this course so fearlessly, and if you investigate thoroughly and understand everything, then that might become the beginning for you and me to gain historic self-awareness and self-surmountal.

Becoming cured of self-deception means becoming a different person. That means, in our instance, rejecting not only War Communism violence, but also the War Communism illusions, War Communism inspiration, and War Communism blindness of faith. You might ask: what are we supposed to do now—remain without any ideals at all? Live for today and only for today? I assume that no, there is no need to reject ideals, and a bit later I shall explain what I have in mind. But this will no longer be a discussion about a disease, but about the treatment methods and a definition of wherein health lies: not about what to change and reform, but how to do this and in the name of what.

But unfortunately we very often propose answers to the questions "how?" and "in the name of what?" without answering the question "what?". And it seems to me that that is the most important one. Because without having ascertained our place in the world, without having completely analyzed who we are and where we have come from, wherein we are similar to others and wherein we differ, it is difficult to define anything—the direction in which we are moving, the goal of that movement, or the means that are necessary for that purpose. And we have not yet ascertained those things. Moreover, when rejecting certain illusions and self-deceptions on our part, we sometimes immediately invent new ones.

It is those new ones that I would like to discuss briefly.

What Should We Call Ourselves?

There have been many arguments about words. For example, people ask: is it possible to consider our society to be socialist? For certain people the question itself causes confusion: how could it be otherwise. Others compare the socialism that has been carried out ("real" socialism) with the intended socialism and they say: no, this is different. But for some reason those who say "it's different" are not very interested in exactly what it is.

I have in mind not the term, not the name. A rather large number of terms have been proposed: both those that refine the name (barracks socialism, bureaucratic socialism) and those that give a new name (administrative-fiat system). Certain people, including myself, advise returning to the old name, "War Communism." But, for the time being, these have been empty discussions. Just as a person's name does not say anything about what kind of person he is or how he differs from others, the name of a society does not say anything if it is not clear what is concealed behind that name. Feudalism is understandable. Capitalism also. State capitalism—more or less. But who are we? How do we differ from others? How are we similar? What stage are we at?

Of course, all of us have learned a few things somehow. We have heard a lot about the fact that in our society we have social ownership instead of private, we have the power of the people instead of dominance by exploiters, real democracy instead of formal, and our own advantages. But about 20 years ago (or earlier for some people) we began to understand that this is self-deception. Advantages are verified by achievements, and if those achievements do not exist or begin to decrease, if others take the lead and we do not have the strength to catch up with them, then those advantages are no longer advantages, but are something from another opera. And it was then, at the time of the collapse of the old illusions and the finding of new ones that there arose for the first time the desire to justify and purify socialism, setting off from it the society that had formed during the Stalin era. If socialism in all respects might be above capitalism and that has not happened, then that means that we have created not socialism, but something else!

I remember well the arguments that occurred then, I remember the readers' letters to the newspapers (at that time I was working at KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA) with a stack of quotations from the classic authors concerning socialism. True, that wave did not roll up to the high scientific rostrums. Our first liberal spring was not really so warm, but in the student auditoriums and dormitories, in the editorial offices, and behind the scenes at scientific meetings and symposiums, everything was churning, bubbling, and foaming.

The first act of self-analysis is comparing oneself with others. The first thing that we did was also to look back and to the sides, comparing ourselves with our neighbors, and them with ourselves. I remember the first results of that comparison, our first "theoretical" discoveries: hey, guys, what we have is not socialism, but state capitalism!

That seemed to be the case. In our neighbors' countries the state had made inroads into the economy, and that also happened in our country. In their countries everything ran on money, but we had not abolished it. On the contrary, we talk louder and louder about material self-interestedness. But we looked deep within ourselves

and we looked carefully at our neighbors, and we understood: it's different. In our country the state, of course, "made inroads," but not into private capital, which had disappeared together with the NEP, but into that which belongs to the state. And our money also is completely different. But the most important thing is that if we are the same as them, and they are the same as us, then why have they not known our problems for such a long time?

Failing to discover anything suitable immediately around us, we began searching in back of us. Our glance glided over the centuries and the eras, and quickly stopped on the ancient East. It seemed that we had finally found our roots there. Obviously, that discovery did not make its way to the rostrums or to the printing press either in the 1960's or especially in the 1970's. But now that discovery is mentioned in large printing runs that are circulated without any hindrance: what we have is not socialism, but "the Asian method of production"!

We're getting warmer. But we're not hot yet. Yes, the Asian method of production is a closed economy with in-kind or petty-commodity relations. It is the regulating role of the state in the economy, accompanied by the cult of the first person who has been given unlimited power. But nevertheless... Nevertheless the Asian method of production is the chief of agricultural civilization, rather than industrial. But, most importantly, the Asian state, while regulating the economic ties among the communes, does not interfere in their internal economic life. But in our country we have something completely different. We have total involvement of the state, an involvement that penetrates into everything!

Perhaps the essence of this matter can be grasped in this instance by using a foreign word "state-ism," which, when literally translated, means nothing else but the universal involvement of the state. We're getting still warmer. But... but in our country the state is actually subordinate to the party, or, rather, to the party apparatus!

And so the present arguments about words lead public thought to the very essence, to those systemic roots and sources that I already began to speak about. Therefore I shall refrain from participating in the contest of names. Use whatever names you want, or do not use any names at all (for lack of something better, "real socialism" or "the Administrative System" will do), but first find out to what you are applying the name or refusing to apply it.

The party (in the form in which it developed under Stalin) is the brains and backbone of the Administrative System. And therefore it is impossible to move ahead successfully along the path of reforms, it is impossible to get rid of the deceptions and the self-deceptions, without completely analyzing exactly what this "guiding role" is. I have already attempted to say a few things about this, reflecting on the two-apparatus nature of the Administrative System, and the division of labor between the

party and the state agencies. But this is not yet everything, or perhaps not the most important thing. The "guiding role" of the Stalinist party is the granting of special powers to its priests not only in the state-economy apparatus of administration. On the contrary, its unlimited powers in the corridors of authority became possible only because it had penetrated deeply into the foundation, it had made its way to the roots, assuming the mission of an intermediary between the base and the superstructure, between the economy and man's awareness, between his labor and his soul, between reality and the ideal.

The administrative management of the economy on a noncommodity basis in an industrial country cannot be the same that it is in a preindustrial society. Economies based on in-kind or petty-commodity relations are inconceivable here, because considerable segments of the population must produce not for themselves and not for limited barter, which in preindustrial times also, in the final analysis, served personal consumption. Therefore economic administration, after the curtailment of the NEP, could not fail to be administration by fiat, and the organization of labor could not fail to be coercive.

But it was not possible to use the methods of coercion that were known to history. Slavery in its classic form was not suitable. Nor was its Trotskyite militarized version suitable. And although Stalin's camp labor armies were suitable, they could not be used everything or for all operations. Kautskiy was right: the more skilled the labor, the more sensitive it is to lack of freedom.

Industrial production, with its expensive equipment and accumulation of millions of people in cities, cannot be encouraged only by means of the whip and fear, if only because it does not allow bringing bureaucratic-police control down from the top to every work station (even if there is an administrative-repressive corps of an unprecedentedly large size). In addition, total direct coercion would cause a mass protest, since it would fail too obviously to correspond to those ideals and expectations that were sown by our proletarian revolution.

It was necessary somehow to combine one with the other. It was necessary to have coercion perceived as freedom, to transfer it into a mode of self-coercion. During the period of Trotsky's War Communism plans, one could not find the required number of persons desiring to do this. Ten years later there proved to be a completely sufficient number of them. But Stalin would not have succeeded in whipping up their inspiration or maintaining their optimism if he had not had at his disposal a special organization that had already had time to win authority by its victories and that could be perceived as a prophet-like organization that was endowed with a higher—true, not religious, but "scientific"—force, an organization knowing where and how to lead the nation. In his hands, it was the party that became such an organization. The mass appeals to young workers to join it in the second half of the 1920's, and the

headlong growth of its ranks, obviously, were not accidental: having said "A" by taking a course aimed at "socialism in one country," which was not yet the most developed one, that was forced to keep up with the others, it was necessary to say "B" and all the subsequent letters.

Like the church in the Middle Ages, the Stalinist party attempted—under the banner of a cultural revolution—to carry out the ideological, spiritual consolidation of the nation, to mobilize it to achieve the "final goals" that had been set by it. Without the party, Stalin not only could not have maintained the social rapture of the workers and the village activists, but—most importantly—he would not have succeeded in ideologically neutralizing the bulk of the population and reconciling it with "socialism" and its values, which is especially important for stabilizing any regime. The persons who believed in the reality of the great dream even included those who were in no hurry to overstrain themselves for the sake of bringing it nearer. They were waiting for that dream to come true. Even those who, by the measuring stick of those years, were considered to be philistines were waiting.

I wrote "like the church" by no means casually. The leader of nations who, by relying on an army (apparatus) of "religious devotees," mercilessly chopped off any heterodoxy, was in no way jarred by this rather "heretical" analogy. Because it was no one else but that leader himself who compared the party with the "order of sword-bearers"! It was no one else but he himself who carefully wove into his speech that was devoted to the memory of Lenin the not very pretty word "commandment"!

I am guessing that the well-informed reader will begin to protest. He will probably say that not a single religion or a single religious organization has left the followers such a spiritual desert as Stalin's "church" did. He will remind us that no previous persecutions, with regard to the number of victims, can compare in any way with the exploits of the Stalinist executioners. I shall not argue with that. I will only add that not a single church has given itself the task which, for the Stalinist party, was practically the basic one: to create special spiritual incitements to labor, to replace material incentives with ideological ones, to imbue the entire economic life with ideology. I think that here, at this point, the rays of all the present arguments come together, regardless of whether the persons arguing are aware of this. I think that here is the chief knot of today's contradictions and tomorrow's, a knot which it will by no means be simple to cut apart.

For decades the party played the role of the economic "church," possessing the monopoly right to interpret the meaning of our daily labor and life as a whole, and it acted as a kind of emissary of the future in the present, an empowered agent of ideals and goals. But if an organization like that changes course sharply, if it drops

down from the heavens to the earth and proclaims, "Work better, so that you can earn more, so that you and your children live in abundance right now, rather than at some time in the future, seek the meaning of your existence not beyond the horizon, but right next to you," if it decides to admit that the value of man and his work must be measured not by the leadership that is acting in his name, but by the consumer who is dependent upon that work, then it is entering into conflict with itself.

Closing one's eyes to that would be unforgivable thoughtlessness and even more self-deception, which would inevitably be followed by the next deceptions. It is necessary to be aware of the fact that the famous article "I Cannot Waive My Principles," that was published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, is not simply the mouthpiece of certain people's interests (although, of course, it is a mouthpiece), or that there lies concealed behind the "principles" not simply the thirst for "objectivity" with respect to Stalin and his "achievements," but also the desire to preserve the party in its previous role of a gardener who is transplanting ideals and goals ("principles") from an ideological hotbed into our daily existence.

It would probably be worthwhile to think about why the crevasse of the conflict cut first of all through the sphere of ideology, when it has not affected (so far) the economy and politics. Is it not because the "guiding role" lay first of all, up until now, in the ideological occupation both of the economy and of everything else? And does it not follow from this that the "manifestos of the anti-perestroika forces" can be successfully opposed only by those "perestroika" manifestos in which a new party concept is set forth?

It must be said that this conflict arose not today or even yesterday (although it has never previously been so acute). It too has its biography, its history with a large number of concomitant deceptions and self-deceptions.

People came up against that conflict as long ago as the 1930's. When socialism—or what was understood by that term—was victorious "over the entire front," when the collectivization was completed (which also, as everyone knows, was a "victory of socialism"), when it was announced that the first five-year plan had been overfulfilled and the modern branches of industry that we were lacking had been created, when all our "enemies" had been eliminated, and when the "congress of victors" was held with at least outward triumph, the question was asked with all seriousness, "What is there left for us to do?" We had rushed through the tunnel, we had made our way to the end of it. Where were we supposed to go now? And why? It was necessary either to change the entire system of life incentives, or to create a new ideological tunnel in the manner of the old one.

Stalin took the second path. You remember, of course, how he substantiated and explained every so well at that time. Although socialism had been completely victorious, it was still not final: intervention was possible. It

was necessary to be ready for everything. The enemy is not sleeping. The more successes we have, the greater his spite and hatred. The class struggle is intensifying. Be vigilant. Trotskiyite and other hypocrites and double-dealers are swarming around us. We have already begun catching them...

But people began to get tired of campaign life, and the amount of enthusiasm and zeal kept getting smaller and smaller, so Stalin, in order to restore them, had to announce, in a semi-impoverished country with a ruined countryside, a course aimed at communism, and simultaneously to intensify the War Communism coercion and (also simultaneously) to seek other incentives: in the late 1930's people began talking even of the intensification of "material self-interestedness." And no one knows how far this would have gone if there had not been a war, to the conditions of which the War Communism organization of life was adapted much better than to calm peacetime existence.

Khrushchev, upon coming to power, understood that the image of the internal enemy had long since lost its encouraging role. So he buried it. The Khrushchev era is not only mass rehabilitations. It seems to me that the change of the course did not reveal itself in anything else so graphically as was revealed in the way that Beriya was eliminated. Ye, he—in the spirit of the well-known tradition—was declared to be a British spy. But for the first time in many years a major foreign intelligence worker proved not to have a well-developed network of enemy agents throughout the country. The elimination of Beriya meant not the resurrection of the image of the enemy, but its liquidation.

But without the image of an internal enemy, there is no justification for the War Communism way of life at all. Khrushchev began to break it. People began to have the present returned to them, and the significance of their personal life and their individual interests began to rise slightly. Timidly, cautiously, as though moving in the shadows, material self-interestedness was legalized. The first major blow was inflicted on the barracks collectivism of dormitories and the communal-apartment way of life: Khrushchev's five-story buildings opened up a new era—the era of individual urban life.

But Khrushchev remained a prisoner of the War Communism ideal. He attempted to purify it, to humanize it, to destroy its "military" component, but he made no encroachments either on barracks-style equalization, in which he did not perceive anything barracks-life, or on the very principle of state-party-ideological incentives for, and regulation of, the economy. He could not imagine anything different: the word "market" caused him to grind his teeth. Therefore he, having rehabilitated the present and individual life, continued to point to the communist light at the end of the tunnel and to demand the subordination of personal interests to social ones.

It is said to recall the lines that were written at that time into the party program and that did so much to harm the reputation of our reformer—lines about how we were separated from communism by only two decades of stubborn labor. But if one judges a person according to those laws to which he has subordinated himself, then Khrushchev was consistent and really was not so hopelessly primitive.

There were two roads in front of him: either break the administrative mechanism and force the changeover to economic methods of management, or begin the capital repair of that mechanism, replacing en route some parts or entire assemblies with new ones, and simultaneously intensifying the ideological expansion into economic life. Just as Stalin, in the mid-1930's, had chosen that which was familiar and known to him, Khrushchev chose the second path, because he was not ready for the first; it frightened him with its unexplored nature and its incompatibility with the political indoctrination that he had already received.

Yes, we ask ourselves, placing our hand on our heart, "Was the previous way of life—the life of living in the future without a present—really exhausted then?" Because we had the virgin lands, we had the Siberian construction projects, and the new, post-Stalin youth rushed everywhere in the North or in the East, seeking in the tent difficulties and tribulations their civic awareness and envying the older generation for already having built everything and won everything, leaving their children so little of any real cause. Yes, we had all that! We really did! And if that is so, then could it be that Khrushchev did not deceive others so much as he himself was deceived? Could it be that he genuinely believed that there exist in the nation unexpended young forces that are capable of working miracles if they believe that the miracles are attainable? Or was the promise of rapid communism the straw at which the already sinking leader grasped?

However it may be, when looking back and peering into the young faces of the workers on the virgin lands and the builders of Bratsk, we shall be sober in our judgments and evaluations. Whether or not Khrushchev had tricked us is not really so important. It is more important to understand where he had erred. The brief and bright flash of enthusiasm and selfless devotion that he succeeded in causing (for the first time without relying on the image of an enemy!) was simultaneously the manifestation of a profound crisis that people were not yet aware of. If the most dynamic young people had rushed from the well-populated, well-developed areas into the uninhabited Siberia, that meant that the society that had been created under Stalin did not satisfy them. It meant that that society did not give them any room for initiative or creativity. It meant that the society could develop only in width, not in depth. That meant that even Khrushchev's reforms were insufficient, that they stirred up society, but did not replow it, they did not communicate to it any new impetuses, they did not charge it

with other, more modern types of energy, and therefore the wave of enthusiasm quickly died down and the country began to turn away from Khrushchev with disapproval and ridicule.

He was a reformer without a new idea. Therefore to many he seemed to be a destroyer, rather than a creator. And the lower that his prestige fell, the stronger he held onto the Stalinist heritage and the more he worried about the foundations of the system and threatened everyone who seemed to him to be undermining them.

But the providing of ideological incentives for the economy could have already been retired. The romanticism of the Siberian trail-blazing began to die down, and it was necessary with increasing frequency to pay extra for the enthusiasm, but people were not eager to admit this. They attempted to preserve the chastity of the ideological unselfishness (otherwise how could you indoctrinate others?), and in order to combine that which was uncombinable, they began, as one can easily guess, to exaggerate. Just read the newspapers printed in the early 1960's and you will perhaps be surprised at how the journalists attempted to prove that the reason people were going to Siberia was not to get easy money, but in order to enjoy the fog and the smell of the taiga, on the one hand, and in order to make their contribution to the common cause and be of benefit to other people, on the other hand.

Under Brezhnev, who, for the sake of foreign stability, drove all the contradictions deeper, reconciling everything with everything and everyone with everyone, lying became the norm. Life and ideology parted finally. No one yet wanted to sacrifice the present for the sake of the future, but they connived and demonstrated rare verbal resourcefulness, and it turned out that there was no conflict at all, and that everything was moving in the necessary direction. Does a person want to live better? Then that is good. It corresponds to our ideals. Everything for man!—that is our principle and our slogan. It is good when people want to have separate apartments and nice furniture. It is good if their needs grow. Do the enthusiasts no longer want to freeze in tents? All right, then, it is necessary to listen carefully to them. Their demands are lawful. One ought to think a bit about first building homes, and only then think about building plants.

But somehow it turned out that life was not becoming better. The problems were not being resolved, and there seemed to be no guilty individuals. Or, rather, the persons who were identified as being the guilty individuals were exactly those for whom things were going poorly. And, actually, where can we get everything from, if we do not make them ourselves, or if we work half-heartedly? Because there is no denying that that does happen in our society. Therefore let's be more conscientious, more zealous. Let's think more about our common causes and ideals. Let's participate more frequently in **subbotniks** and let's stop putting the personal

above the social (this is to assure that one is not paid more for good work than for bad work, but is paid more for necessary work than for unnecessary work, that is, for bureaucratic work).

Probably never before was so much effort or so much money thrown into implementing an ideology as during the era of stagnation. And never before had that expansion been so fruitless. No one put up any resistance to it, but it bumped into a solid wall of indifference and apathy that could withstand any assault or the longest siege.

Millions of people who had been deprived of proper living conditions for decades, upon being freed of the fear of being caught red-handed as philistines or unconscientious individuals, people who had thrown off from themselves the burden of War Communism customs and values, and who had ceased being proud of poverty and being ashamed of prosperity, rushed to arrange their own private life. This was an unprecedented outburst of arranging private life—impulsive, avid, clumsy, and in some respects detrimental, and absorbing all the mental powers. But could it have been otherwise, if the light at the end of the tunnel had been seen only by those who pointed it out from the rostrums, if normal life had not yet arrived after so long a time, and it was so difficult to establish it?

The people who did this were not hindered, but they were censured. Their critics reconciled themselves to what was happening, but they did not tire of reminding people that this should not be happening. And when our urban prose began to describe with understanding, anguish, and pain what was occurring in the dining rooms and bedrooms, in the swap bureaus and furniture stores, then people did not like that: everyday life is not supposed to take the place of objective reality! It turned out that previously there had been objective reality, but now it was being destroyed by everyday life. It turned out that the departing War Communism lack of everyday life was, in fact, objective reality. It turned out that we were confronted not by an agonizing and painfully strained breakthrough to a new objective reality and new meaning, but the loss of a sense of reality and a loss of every meaning.

The Brezhnev era was, of course, stagnation. But it was stagnation only because, and to the extent that, it was the consequence of the final disintegration of the War Communism way of life, and primarily the self-exhaustion of the War Communism incentives for labor participation. People were allowed to live well, the personal "I want" was rehabilitated and was crushed by the impersonal "it is necessary." But that was only in everyday life. On the job the "it is necessary" was not replaced by anything, and therefore, after crossing the apartment threshold, everyone began to feel that nothing was necessary. Everyone wanted everything, but everything came to a stop.

On the Threshold of a Spiritual Revolution

Perestroyka was supposed to replace the impersonal "it is necessary" by the personal "I want" not only in everyday life, but also on the job. Otherwise it would not restructure anything. That means that it would be necessary to break the entire system of values, the entire War Communism ideology of incentives that had come down to us from Stalin's times. To break it, rather than purify it! People also said then, "Work better in order to live better." But by that they understood: work better now, and live better later on. They understood: living better means that everyone will live identically well. But that is precisely what will have to be changed. The perestroyka formula is: if today I work well, then I will also live well today, if I work better than someone else, then I also have the right to live better than he does; it is not for the leadership to decide who of us is worth what, but rather the purchaser of our output. There is nothing simpler than this. And nothing more complicated. Not only because this affects the principles against which neither the reformer Khrushchev nor the conservative Brezhnev dared to raise their hand—the principles of ideological incentives for economic activity, which, for the Stalinist party, were actually the most fundamental, keystone, and unquestionable ones; waiving them would mean actually going farther than many would want to or be able to. This is also complicated because principles are protected not only by the overly principled functionaries and the volunteers who are ready to help them with their pens.

War Communism ideology has been removed from the awareness of many people not entirely, but only halfway. The enthusiasm and labor zeal caused by the forced sense or premonition of a military threat remain the past, but the "communist" component of that ideology has remained firmly and consciously established in people's heads. Millions of people have been taught that the farther ahead we go, the closer we get to complete equality. It was not by accident that Khrushchev took a course aimed at overcoming the gap in the payment of labor—he acted in accordance with mass expectations. Corresponding to these expectations relative to the future is the process of equalization in the present. But how does one combine the ideal of equality with the deepening of differences to which payment on the basis of labor and an orientation on the consumer inevitably lead?

I think that it is necessary to tell ourselves clearly and definitely: the combining is impossible. And to reject it. When the truth is hard, people are afraid to admit it, but concealing it is dangerous. It is necessary sharply and openly to shift the emphasis from the future to the present. China was the first country to take this truly decisive, truly bold step in this direction: it was announced there that socialism will not be built there until a hundred years from now, and even that will not be completely, but only basically. This shifting of the ideal far ahead, while simultaneously lowering it and

bringing it closer to earth, means the beginning of an ideological revolution. This is not rejection of an ideology or of ideals in general. And it is not even rejection of the ideological incentives for economic participation. No, this is only the rejection of that ideological incentive which claims to replace the economic incentive. And it is a search for that ideology which could help man to adapt to the economic incentives and to accept them, an ideology that would fuse them into realized motivations, and would convert them into a stable spiritual reality.

The War Communist ideal, by rejecting the present for the sake of the future, deprives us of the future. Because the War Communism economy uses man without developing him; it exploits his physical and mental energy, and then cast him aside. On the other hand, the modern ideal is the ideal of individual self-developing, self-movement toward a higher proficiency level, toward a higher quality, toward the higher manifestation of creativity.

Of course, money and the market in service of the ideal can be confused; some people will possibly discover that, in all respects, the servants are below the master and they can exert a bad influence on him, and that this is a contradiction. All this is so, and who will argue it? But that contradiction is a living one. It leads us ahead, whereas War Communism noncontradictory unselfishness leads us down the blind alley of stagnation.

Therefore I shall repeat over and over that we cannot do without an ideological perestroyka. And say over and over that there is nothing more complicated than carrying it out. This is not an answer that must be urgently propagandized, but a problem which all of us will have to resolve. And the first step here is to be completely aware of it, to free it from the thick web of "principles" that enmesh it.

The transition from the noncommodity economy to commodity was never carried out easily or painlessly anywhere. It was always accompanied by (and anticipated!) by the most profound spiritual shifts. Among some nations (for example, the Japanese) the ideological revolution occurred relatively calmly and peacefully, since the new civilization found a common tongue with the existing national culture, entered into lively and fruitful dialogue with it, fed on its juices, and simultaneously enriched and transformed it, adapting it to itself. Other nations (for example, the western Europeans at the end of the Middle Ages) proved to be not so fortunate. They experienced the sharp collision between the cultural continents, when the new spiritual way of life in the form of Protestantism decisively opposed the cultural tradition. In that struggle much blood was shed, but Protestantism gave the world a new individuality, a new—responsible and disciplined—worker to whom western civilization owed much, if not everything.

It is very important for us to examine closely today the experience of the spiritual revolutions and evolutions which were carried out at various times by other nations. But nevertheless other people's experience will not replace our own. Every country enters modern civilization in its own way. Every country acquires its unique face there. And it is this road of our own, and our own special version, that we will have to seek. This is a task that is unique in its innovative nature and originality, because no one has every attempted to introduce developed commodity-monetary relations in a society where a War Communism regime existed for several decades, only because it had asserted that it had destroyed commodity production and the market. We are on the threshold of a spiritual revolution that is not only profound, but also unique, and one that will require us to apply the maximum effort and genuine creativity.

For the time being, it would seem that people are not very aware of the uniqueness and responsibility of the forthcoming (or already begun?) turning point. The "commodity types" are hurriedly describing the advantages of the market from the point of view of effectiveness and profitability, but that market is being taken by means of them, as it were, without regard for time or space, completely separated from our cultural traditions and customs, our spiritual way of life, our War Communism past. If it were so that any nation at any time is ready to accept and put into motion the most effective and most efficient means and methods of management, if certain national organisms did not reject the medicines that have already cured their neighbors, then market relations would have been established in our country as early as the times of Moscow Rus, and would have been a reality long ago in Asia, Africa, and the entire white world.

And as a reaction the the abstraction of effectiveness, the abstraction of national individuality. We do not need, people say, those things from across the sea. They won't catch on here. This is not the proper soil for them. We'll get along somehow without this "petty trading." Yes, but with what are we supposed to replace these marvels from across the sea? What are we supposed to do in order to have our own computers, as well as our own cows, which, even though they are not the best in the world, are able to feed us, or our own bread, that does not get stale long before it is delivered to the baked-goods store?

In order to find the answer, the "national-uniqueness types" send us to the national traditions and roots. But they themselves fail to notice that the desire to find in our cultural past something that is uniquely high, that is capable of replacing the "petty trading" and of surpassing it, leads them to the restoration of the War Communism ideology that they avoid as though it was the plague.

Several of them take as the basis its "military" component. They say that for long post-October decades and pre-October centuries we learned how to live and work

"for defense," and that became our special cultural reality. Therefore it would be stupid and wasteful to throw our "defense awareness" overboard. On the contrary, it is only from that awareness that we can derive the strength for a new spurt. It remains today a storage battery providing our national energy.

All this would appear to be very enticing if there were not a certain hitch. The "defense awareness" that is known to us could be a reality only because the barracks organization of life and the image of the enemy were a reality. But how can we contrive to preserve that which is "good," and eliminate that which is "bad"? For the time being, so far as I can judge, no one has yet discovered how to contrive this.

Others are attracted to the "communist" link in this old ideology. Of course, also without the costs that were inherent in the Stalinist era, without the sacrificing and disdaining of man. It is proposed that all of this be rejected. But it is necessary to preserve the traditions that go back to the days of communal existence—traditions of humanitarianism, mutual assistance, collectivism. It is necessary for man to work not because of his own selfish motivations, not for the sake of his personal success or wealth that elevate him above his associates, but out of a sense of love for people, and the desire to be needed by them. And all this looks very attractive and I am ready to sign my name under every word, if they will explain to me why things still have not turned out until now without the "costs," why the equality, collectivism, and justice that oppose the fractionation, individualism, and injustice that are being caused by "petty trading" have led not to the triumph of universal love, but to barracks-style equalization, to universal depersonalization, and to the escalation of hatred. Without feeling any sympathies for "petty trading," I nevertheless want to know why the desire to place oneself above it ended, until most recently, in submergence into barbarism. And I would like to know why we must believe that nothing like this can happen in the future.

In my opinion, it is nevertheless better to find one's road into the world family of nations that to try once again to rise above them. For the time being, we have not found that road. For the time being, we are attempting to carry out perestroika, using that which itself requires perestroika. We want to have this breakthrough to the new management method to be carried out by the enthusiasts at their machine tools and in the offices of leadership, without being aware that mass enthusiasm is the result of the same War Communism organization of the economy that we are indeed attempting to rid ourselves of. We want the bureaucrats to display nonbureaucratic consciousness and to put the dynamite under their own chairs.

But the illusions are gradually disappearing. Their place is being taken by a fatigue that has been building up from long expectations. We are faced, to an extent that is even more acute than previously, with specific questions

about commodities that do not exist or that continue to be completely useless and about prices that have been rising even before there is an announcement that they will rise. With increasing frequency we hear voices saying that we need real success, success than can be sensed by everyone. Otherwise the reserve of optimism concerning perestroyka will finally dry up, and without it there will not be any perestroyka.

It is difficult to argue with this. Success is needed, and so is optimism. But let us not deceive one another for yet another time: optimism can also be caused artificially (for example, by purchasing scarce commodities abroad), but it will not have any relationship to perestroyka.

Perestroyka is the demolition of the Administrative System. It is the formation of the modern worker and a modern economy, the creation of a democratic political system. And optimism can become something stable and firm when people see, first of all, that this is possible, and, secondly, that, as a result, life is becoming better than it was.

For the time being, there are not many grounds for this kind of optimism. Therefore it continues to be so difficult to speak the truth. Therefore the truth remains a symbol and slogan of changes.

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Pravda Readers Respond to Article on Soviet Germans

18300431 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 10 Mar 89 p 4

[Letters from *PRAVDA* readers in response to 5 November 1988 article with identical title: "Soviet Germans Before the War and Today"]

[Text] An article by V. Auman and V. Chernyshev under the same headline ["Soviet Germans Before the War and Today] was published in *PRAVDA* on 5 November 1988. Recounted in it was the history, life and work in our times of the two million Soviet Germans. Hundreds of readers of various nationalities responded to its publication. Many were disturbed by the dramatic pages of the past of the Soviet Germans, which had been concealed from the public during the years of the cult of personality and stagnation and which showed that the Soviet Germans had been subjected to unjustified repressions by Stalin and his circle of cronies. The Soviet Germans were the first ones in the country who fully experienced what our prominent poet, A. Tvardovskiy, wrote in the poem "Beyond the Distant Point Is a Distant Point": "...In the hour evil, having the law defied, he could upon entire peoples his own wrath supreme bring down."

Those dark times have become a thing of the past, but their legacy, burdened by the years of stagnation, continues to be felt even today. The incomplete public exoneration of an entire people has had a negative effect on the level of satisfaction of its national inquiries and the development of the native language and culture. During the preparations for the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the Problems of Interethnic Relations, these questions are arising again and they require their own solution through the joint efforts of our entire society. We are publishing some of the responses received.

The fate of the Soviet Germans disturbs many people today. Those who are at least a little bit familiar with history know that, over the last 3 centuries, the Germans have made a large contribution to the development of domestic science and culture. Inscribed forever in our history are the names of Barclay de Toll and one more hero of the War of 1812, the partisan Fiegner. Karl von Clausewitz fought in the uniform of a Russian officer and was awarded the Golden Saber for bravery. Then there are the Decembrists Pestel, Kuechelbaecker, Lohrer and Stengel, the founder of the homeland's archaeology and an academic, Keppen, and the St. Petersburg merchant, Schliemann, who discovered Troy! And there are the writers Vonwiesen and Delwig, the artists Bryullov and Roehrich and the sculptor Klodt!

Not forgotten is the scientific exploit of the polar researchers Otto Yulyevich Shmidt and Ernst Teodorovich Krenkel. Fridrikh Arturovich Tsander became a companion of Tsiolkovskiy and a continuer of his work.

Russian German gave the world the academic Raushenbakh, the pianists Rudolf Kerer and Svyatoslav Rikhter, the composer Alfred Shnitke and many other figures of science, culture, and education, and excellent business executives.

Many Russian Germans, as is well known, preserved in their new homeland their own language, their own customs and their own culture. Folklore and literature of the Russian Germans emerged, as did national regions in the Volga River Region, the Ukraine and the North Caucasus Region. Before the war, there were five VUZ's with instruction given in German in the country and teachers technical schools in Khortitse and Prishib, in Feodosiya, Leningrad and Slavgorod, and in other places. There were German primary and secondary schools, three operating theaters and a publishing house.

Now it is necessary to do everything possible to help our fellow countrymen-Germans to reconstruct anew their own statehood, of which they were deprived during the era when entire peoples were declared "enemies of the people." Of course, a lot will have to be done, as it were, from scratch. Not all will want to leave their new places of habitation, where, possibly, they have already taken root and much has become native to them. Yet, at the site where the Volga German Republic once existed, a quite different situation has already been created. Any actions which can be undertaken to re-establish the statehood of the Soviet Germans, of course, should be careful ones, tactful and considerate of everyone's interests.

[Signed] D. Likhachev, academician, and N. Samvelyan, writer, Leningrad.

Thank you for a real and balanced article. In my opinion, also extremely necessary are similar articles about the Soviet Poles, Koreans, Greeks, Bulgars, Hungarians, Uighurs... Such publications are more useful than general discussions about the friendship of peoples. Objective information dispels prejudices and biases in some people and strengthens the feeling of human and national dignity in others. In reading the article, one gets a specific idea about the people and their contribution to the national economy, science and culture.

[Signed] Ye. Shtokman, Rostov-on-Don.

Recently, the newspapers have been writing a lot about the citizens of German nationality who are leaving for the FRG. Through your newspaper, I want to say to them: our homeland is here, in the Soviet Union. Take time for second thoughts, weigh all the "pros" and "cons" and you will find a way out of the labyrinth in which you are wandering. The revolutionary perestroika, democratization and glasnost in our country, in the future, will solve all the questions on the basis of Leninist principles and in the spirit of justice. Our people of German nationality were, are and will remain members of the family of peoples of the USSR.

[Signed] I. Goberling, Ryazan.

The article touched my heart and I decided to thank the authors on behalf of myself and in the name of all my older relatives who have perished and died. Our parents also thus went to the grave as pariahs who were on the special list. Your article, to a certain degree, exonerated all of them. Thank you for not allowing the labor of the Soviet Germans and their contribution to the common affairs of the people to remain unnoticed.

[Signed] M. Dakhler, Dushanbe.

With the issuance of the order about dismissing Germans from the active army, I, along with other Germans, was sent to Magnitogorsk and enrolled in the work colony at the metallurgical combine. Later, I was sent to Frunze. In subsequent years, I experienced a large number of deprivations, was placed on the list as an exile without the right to leave and could not continue my studies. My daughter, born here, was placed on the special list as well.

Only after Stalin's death did our legal position gradually begin to change for the better. However, I could not even go to my hometown, to Odessa. I have spent my life in Kazakhstan. I have worked for 45 years. My cherished dream always was and remains—to return to my native regions. However, for all practical purposes, this is impossible even now, since no one would give me an apartment there and exchanging my own in Alma-Ata for an apartment in Odessa is impossible.

[Signed] A. Ritter, Alma-Ata.

Despite the enormous damage inflicted on our country by Hitler's Germany, we, the Soviet people, have never been ruled by a blind feeling of hatred toward Germans in general and, especially, toward Soviet Germans. It is impossible not to respect these hard-working people, people with a high degree of culture.

*[Signed] V. Kichigin and other workers of the Nizhneka-
mskneftekhim Association.*

I read with satisfaction the article "Soviet Germans Before the War and Today." I have long awaited such an article. Yes, the time has come to restore justice with respect to the Soviet Germans. While realizing that, in all probability, there is no chance of re-establishing the ASSR of the Volga Germans within the former boundaries, all the same, I feel it is necessary to establish a new formation, taking into account the existing realities.

[Signed] R. Bender, Krasnoyarsk.

I read with interest the article about the Soviet Germans, although I am not German by nationality. Such articles facilitate the growth of respect for people of other nationalities.

M. S. Gorbachev emphasized in one of his own speeches that a Soviet person of any nationality should feel that he is protected in our country. It is necessary to develop this thought further in articles and by specific deeds.

[Signed] Ya. Kreyzin, pensioner and CPSU member since 1943, Moscow.

I am 41 years old. I wanted very much to learn about the history of my own people: when and from where the Germans immigrated into Russia, how they lived and what kind of contribution they made to the development of Russia and the establishment of the Soviet State.

I got interested and looked for grains of truth in encyclopedias, reference works and artistic literature, but could find almost nothing, and here, suddenly, so much information! Finally, the young generation of Soviet German citizens and, indeed, all the Soviet people can learn the truth and we Germans no longer need to be embarrassed about our own grandparents and parents.

[Signed] V. Lyust, Berdyansk.

NKAO Group Visits Yerevan to Discuss Cultural Ties

18000680a Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
4 Mar 1989 p 4

[Interview with Lenard Gaziyan, head of the delegation from NKAO and chief of the oblast cultural directorate and Vardan Akopyan, representative of the Nagorno-Karabakh writers' organization and poet; interviewer Correspondent K. Zakharyan: "To Establish Creative Contacts."]

[Text] As we have already informed you, a group of workers from the cultural institutions of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast has been visiting Yerevan. The delegation from Nagorno-Karabakh came on a 3-day visit, during which its members became acquainted with the cultural life of the capital of our republic, had meetings at creative unions and the Ministry of Culture, and met with representatives of the artistic intelligentsia. Our correspondent, K. Zakharyan, met with Lenard Gaziyan, head of the delegation from NKAO and chief of the oblast cultural directorate and poet Vardan Akopyan, representative of the Nagorno-Karabakh writers' organization.

[Correspondent] We consider your visit a good beginning for extensive cultural ties between NKAO and our republic. This leads us to ask: what is the specific goal of your trip and what precisely made this visit possible today?

[Gaziyan] First, with regard to the goal of our visit. It is very simple: to take the measures necessary to implement the tasks established by the well-known decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of

Ministers on Nagorno-Karabakh. Ties, especially cultural ones, between Nagorno-Karabakh and the republic must be strengthened. I would even put it thus: these ties must interact, must merge into a single cultural movement.

[Akopyan] A clarification is necessary here: the term "ties" fails to reflect fully the essence of what is occurring in the social-economic, cultural, and ethnic life of the Armenian people. In essence, we are reestablishing normal, natural, relationships between us. After all, we have common roots and a common culture. The fact that we have been forced to forget these indisputable truths for too long is something else again. Thus, the goal of our visit is to set up specific contacts in various areas of culture—whether they be in film, in theater, or other artistic, creative spheres.

[Gaziyan] By the way, the visit of our delegation was not merely coordinated, but in essence, if I may express myself thus, was blessed by the Special Committee for Management of the NKAO. On the eve of our trip we met with committee member V. A. Sidorov, we talked things over and together developed a plan of action for our visit. By the way, I would like to note that it was precisely because of this special form of management that such business contacts and meetings were made possible today. In other times, as is well known, our meetings would have been forced to take on different coloration.

It should be noted in the light of what has been said that Nagornyy Karabakh is an uncultivated field (untapped resource). There are plenty of areas here to serve as focus for the efforts of all the representatives of the Armenian intelligentsia: writer, artists, composers, directors..

[Correspondent] Could you list the major problems which, with the help of the republic cultural agencies or other organizations, must be solved in order to foster the development of the cultural life of NKAO.

[Gaziyan] We would not divide them into major and minor. It is important to solve all problems. Let me begin with preservation of the historic and architectural monuments of Nagorno-Karabakh. As is well known, there are many of these in the Artsakh territory. Not long ago, by the way, a book by Shagen Mkrtchyan, "The Historical and Architectural Monuments of Nagorno-Karabakh," was published in Russian in Yerevan. Familiarity with this book alone, we would even call it a major monograph, forces one to think about the fate of the historical legacy of our forefathers. In Nagorno-Karabakh itself, unfortunately, we have neither sufficient resources, nor the appropriate conditions, nor the facilities and equipment to ensure that these monuments are preserved. This is precisely why it is essential to establish a section of the restoration directorate of the Armenian SSR Ministry of Culture in the oblast center, which would concern itself with all these specific issues. As it is,

a paradoxical situation has arisen today: the restoration agency operating in the oblast is not financed out of the oblast budget and thus is not accountable to the oblast cultural directorate.

[Akopyan] It is essential to establish a close bond among all the creative unions. Here is an example. At meetings at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia, the chairman of the Film Makers Union, Sergey Israyelyan, introduced us to its program. We were very pleased with it. It included the establishment of a filial of the Armenian Division of the All-Union "Kinot-sentr" in Stepanakert, as well as of a correspondents' office of the association of documentary films of the "Armenfilm" studio, the use of republic funds for a full-length film on Nagorno-Karabakh, and also for films devoted to the working day of or residents, their everyday life. All these are in the works. The film makers' program has already become a concrete plan.

No less concrete is the program of the Armenian Writers' Union. It is well known that for many years the literary life of the inhabitants of Karabakh took place outside their [i.e., the Armenian writers'] field of vision. In essence, we, found ourselves in some kind of vacuum; we were not permitted to participate in the work of the Writers' Union of Armenia, yet the Writers' Union of Azerbaijan did not have a section devoted to Armenian literature. Today the situation has changed. In accordance with the program presented by the chairman of the Writers' Union of Armenia, G. Ovanesyan, in the interests of the development of Armenian literature, the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian literary organization will be placed under the jurisdiction of the Writers Union of Armenia.

It is natural that we too will have to report regularly to the board of the Armenian Writers' Union, especially since it is taking responsibility for getting talented young poets and prose writers living in the autonomous republic accepted into the USSR Writers' Union.

The program also stipulates that the writers' organization of the NKAO will participate in all the measures undertaken by the Armenian Writers' Union. We have also agreed that the best works of the writers of Nagorno-Karabakh will be published in Armenia. In the future we hope to publish a literary-artistic journal in Stepanakert.

[Gaziyan] As long as we are speaking of books, let me mention that at our meetings we came to an agreement with the Goskomizdat [State Publishing Committee] of the Armenian SSR that the oblast will be furnished with literature in the Armenian language, and also with school texts in Armenian, especially textbooks on the history of Armenia. It is shameful that in the past the syllabus did not call for teaching this subject in the Armenian schools of NKAO. By the way, in connection with the changes in

this oblast, we will need appropriately trained cadres of teachers—a certain number of newly graduated students in this subject will have to be posted to Nagorno Karabakh.

[Akopyan] One more thing with regard to yet another creative tie—this time a theatrical one. The Stepanakert dramatic theater has long been well-known to the theater buffs of Armenia. Such illustrious actors as Vagram Papazyan, and Zhasmen have performed on its stage. Today we must further develop the creative ties between our theaters. For this purpose we must have not only tours in each others' territories, but also exchanges among the artists of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Stepanakert theater also needs technical help: thanks to the efforts of the Theater Union of the Armenian SSR our theater will also be given material aid.

[Gaziyan] We are also troubled by shortage of trained workers in the area of culture. Approximately 90 percent of these workers have no special education. It is true that a good beginning has been made here by the Ministries of Culture and Public Education of the republic: the Armenian Pedagogic Institute is already training 12 students from Karabakh in the appropriate subjects. It would be desirable to organize courses in Nagorno-Karabakh to upgrade the credentials of workers in cultural education.

There are more than a few problems of course. They cannot all be covered in a single interview. We liked, for example, the proposal by G. Torosyanets, the director of the Central Committee of the Armenian CP Publishing House, to publish part of the circulation of the newspaper "Sovetakan Karabakh" in Yerevan, using the latest typography. After all, the quality of our newspapers today is that of the last century, and a publishing center will not be built in Stepanakert any time soon.

[Correspondent] Are any return visits planned from Yerevan to Stepanakert?

[Gaziyan] This must be a natural process. What is needed here: coordination among headquarters, a delegation or something else—is a technical issue. And speaking of trips, I would like to say something about tourism. Everything must be done to encourage it. After all, unfortunately, many of our countrymen from the Armenian SSR, even those whose roots are in Nagorno-Karabakh, have never once been there. There is great potential opening up here for the republic Council on Tourism. By the way, I would like to assure those who want to take a trip to Nagorno-Karabakh that any inhabitant would be overjoyed to open wide his doors to a guest from the Armenian SSR. When they have finished building the Goris-Stepanakert road, the way to Nagorno-Karabakh will seem even shorter.

**Volume of Literary Works on Chernobyl
Published**

18000680b Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in
Russian 15 Feb 89 p 4

[Interview with Ukrainian writer Vadim Shkodoy, editor and contributor to the Chernobyl collection, by L.I. Shevchenko, candidate in philosophical sciences, docent of Kiev University; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] A new book recently made its appearance on the shelves of our republic's book stores and instantly sold out. We are referring to the collection "Chernobyl. Days of Trial." This collection contains artistic works, written after the accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Energy Station and dedicated to the individuals who attempted to eradicate its aftermath. It also contains long poems by B. Oleynika and V. Brovchenko and poetry by Ye. Yevtushenko, I. Zhilenko, D. Shuply, and V. Zadvornyy. Among the authors represented are A. Voznesenskiy, V. Yavorivskiy, D. Pavlychko, Yu. Shcherbak, L. Oshanin, N. Teren, S. Yovenko, and others.

At our request, L. I. Shevchenko, candidate in physiological sciences and docent of Kiev University, met with Ukrainian writer Vadim Shkodoy, compiler of the collection and author of the essay, "Special Zone," which is included in it.

[Shevchenko] How did the idea for the collection arise?

[Shkodoy] I had occasion to visit Chernobyl more than once. I was there first on 29 April 1986. I saw it all with my own eyes, I spoke with the people and made notes, never thinking that they would one day become the basis for essays; I collected materials and articles cut out of newspapers. In short, I verified my own impressions by comparing them to the observations of others. And I still did not know that these works would be incorporated in a book published by "Radyanskiy Pismennik," and that I would become its editor and one of its authors.

[Shevchenko] This book stands out because of the richness of the material it contains. Did you conceive it as a kind of documentary-literary chronicle of the events of those unforgettable days?

[Shkodoy] For the most part, the material is arranged in chronological order—essays, interviews, drawings, short and long poems, written while the fire was still hot, are interrupted every 20-30 pages by insertions of documents chronicling the events. In our view this gives the book a special rhythm. We have included here TASS releases and fragments from speeches made by CC CPSU General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev as well as interviews with the most eminent scientists, experts who were involved in cleaning up the aftermath of the accident, and who are knowledgeable about atomic energy. Our

book also contains a review of foreign reactions to what happened and an analysis of the fables the world press planted in the minds of the people.

[Shevchenko] The essays on the heroes of Chernobyl, both those who are known and those unknown to us, who did not falter in the face of danger, are profoundly human and highly affecting. For some reason I was especially touched by ...

[Shkodoy] The essay on Vladimir Pravik.

[Shevchenko] Yes that's right.

[Shkodoy] He was the first to step forward to meet the atomic disaster. But people knew little of him as a romantic, who was highly attuned to this world, in love with life. The essay by the wonderful journalist Galina Kovtun, who died a year ago, entitled "They Lived Like Swans" talks about him as a strong person, about his remarkable love. Such a person could not act otherwise, could not help but become a hero.

[Shevchenko] The appearance of the book was a great occasion. But let me say something about its faults. In my view, it could have been illustrated in a more interesting fashion. And too it obviously would have been worthwhile to give the dates of the works and their sources, the journal or newspaper where one or another essay or poem first appeared.

[Shkodoy] I acknowledge your criticisms, but, alas, everything is not under the control of the editor. It is possible that the faults you cite will be corrected in subsequent editions. First the collection was published in the Ukrainian language in an edition of 28 thousand copies. Now we have an edition in Russian of 115 thousand copies.

[Shevchenko] Isn't that still too small?

[Shkodoy] You are right, it is just a drop in the ocean. After all, undoubtedly all those who worked to clean up the aftermath of the accident and those who were evacuated would have wanted to buy the book. Moreover, as the trade data showed, many other people would not have been averse to having this book in their libraries, and not only within the confines of our republic. A good dozen foreign publishing houses have voiced interest in it.

[Shevchenko] Yes, people want to know the truth about what happened, the facts, the documents, the testimony of eyewitnesses. I, for example, was particularly taken by the sincerity and laconicism of the notes taken by the students of the Obninsk Institute of Atomic Energy, which were published in the collection.

[Shkodoy] The Russian edition contains additional new material. This is Chernobyl seen through the eyes of those who lived there, poems by participants in the Prometheus literary association, which was active in Pripyat, by Lyubov Sirota, by Vladimir Shovkoshitnyy, who was recently accepted into the Writers' Union, and by other interesting poets.

Churbanov's Career, Ties to Brezhnev Examined
18000516 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in
Russian 31 Dec 88, 3 Jan 89, 4 Jan 89

[Article by Yevgeniy Dodolev: "A Family Chronicle During the Time of Stagnation"]

[31 Dec 88, p 4]

[Text] I lived in the same house as Yuriy Churbanov—a five-story "khrushchoba" on Second Novoostankinskaya Street. Inquisitive ladies in the pension years of their life, who knew all there was to know about the occupants of the house, held their "briefings" near its entrances. They generally gossiped dutifully about a spectacular and stately dark-haired man from the third entrance: He had abandoned his wife and child and goes on sprees like a handsome unmarried man. To put it briefly, trite rumor. Without the slightest criminal smack of the coming scandals. Yuriy headed a sector in the Komsomol Central Committee's Propaganda and Agitation Department.

The future vice-chief of the Soviet militia was born in Moscow on 11 November 1936. To a good family, they say. He worked as a mechanic. After finishing a technical school, he worked in a factory. At 23, the joker and jovial fellow, who was "his own fellow" and who knew how to speak the necessary words, became an instructor in the Komsomol Leningradskiy Rayon Committee. He later worked in the Komsomol gorkom. He worked well. But not long. The Komsomol "leader" transferred to service in agencies. He was an instructor in the RSFSR MVD detention facility political department.

Later, in a similar department of the capital's Internal Affairs Administration, he was the assistant chief for work among Komsomol members and youth.

For Churbanov, 1964 was a critical year. He completed the correspondence section of the Moscow State University philosophy department. With his brand-new diploma, he abandoned his former place of service "in connection with an assignment in the Komsomol Central Committee"—at the same time "dissolving his marriage with T. V. Churbanova by whom he had had a son in 1963." I will complete the quotation from the document: "He maintained no connections with him from that time on." Thus, the old women near the entrance had some reliable information at their disposal.

Work in the Komsomol was cheerful at that time. Yuriy's reputation among his colleagues was very excellent. Sociable, industrious, reliable. The companionable lad became intimate friends with his work colleague, Igor Shchelokov. They say that the son of the former minister of internal affairs also introduced Yuriy to Galina Brezhneva—in the restaurant at the Central House of Architects. This acquaintanceship, no matter what else, became a dizzying spring-board for Churbanov.

Yuriy caught the older Brezhnevs' fancy very much. They were already tired of the capricious circus loves of their willful and restless daughter. Churbanov stood out favorably in the eyes of his future relatives against the background of his frivolous predecessors. Here is not some short acrobat for you, who has sat in the armchair of the director of the capital's circus, and not a handsome super-illusionist. No! Yuriy Mikhaylovich, it seemed, completely assumed the look of a grenadier with honorable titles and high decorations. The stately carriage of the dark-eyed suitor with an ideal hair parting implied that these broad shoulders were meant for nothing more than the shoulderboards of a great figure. He will be—he will be a general! There is not long to wait.

In June of 1970 Churbanov was appointed deputy chief of the USSR MVD corrective labor facility political department. March of the following year found him the deputy chief of the internal troops' political administration.

The 24th congress resounded with "stormy applause which became an ovation." However, this was not the most festive event for the Brezhnevs in April of 1971. Galya was married. To the echo of studied applause, Churbanov quietly received an innocent present—the early awarding of the rank of colonel. (A military rank, I will point out. And this has significance not only for the amount of a future pension).

There were other presents after the wedding. His father-in-law presented Churbanov with a luxurious Skoda-1000. That same day, the vehicle was in a commission shop. No trouble. In two weeks, Brezhnev transferred a brand-new Renault-16 with a powerful engine to Yuriy.

The president of a Western state had presented this limousine to the general secretary and, in the logic of things, the gift's legal place was in a special garage. However, this did not prevent the new owner, Yu. M. Churbanov, from selling the vehicle for a profit sometime later.... "Ah, how many Moscow hucksters did this beaming son-in-law make happy!"

1972. The Ninth Five-Year Plan, if you are to believe the newspaper editorials, is gathering speed. The next volume of Brezhnev's works, called "Leninskym Kursom" [A Leninist Course], is published.

The grey cardinal of the general secretary, M. A. Suslov, can congratulate himself on his second Hero of Socialist Labor gold star; and the "father of the Kazakh people," D. A. Kunayev—on his first. The old buddy of the General, M. A. Shchelokov, efficiently organizes a luxurious small shop exclusively for members of his family and their lucky acquaintances (this shop operated with an annual trade turnover of 100,000 rubles).

Well, Yu. M. Churbanov was awarded the title "USSR MVD Honored Worker."

And "Galin Yura" began a bonus marathon but without looking back, I suppose, at his peerless (in a decorated sense) father-in-law who worshiped ritual procedures no less than wild boar hunts and car races. Another award—60th Anniversary of the VChK-KGB—followed immediately after the Honored Worker decoration. And another 19 domestic awards and medals. Plus 26 foreign ones.

According to the reminiscences of his relatives, Churbanov kept count of the shinnying pieces on his broad chest in an over-particular manner mainly because he had started a jealous competition with his namesake—Brezhnev's younger son. In turn, they pushed their way into ministry deputy directorships (Yuriy Brezhnev worked as a deputy minister for foreign trade), became deputies to the country's Supreme Soviet, and strove to add "candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee" to their showy titles.

Churbanov himself did not have the reputation of being a dark horse very long. Soon, his smiling impudence and vindictive lack of restraint became evident.

I think that Churbanov's pathological jealousy toward other favorites and relatives of Leonid Illich was nurtured in him for a long time, even during his Komsomol work. You see, all experienced and professional apparatchiks intently watch their "neighbors on the floors," groveling before arrogant "heads" and holding "lower people" in contempt. The main thing is not to allow yourself to be left out during the next change. Without tripping someone of your rivals up while dressed in patent leather boots, you will not step up to the next rung with that same foot. Yuriy Mikhaylovich quickly mastered the art of stamping with an overbearing foot and angrily tapping with an iron fist on his wide desk. He wanted no one to last as a potential rival. At the beginning of the 1980's, he even aspired to the uneasy chair of the minister of internal affairs, dreaming about intriguing against the aged chief. An investigator, Vyacheslav Mirtov, told me that Shchelokov once admitted over tea that Leonid Illich had proposed that the "position be freed."

When Churbanov became Brezhnev's official son-in-law, the general secretary's younger son was working in Sweden. Churbanov's career excluded the bright prospect of living abroad.

However, his younger sister, Svetlana, and her first husband, a MADI [Moscow Motor Road Institute] graduate, spent quite a few years in the West. First, in Italy; then, in England (where, later—on the eve of the grandfather's death, Andrey Yuryevich Brezhnev, a MGIMO [Moscow State Institute for International Relations] student, was sent for easy fieldwork. Igor Churbanov, the brother of the exulted son-in-law, worked four years in Geneva (his lack of knowledge of languages did not hinder him at all, as his colleagues of the time recall).

Yuriy Mikhaylovich himself loved to go off on foreign inspection trips. He even received a government decoration for one of these blitz inspections. This, however, was later. The former Komsomol worker was filled with a sense of his own grand importance moving from rank to rank. You see, he had discovered the simple secret of service advancement and had empirically calculated the desired formula of "how to be liked by everyone." He told his friends about his discovery without concealing it.

"It is simply necessary to be able to drink. Drink as much as possible, but stay on your feet during it. Then, you will get in with people."

He drank—I do not know how much—with pleasure, but with different people.

With directors and generals. With diplomats and friends. Later, when the grasping stream of "campanions-in-arms" had become shallow and when the difficult finale, like a hangover, had drawn near, he invited militia men on point-duty and chauffeurs, with whom he was acquainted, to the drunken bath and wide table. Of course, he also drank in the family circle, swearing, damning, committing assault and batteries, swinging an ax. And, I suppose, he rather accurately defined that force that is incomprehensible for gossipy Sovietologists—the force which chucks people, who are not bright but rough in mind and disposition, out onto the main line of the fanfare of official take-off, "the ability to drink."

One of Leonid Illich's former bodyguards told me about the somewhat strange, lest more be said, entertainment of the general secretary. We are talking about the last years of his administration.

A very serious illness, complicated by old age and raised to the second power by the power holder's drunken tension, had transformed the once dexterous rifleman and dashing racing driver into a feeble old man. During regular trips to his nearest dacha, one and the same odd scene was repeated from month to month until it became hysterical and a joke like in a crazy movie film. Hardly having left his residence, Leonid Illich, who loved to ride on the front seat next to the driver—in violation of tradition—ponderously turned around to his two guards and playfully "suggested":

"Lads, I have a ruble."

After this, he triumphantly took an earlier prepared one-ruble note from his jacket's breast pocket. Here, he says, is my share. As I understand it, he was in a state of holy ignorance that vodka no longer cost 2.87 rubles.

Having received the usual agreement to the daring drinking action, Leonid Illich happily commanded the chauffeur, who already knew the "illegal" route:

"Break away from them. Quickly. Let's go, let's go!"

Subsequently, he ordinarily faked a supposedly hooligan escape from contact with the escort vehicle. For one who loves a drive with a breeze, these were, I am confident, delightful moments. One of the guards, stealthily looking back, darted into a tiny store near which the limousine had stopped, as had been agreed to earlier. A single half liter in a green bottle was stored under the counter. Both bodyguards split it, the green bottle, in the middle of the nearest clearing in front of their delighted patron whose health, alas, did not permit him to take an actual part in this type of spectacle.

... They conducted a seizure of property and a search at Galina Brezhneva's home in the middle of September 1987. After all papers had been signed, one of the investigators announced:

"Galina Leonidovna, we will finish our work today."

The half-joking reply was: "Let's have a bottle. Where is the bottle?"

Churbanov's wife now asked more seriously, holding the papers in her left hand and removing her glasses in a business-like fashion with her right hand. Smiling politely, the investigator parried:

"The sun has not set ..."

The daughter of the dead general secretary persists: "Well, let us wait."

The video camera of Vsevolod Bobrov, a criminalist in the USSR Procuracy, records the fleeting confusion of the lawyers seated behind the wide table. An evasive question from the senior one of them, Vyacheslav Rafailovich Mirtov:

"Galina Leonidovna, there is some complaint?"

[3 Jan 89, p 3]

[Text] Just as her dead father, G. Brezhneva loves to crack jokes good naturedly. During the 60's, she—literally and figuratively—acquired a rare resemblance to her long ailing parent.

... On that same day when they conducted the search and Galina Leonidovna endeavored to celebrate the affair, the investigator—I remember—asked about complaints.

Well, I think, is it really possible to ask again about the bottle? No! the country's former first bride coquettishly joked:

"Of course," and, having paused playfully, interprets the unexpected statement, "They paid little attention to me as a woman. And they have still not read poetry."

When I read that L. I. Brezhnev, in confusion, identified a made-up actor with the leader of the revolution during the performance of a well known play and asked his stern neighbor in fright: "Is that Lenin? Is it necessary to welcome him?"—it does not seem ridiculous or terrible to me. It is a shame. All of us should be ashamed. For our blindness. For the anecdotes that have been constructed with a complete lack of concern and often only by a sacred defect of speech.

Because behind the ligature of amusing stories (many of which, it turns out, completely correspond to the realities of Brezhnev's way of life), there were few who were able to discern the lingering tragedy of this figure.

Enough has already been written about the sad phenomenon of Leonid Illich. However, a unanimity exists and will exist, from which people who are able to state their thoughts well cautiously hold back. To put them into the mouth of a sick old man whom they reduced to the pitiful condition of a self-willed, stubborn, careful man but—nevertheless!—a marionette. The public speeches of the soft-hearted general secretary were transformed into painful shows.

In speaking about Leonid Illich's soft-heartedness, I am really not playing the fool. A convenient analogy has become the revealing refrain of many publications during recent years: Stalin killed physically and Brezhnev destroyed spiritually.

However, the difference is indisputable. Whereas this was a tragedy, it was only a half one. The semi-tragedy was a semi-farce. They did not crack joints under torture. In the final analysis, it was possible to become an inveterate drunkard quietly. Several were "lucky"—they managed to leave. Some sleep-walked into being a hippie. Some were just as cut off—in a monastery. Finally, in themselves. When the word "dissident" became a double-edged one, a whole "generation of sidewalk cleaners and watchmen" grew up.

And something else. As soon as we fearlessly glue the decrepit executioners from the NKVD to "agencies" that do not have any relationship to them, why not call—yes, call—all recent oppressors of freedom from ministries and departments? By name. Mandatorily, by name.

The long court trial ended on the next to last day of last year.

The country's Supreme Court did not simply try generals; it tried corruption. Brezhnev corruption. For which the "leader's" spinelessness and indulgence had turned into a reliable screen in any event.

Galina Brezhneva shakes her head: "Like my father, I am not evil," and then sums up: "Kindness ruined us!"

This kindness—of a Brezhnev brand—ruined many, I suppose. Churbanov's wife talked her head off about her similarity to Leonid Illich, pointing out that she even “tried to imitate her father in her signature.” Tracing out with a shaky hand the last name known to the entire world, she complains:

“However, it is necessary. They planted this man. If you knew how I pitied Yurka. I wanted him to go—to live as he wished. However, I will never in my life trample on him. Let him take the Mercedes that he loves madly. But I do not want to see him!”

Hearing these inconsistent lamentations, I caught myself unexpectedly thinking that I also was sorry for Yuri Churbanov. I know that I am substituting. I am confident that many will not understand me. However! He was alone. Yes! Of course, he had a thousand noisy friends. A sister, a brother, concerned parents.

However, the acquaintances of the younger Churbanovs remember that an intense guardianship by a mother, who thought that she would willingly be not only the master of each of her children's destinies but also of her husband's career though he was a party raykomi secretary, exuded from the home of all three. The former colleagues of the middle brother, Igor Churbanov, remember that (using his words, of course) Mariya Petrovna actively interfered in the family life of her heirs and allegedly “divorced Igor” and “urged the poor devil Yurka to get a divorce.”

Logically, then, the first-born's second marriage was not greeted with approval only in the bride's family. Those, who visited the luxurious suite of the senior Churbanovs about 10 years ago, describe an impressive portrait of a leader who had many decorations. It was in a prominent place. Is the mother not sorry for the stunning match of her son? You see, a blue Mercedes, dachas in Barvikh, a general's shoulderboards, and a vacation in Nizhnaya Oreanda side by side with the first person in the state do not mean happiness or mental peace if there is not a really close soul nearby. I do not know how it was at the beginning of the Seventies.... Galina Brezhneva had a “close friend” from the Romen Theater, and she was living with Yuri indifferently. She lived separately.

From 1975 to 1977, Yu. Churbanov served as a deputy chief of the Internal Security Forces Main Administration (chief of the USSR MVD Internal Security Forces Main Administration's Political Administration). However, his other “position”—exalted son-in-law—helped him to manage a charitable miracle in his new career. An affected saying, stylized after the East, was evidently born somewhere in the midst of the MVD workers: “Do not have a 100 rams, but marry like Churbanov”. In seven years (1970-1977), he rose from an Internal Affairs lieutenant colonel to a combined arms lieutenant general. He managed to complete the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin.

It seems to me that Churbanov left a “good memory” in the MVD: Some workers assured me that “Yurka is not a bad fellow, in general”; others cursed him for standing in someone's light.

The fact is that the idea of establishing army-type political departments in MVD agencies (in agencies and not in the troops) belongs to him. I will quote from a letter by Zh. Ilyatov, a serviceman, which was received by me after one of my articles in which Churbanov was mentioned:

“If this had happened (the subject concerns the political departments—Ye. D.), the entire militia, the corrective labor institutions and other MVD agencies would have been taken from the control of local party committees, may Lavrentiy Palych's memory live forever. Since, I will explain for the uninitiated, political departments in the army are party agencies with the rights and functions of raykoms and higher. They only interact with local party committees. Someone in the Central Committee remembered in time, however, and truncated political departments with cultural, educational, agitation, and propaganda functions accountable to local party committees were established in the MVD. Another “service” of Churbanov is that he pushed through the Council of Ministers a decision about increasing pay for special officer ranks in the MVD by 70 rubles, that is, he practically placed them on the same footing as military officer ranks. Put briefly, the social and administrative activity of Shchelokov and Churbanov, the fathers of stagnation and corruption in the MVD, requires its own investigator since the consequences are great”

Such “investigations” are not especially countenanced, in my opinion. I have often heard statements in high offices about “periods of antiquity.” Why, they say, recall the sins of ten-year-old antiquity. On 9 September of the year before last, a decision of the Party Control Committee attached to the CPSU Central Committee expelled Churbanov from the party “for his abuse of his official position and bribery.” Seventeen days later, a USSR Council of Ministers decree deprived him of his military rank. He was arrested at the very beginning of 1987. Churbanov was not able to celebrate the 10th anniversary of his triumph....

... 1977. Brezhnev, while remaining general secretary, simultaneously became the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman. Several well known journalists were working at one of the dachas near Moscow on the next volume of “Leninskij Kursov.” Others were working on the first book in the “imperishable trilogy.” Very soon, the local inhabitants nicknamed the dacha region—more accurately, the dacha paradise, where the Brezhnevs lived—“Malaya Zemlya” [Small Land].

S. F. Medunov celebrated the first anniversary of his membership in the party's Central Committee splendidly. Sh. R. Rashidov illustriously marked his 60th and received a second Hero of Socialist of Labor star.

Well, Yu. M. Churbanov, it is clear, was not forgotten. He received two gifts for the October holidays: the rank of lieutenant general (on the eve of them) and the position of deputy minister for internal affairs (after them).

A boundary of 10 years. Afghanistan. The Olympics. But for Galina Leonidovna's husband?

There was another spurt. In 1980, Yuriy Mikhaylovich became a winner of the USSR State Prize without any unnecessary noise—"for the successful holding of the Olympic games in Moscow." Before that, in February, he was appointed first deputy to Shchelokov. Now, already the first! For Churbanov—and there is evidence for this in the criminal case—these were heady days: weeks of festively arranged hard drinking. Especially during the inspection tours around the periphery of his vast MVD system holdings. Nevertheless, the patron describes his first deputy as the best example during that period—you see, the Shchelokovs and Brezhnev's were on friendly terms at home.

From the concluding speech of A. V. Sboyev, the public prosecutor: "Heading the USSR MVD with Shchelokov and using his closeness to the head of state and his authority as first deputy minister (at the same time, being in general charge of MVD cadres), Churbanov did not shun—as it was indisputably stipulated in the court session—luxurious meetings, receptions, feasts, lavish entertainment, and expensive presents. The well-known command aura surrounded Churbanov. Thanks to this aura, he was accepted higher than some minister. This was a person, as they said in olden days, in attendance. All of his actions were determined not so much by the dimensions of the person as by his excessive greed and love of power which were fully used by the numerous time-servers, those anxious to please and bootlickers. There were quite a few of these people in our country during the time of stagnation; and they were, as you know, quite well off.

In an interview with journalists and during the court examination, defendant Churbanov's lawyer constantly drew a line and tried to suggest that they wanted to condemn his client only because of his relationship ties. One does not institute criminal proceedings only for blood ties no matter how high they are. In my opinion everyone knows this. When speaking about Churbanov, just as about bribery, however, one cannot disregard his relative connections since he rose so high thanks namely to them—to this connection and not to his personal services. He received power, and he was perceived that way in all the country's regions where they rendered him nearly a king's honor. Although based on his work qualities and professional training, he, of course, was far from old enough for the post that he had received from his "corpulent" father-in-law's hands.... He had risen to colonel general in an unbelievably short time. They did not even scatter ranks this way at the front during the war. Having acquired a taste for and demonstrating

unrestrained self-interest and being confident of his inviolability, Churbanov began to take bribes regularly and in large monetary amounts"

[4 Jan 89, p 3]

The sums indeed were not small ones. Where did they go? Yuriy Mikhaylovich sometimes hinted at his dead father-in-law and sometimes pointed to his prosperous wife (who was held as a witness in the case but never once appeared in court); however, he was not able to explain clearly on what and how he had spent the money or where he had concealed it. Aleksandr Vasilyevich Sboyev, the procurator, directed the judges' attention to this:

"... People sitting in the dock have a right to a defense and this right is in reality guaranteed to them by the presence of a personally qualified lawyer beside each one. There is also the right of each defendant to provide an explanation, as he wishes, or to refuse to testify, as Churbanov has done. In particular, he has evaded the question of where he put the money received from bribe-givers."

This, of course, was not the last question. I suppose, it was not easy for Churbanov to answer it and for those who excused him.

I will not begin to analyze the lawyer's tactics. However, I would like to express my opinion on the resounding passages concerning the "interference of the press." In the words of that same Sboyev: "... Bold journalists—these are the pace-setters of our age of restructuring. They are ubiquitous and the overwhelming majority of them are objective. They are not afraid to raise their voices, draw their pen and rush into battle for truth and social justice and for that which we have lacked for many years. With their help, we have recently received an opportunity to know 'who is who' and 'what, where, when.' It was from the press that the public found out about important criminal cases that took place in different regions of the country."

Now, after the sentence, new publications will appear. The majority of journalists, I will permit myself a prognosis, will be unanimous in their hostility to the defendants. Just as the defendants themselves are unanimously set against the investigation. As is known, however, unanimity does not mean the merging of hearts. Among Churbanov's neighbors in the dock were different people. Among them were two, in my view, interesting figures.

Kh. Kh. Yakhayev, the republic's ex-minister of internal affairs, who sat opposite Yuriy Mikhaylovich on the end of a massive—like these people themselves—bench. His neighbor to the right, P. B. Begelman, the former deputy minister for construction.

A special discussion of Yakhyayev. This individual had a complicated and contradictory nature. At one time, he worked as a chief prison warden and has written spirited verses all of his life. (On the day of the verdict when the court decision his term of punishment and sprightly escorts opened the heavy wooden wicket-gate "of the defendants' lies," I managed to get a blitz interview with Khaydar Khalikovich. It turned out that the former guardian of order had continued to write verses while confined. About what? You would never guess—about restructuring!...).

The most impressive (in amount) episode unearthed by the investigation was connected with the name of Begelman. A very real battle raged around this event during the trial.

In the end, A. V. Sboyev eliminated the so-called questionable episode. The judicial board readily agreed to reduce such a sizable sum which was almost a third of everything that was "hung" on Yu. Churbanov. The investigation showed that Brezhnev's son-in-law had received a bribe that was due to him from Yakhyayev and, all the more, from his successor, Ergashev.

Ineradicable rumors concerning the new minister—that he was Churbanov's protege—traveled about the entire republic. The investigators were convinced, as before, that Churbanov had received a very large bribe from the new minister in the fall of 1982.

Begelman, even during the first days after his arrest, talked about the circumstances of his transmitting a bribe to Churbanov from Ergashev in October 1982. When Churbanov was in Tashkent, a bath and dinner was prepared for him one day in the settlement of Chernyaevka. Begelman was working there on economic matters. After dinner in the hotel, Ergashev summoned him and handed over a black briefcase telling him to hide it and keep it at his home.

Five days later, Ergashev summoned him and suggested that he fly immediately to Moscow to deliver the briefcase to Churbanov. He handed over to him the keys to the case along with the tickets. When doing this, he said where he should meet Churbanov and warned that the trip was to be in strict secrecy.

"As I had been ordered, I left the airport building and went to the left to the parking lot. After about 10-15 minutes, a black vehicle passed by me and stopped.... A man of about 35, plump and with blonde hair approached me. He was dressed in a dark suit and tie. The man asked me where I came from and what was my last name. I answered.... He suggested that I get in the vehicle. I opened the door on the right rear and saw Churbanov there... He said: 'Sit down.' I sat down in the vehicle on the rear seat next to him, and the vehicle immediately started up.... Along the way, I placed the briefcase on the seat and the keys to the locks on top of it. Next, I pulled out a package with 20,000 rubles and

placed it on top of the case and said to Churbanov when I did this: 'This is to you from me.' He replied, 'Good.' After this, I said good-by and left the vehicle...."

Begelman testified about his motives for personally giving a bribe to Churbanov:

"I made this decision in Tashkent before the flight to Moscow. Assuming that I was to meet with Churbanov as Ergashev's courier, I decided to also use this propitious moment to give a bribe.... In Tashkent, I did not tell Ergashev that I had personally given Churbanov 20,000 rubles. I counted on the fact that there would be an opportunity in the future to provide some service to Churbanov again and that this would improve my official position. Indeed, after two-three months, Ergashev told me during a conversation that Churbanov had spoken well of me."

Churbanov reported the receipt of the bribe amounting to 200,000 rubles from Ergashev through Begelman in his statement to the USSR General Procurator on 15 January 1987, that is, on the day after his arrest.

During an interrogation on 4 February 1987, he again confirmed the receipt of a bribe from Ergashev through Begelman; however, he began to maintain that the briefcase was not intended for him but for Shchelokov, the USSR minister of internal affairs, at whose request he had met Begelman at the airport, and that he had handed over the briefcase with the money to Shchelokov in his office on the next day.

Churbanov explained: "The night before in my dacha, I examined the contents of the case and discovered that packages of money in bank wrappers filled it to the top... From experience (!!!—Ye. D.), I knew that there was approximately 200,000-300,000, though I did not count it..."

On 18 September 1987 during a confrontation with Begelman on the handing over to him of the briefcase and package, Churbanov declared:

"I listened very attentively to Begelman and honestly was amazed at the unscrupulousness with which Petr Borukhovich spoke. I did not meet him in Moscow and I do not know about this arrival... Naturally, there cannot be any talk about money. Many—now, when you think about it—many questions come into one's head... I regard Begelman's testimony in a very negative way."

Churbanov justified the renunciation of his previous confessions by the fact that he had previously allegedly "displayed cowardess." Despite the fact that Begelman continued to insist in the courtroom on the transfer of money to Churbanov, he categorically denied even the fact itself of a trip that dank evening from the Domodedovo Airport to the Sport Hotel where, in the words of his former subordinate, they parted.

A modest piece of information was the main trump card of Churbanov's lawyer: "Sport had no taxi stand. A. Begelman, that bad fellow, stated that he had climbed out of the vehicle at the stand." I have lived for ten years on Leninskiy Prospect in the neighborhood of the Sport Hotel and I can testify that the "green lights" are on duty there in the evenings, not a bit troubled by the absence of an official parking sign. There is nothing surprising in this. Not for anyone—except the lawyer, perhaps.

To put it briefly, this episode did not, as they say, "go well" in the court. Whose mistake was this? I do not know. Aeroflot documents, as it turned out, are not kept that long. A so-called motion-time study was not performed. Trusting Begelman and the testimony of the "son-in-law" himself, the investigation missed the opportunity for an experiment. In the final analysis, this played into Churbanov's hands. All doubts are in favor of the accused.

Perhaps this is the most "detective" fragment in the "Churbanov affair."

However, ... the failure to prove guilt means to prove innocence. That is why I go along with the judges' conclusion that the described meeting is the fruit of Petr Borukhovich Begelman's strange fantasies.

Although the persistence, with which he stood his ground—I do not conceal—surprised me. I have far more faith in him than in the general secretary's son-in-law. Begelman had a reputation for being a real professional. In life, it turned out, he was not modest for his rank. He had done anything he needed to "succeed", but this ruthless system—and not he—had created it. He received what was due to him because he was not able to resist it—1.5-fold more than the public prosecutor demanded.

Those, who hindered the rapid investigation of the affair, remained in the shadows. Churbanov's arrest was delayed for more than a year. During this time, he managed to make all traces disappear—in water and in fire. Among the few "items" was a luxurious folk dressing-gown (a chapan) which his neighbor gave him, having seen "Yur Mikhalych burning evidence in the yard of his dacha near Moscow. (Churbanov was wonderfully informed that the investigation was incriminating him). Now, the ex-general is probably sorry that, having yielded to the request of a true, as it seemed to him, friend, he did not commit to the fire the gold-embroidered evidence of one of his visits.

Somebody, I am convinced of this, is sorry that Churbanov himself did not give way to the cruel pressure and do away with himself. You see, it would have suited very many if the vice-minister had followed the dramatic

finale of his immediate chief, who before shooting himself in the head with a hunting rifle, wrote a note addressed to K. U. Chernenko in which he complained about the "persecution" and reserved the right to the title "true Leninist."

I am confident that they will open the archives some day and we will, of course, find out about the intriguing details of the criminal aspect of our story. We will, for example, be guided by the details of the unsuccessful attempt on Brezhnev at the end of the Sixties no worse than the unexpected turns of the successful one on Kennedy several years earlier....

For me, any of these recent suicides are inseparable from the sickly-sweet after-taste of monastery cell games after a careful analysis.

Well, who?! Who warned K. Ergashev, the Uzbek SSR former minister of internal affairs, about the arrest being prepared for him? And suggested a quick and convenient (for higher placed accomplices) out for him—a bullet in the head? Was it not those who earlier had hampered the bringing of criminal proceedings against the bribe-taker and obscurantist by citing his membership in the republic's Supreme Soviet and his membership in the republic Central Committee?

Who obligingly tossed a pistol to Uzbekistan's former first deputy minister of internal affairs? They found G. Davydov on the night of 17 May 1985 in a hospital ward with three bullet wounds in his head! The first serving of lead knocked out his jaw. The second stuck in the back of his head. The third bullet passed through his temple. There have been dozens of suicides from only one of these!

What, nevertheless, compelled the titled Mafiosi to put pressure on the triggers of the breach automatics? What if one ignores the questionable version of the professionally staged "clearing of the stage"?

Some were killed and others received their term. An unavoidable finale? I think not. Had Yu. V. Andropov not formally given an impetus to all these affairs, it could have been "avoided."

However, their heirs, who find it sweet to bully the law, remain. I do not have in mind the heirs of their concealed treasures, of course. We have been fed enough "disturbing" rumors. It is time to open up another "closed subject."

Evaluating Effectiveness of Public Information About AIDS With a Telephone Survey
54001014 Moscow ZHURNAL MIKROBIOLOGII,
EPIDEMIOLOGII I IMMUNOBIOLOGII in Russian
No 10, Oct 88 pp 20-22

[Article by V. V. Pokrovskiy and A. I. Akimov, Epidemiology Central Scientific Research Institute, USSR Ministry of Health, Moscow]

[Text] At the present time, educating the public in correct sexual behavior is the only effective measure for preventing the propagation of infection with human

immunodeficiency virus, which causes AIDS.^{1,2} The USSR's mass media has been used extensively for this purpose since February of 1987.

Just between February and October 1987, associates from the USSR Ministry of Health's Epidemiology Central Scientific Research Institute prepared 23 publications in central and Moscow newspapers and journals, four television broadcasts on all-union and Moscow channels, four all-union radio broadcasts, and 53 lectures for physicians and the public about AIDS. In addition to the associates from the Epidemiology Central Scientific Research Institute, many other scholars and health care organizers (including V. M. Zhdanov, G. N. Khlyabich, R. V. Petrov, R. M. Khaikov, M. I. Narkevich, and O. F. Bogatyrev) took part in disseminating accurate information about AIDS. The purpose of the present study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the measures used to inform the public about AIDS.

Materials and methods. Two telephone surveys of the public (using random telephone number sampling) were conducted—one in July 1987 (100 persons surveyed) and the other in October 1987 (sample size, 100). A total of 57 persons declined to respond (21 in July, and 36 in October). The questionnaire included the following questions: 1. What is AIDS? 2. How does a person get AIDS? 3. Who is at risk of getting AIDS? 4. How is AIDS transmitted? 5. Where did you learn about AIDS? and 6. Has the mass media done enough to inform the public about AIDS? Questions 8 and 9 dealt with the respondent's age, education, and occupation. The responses to

questions 1-4 were judged to be "correct," "partially correct," "incorrect," or "does not know." The possible responses to question 5 were as follows: "from newspapers and journals," "from television," "from radio," "from acquaintances," or "from physicians." The responses to question 6 could be either "yes" or "no."

Results and discussion. One hundred ninety-seven questionnaires were analyzed (three were unusable). The respondents' ages ranged from 18 to 83 years, with the average being 45 years. There were 127 females and 70 males. Of those surveyed, 51.3% had some higher education, 40.6% had a secondary education, and 8.1% did not complete secondary education. Table 1 presents the responses to the first four questions. As is evident from Table 1, 78.6% of those surveyed had correct or partially correct notions about what AIDS is. Similar responses were given by 65.0% of the respondents to the question "How is AIDS acquired?" Also, 62.4% had an idea of which groups are at risk for AIDS. With regard to the question on the transmission routes of the AIDS pathogen, 89.3% responded with correct or partially correct answers. The drop in the frequency of correct (positive) responses to questions 2 and 3 was evidently connected with the fact that a number of publications stated that weakened immunity was the cause of the development of AIDS and that the risk groups were those who have a promiscuous sex life and blood donors. The latter were considered a risk group because they, specifically, are subjected to testing for the AIDS virus antibody. At the same time, the percentage of "positive" responses to the question about the routes of the virus's transmission turned out to be encouragingly high.

Results of Telephone Survey of the Public (absolute/%)

No	Question	Correct Responses			Partially Correct Responses			Incorrect Responses			Response "Does not know"		
		July	October	Total	July	October	Total	July	October	Total	July	October	Total
1	What is AIDS?	36/38.8	34/34.3	70/35.5	38/38.8	47/47.8	85/43.2	13/13.3	7/7.1	20/10.2	11/11.2	11/11.1	22/11.2
2	How does a person get AIDS?	54/55.1	34/34.3	88/44.7	17/17.4	23/23.2	40/20.3	11/11.2	25/25.3	36/18.3	16/16.3	17/17.2	33/16.8
3	Who is at risk of getting AIDS?	31/31.6	25/25.3	56/28.4	28/28.6	39/39.4	67/34.0	22/22.5	24/24.2	46/23.4	17/17.3	11/11.1	28/14.2
4	How is AIDS transmitted?	45/45.9	56/56.6	101/51.3	42/42.9	33/33.3	75/38.1	5/5.1	5/5.1	10/5.1	6/6.1	5/5.1	11/5.6

No significant ($p > 0.1$) differences were found in the knowledge level in July and October, despite the fact that the number of publications increased significantly during this period. This was obviously related to the fact that these publications did not, as a rule, contain anything new to readers. The increase in the number of those who declined to be surveyed in October (the number was 58% higher than in July) was connected with the excess of monotonous information. The general motivation for the refusals was "I have had enough."

The overwhelming majority of those surveyed (67.5%) learned of AIDS from newspapers and journals; 20.8% learned of it from television messages, 5.6% from the radio, 5.1% from acquaintances, and 1% from physicians. There was no significant difference between the polling data of July and that of October.

Of those surveyed, 43.2% felt that the mass media is not informing the public about AIDS sufficiently. When the responses of the individuals in this group are compared

with those who believe that sufficient information is being provided, it turns out that the former group actually did somewhat worse on the questions (45% and 56%, respectively, responded correctly to the question about transmission routes). In July, 52% of those surveyed felt that enough information is being published about AIDS. In October, the figure was 58%.

Education had a definite effect on the correctness of the responses. Thus, 69.8% of those who responded correctly about the virus's transmission routes had a higher education, 44.2% had a secondary education, and 18.8% had only partially completed secondary education. Among the 58 individuals below the age of 35 years, only 1 answered that he did not know to the question about the routes by which AIDS is spread. The others either responded with correct answers (34) or partially correct answers (23). At the same time, 20 (14.8%) of the older respondents answered incorrectly or that they did not know.

No differences in the knowledge levels of men and women were noted.

The survey results demonstrated that even though the health education measures have had an obvious effect, the effect cannot be considered sufficient.

Several distinctive features of the telephone survey method were discovered. The study samples, in which people with a higher education predominates, were not random, since persons who have a higher education are undoubtedly more likely to have telephones at home and at work than are people with a secondary or an incomplete secondary education. This also apparently explains the predominance of older persons. An analysis of the results revealed defects in the formulation of certain survey questions (questions 2 and 3) that resulted in a certain subjectivity in evaluating the quality of the responses.

Thus, the research showed that the telephone survey method may be used to assess the effectiveness of public health education measures to prevent the spread of epidemic diseases. This method has helped show that the information campaign to prevent the spread of AIDS was partially effective.

Conclusions

1. The information campaign on AIDS prevention that was conducted from February to October 1987 was partially effective.
2. The telephone questioning method may be used to assess the effectiveness of mass public health education measures.

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Anti-Alcohol Campaign in Kazakhstan

18300462 Alma-Ata VESTNIK AKADEMII NAUK KAZAKHSKOY SSR in Russian No 6, Dec 88 pp 73-79

[Article by V.I. Grigoryev: "Organizational and Administrative-Legal Problems of the Struggle Against Hard Drinking and Alcoholism"]

[Text] In the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress it is stated that "in the country a struggle against hard drinking and alcoholism has unfolded. . . . Without flattering ourselves, it can be said that the drinking-bout has been squeezed from production, and it has become less in public places. . . . But in the future, too, large-scale, persistent and diverse work is needed in order to secure a definitive break in the habits that have taken shape. There must not be any indulgences here!"¹

A great deal of work on overcoming hard drinking and alcoholism is being conducted here in Kazakhstan. On 23 May 1985, the Presidium of the KaSSR Supreme Soviet adopted the ukase "On Measures to Intensify the Struggle Against Hard Drinking and Alcoholism, and the Eradication of Home-Distilling of Vodka,"² and a little bit later, with a view to coordinating the activity of state organs and public organizations aimed at the struggle with these negative social phenomenon, the Presidium of the KaSSR Supreme Soviet confirmed a new wording of the Statute on the Commissions on the Struggle Against Hard Drinking under the KaSSR Council of Ministers and the executive committees of the local Soviets of People's Deputies³ and first—the Statute on the Commissions for the Struggle Against Hard Drinking, which are being formed in enterprises, in institutions, organizations and their structural subdivisions.⁴ These and a number of normative acts, adopted in accordance with the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee "On Measures for Overcoming Hard Drinking and Alcoholism"⁵ the competent organs of the KaSSR, are the legal basis of the solution of the problem being examined.

In the KaSSR, as well as in other regions of our country, until mid-1985, the problem of hard drinking and alcoholism was extremely acute. The measures to eliminate this negative phenomenon that had been outlined earlier were implemented unsatisfactorily and did not yield positive results. In our republic an increase in crimes and administrative infringements of the law, committed in a state of intoxication, was observed in our republic. Thus,

in 1984, the incident of crimes committed in a state of intoxication ranged from 40-47 percent in Alma-Ata, Guryev, Kokchetav, North Kazakhstan, and a number of other oblasts; in 1985, thanks to the implementation of a complex of organizational, administrative law, criminal law, and other measures, the number of such oblasts sharply decreased; in 1986, there were no oblasts at all in the republic where this phenomenon reached 40 percent; but in 1987, compared to the previous year, an insignificant increase of social phenomenon took place. Administrative misdemeanors—drinking alcoholic beverages in the streets, in squares, parks and other public places or appearing in these places in the state of intoxication, insulting human dignity and public morality; drinking alcoholic beverages in industry or being at work in a state of intoxication; violation of the trade regulations for alcoholic beverages, and others, stipulated by the Ukase of the Presidium of the KaSSR Supreme Soviet of 23 May 1985—sharply increased in 1985 (by almost 50 percent in comparison with 1984). The reason for this lies not in the real increase of these administrative misdemeanors, but in the intensive law enforcement and law application activity of both the organs of internal affairs and other organs (officials) empowered to examine these cases. In 1986 and 1987, a reduction of administrative misdemeanors connected with the violation of anti-alcohol legislation is observed. The struggle for a sober way of life occurring everywhere yielded positive results: There was a reduction in per capita wine consumption (in 1984, in the KaSSR, 7.8 liters of alcohol were sold per inhabitant on the average, in 1985—6.6 liters, in 1986—3.7, and in 1987—about 3 liters).⁶ However, the alcohol consumption index remains significantly higher than the average republic index in Dzhezkazgan, Kokchetav, Pavlodar, and North Kazakhstan oblasts.⁷

From the analysis of the various official sources of information of the law enforcement organs and, in overwhelming numbers, of the organs of internal affairs, it is evident that today in the republic, in spite of all the efforts that have been undertaken, a decisive turning-point in the struggle against hard drinking and alcoholism has not yet come, and in some oblasts even a reduction in the effectiveness of this struggle is even observed.⁸ What are we required to do for the further neutralization of this negative social phenomenon? It seems to us that it is necessary to put into effect certain organizational measures.

Organization as the most important function of administration presupposes the presence of timely, reliable and complete information. The bearers of administrative violations of anti-alcohol legislation are concrete persons who have reached the age of 16.⁹ For this reason, as the results of the analysis of the administrative practice of the republic organs of internal affairs indicate, it is expedient to have an information collection—the registration of the persons who have had administrative proceedings instituted against them. In the organs of internal affairs, such card-index forms of registration

exist, and in the solution of the question of instituting administrative proceedings for the violation of anti-alcohol legislation a check of this offender is certainly conducted on the basis of the available information collections, for repeat perpetration of an analogous misdemeanor within a year entails an increased sanction.¹⁰ However, in large cities, with several rayons, such a check is made difficult. For this reason there arose the problem of the storage and receipt of this information in automated information retrieval systems (AIRS). The advantage of the AIRS over the card-index form of registration is obvious.¹¹ At the present time, AIRS have been created in a number of republic Administrations of Internal Affairs.

Along with internal affairs and other law enforcement organs, physicians and experts in narcology take an active part in the struggle against hard drinking and alcohol. The goals of the employees of the militia and the medical workers are the same—prevention and the struggle against hard drinking and alcoholism, but the methods are different: The first use basically administrative and legal, and the second—medical methods. However, the former as well as the latter must have at their disposal reliable information on the persons who are abusing alcohol and, accordingly, are in need of treatment. And the militia and the narcological service conduct their “plant” registration. This leads to an unproductive expenditure of forces, means, and imprecise information. Thus, for example, persons abusing alcoholic beverages and being in need of treatment, according to the information collections of the narcological service of the health department of the Alma-Ata Gorispolkom numbered about 3,000 during 1985-1987, and in the Administration of Internal Affairs—several times more.

Advanced experience in supplying these departments with reliable information through telephone channels of communication was accumulated in Kiev. The Administration of Internal Affairs of the Kiev Gorispolkom, jointly with the narcological service of the city health department, enter into the memory of an electronic computer information about such people. This helps to effectively expose those who are abusing alcoholic beverages, bad families, houses and apartments, and to take measures provided for by the legal norms. The technical service of the computer is effected by the information center of the Administration of Internal Affairs, and necessary data can be obtained in a few minutes over the telephone by an official of the militia as well as of the narcological service.¹²

Such technical possibilities exist in our republic in many oblast center, but unfortunately, there is a lack of organization. What is to be done in the rayon centers and small towns? The result of the analysis of practice indicates that there it is expedient to keep the usual card indexes. At present, they are kept separately by the militia and the narcological service of the public health service, but they should be kept jointly. The place for the

storage of the card indexes may be the duty stations of the city or rayon departments of internal affairs, since they operate around the clock on week-days and holidays. This will be conducive to the unification of efforts by the militia and the narcological service and will reduce scribbling.

The next aspect of the organizational problem is the lack, in the overwhelming majority of the republic's oblast centers, of specialized departments in the narcotics clinics (in Kazakhstan there are only 4 such departments with a total capacity of about 150 places). The following must go through a course of treatment in them: Chronic alcoholics suffering from serious accompanying diseases (tuberculosis, syphilis, etc.); middle-aged people (men 60 years of age and women 55 years of age and older) who are invalids of the first and second groups. In every sphere there is a sufficient number of alcoholics of that type, but up to now it is difficult to place them. The question of expanding the network of specialized departments of narcotics clinics is problematical because of their unprofitableness and weak material base, but, in our view, there is a path to the solution of this problem. The decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 7 May 1985 "On Measures to Overcome Hard Drinking and Alcoholism and to Eradicate the Home-Distilling of Vodka" ordered the Councils of Ministers of the union republic to carry out, in coordination with the Ministries of Internal Affairs, during 1986-1990, the construction and introduction of medical-labor preventive clinics with their own production base.¹³ Since the medical-labor preventive clinics already have their own production base and in the future, in accordance with the above-named decree of the government, it will be expanded, and this is a practical possibility for all who are undergoing treatment there to engage in labor on their own production base. Therefore, we propose that it is expedient to transfer from the narcological institutions to the medical-labor preventive clinics the category of alcoholics being examined, as well as those who are undergoing compulsory treatment in the narcotics clinics, and, for the patients who are suffering from serious accompanying diseases, to organize special isolation departments in the medical-labor preventive clinics.

Overcoming alcoholism is not achieved by keeping chronic alcoholics in medical-labor preventive clinics, where they undergo treatment for the first, second, and eighth time. You see, the first category of alcoholics has, to a significant degree, a positive purpose for treatment, but the second—an extremely negative one. The time has come to keep them separate. For this, we now have in our republic the practical material conditions—a sufficient number of medical-labor preventive clinics. One of the important reserves for increasing the result of the struggle against hard drinking and alcoholism is the close interaction of the internal affairs organs with the state organs and public organizations. It is realized in various forms, and one of them is the exchange of information with the law enforcement organs, the public health service, public education, the institutions of higher and

secondary specialized education, etc. As a matter of fact, prior to the beginning of 1987, we did not have any well-organized exchange of information of that sort in our republic. But in January of the past year, the Republic Coordination Council for the Struggle Against Crime, Alcoholism, and Unearned Incomes was created under the Kazakh CP Central Committee, and analogous councils were created under the obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms of the party. This made it possible to a significant extent to secure the exchange of information and coordination of the efforts of law enforcement and other state organs and public organizations.

However, this exchange of information does not have a systematic character. The dynamic of the results of the complicated struggle against this social evil is not visible to the state organs and public organizations which are conducting the struggle against hard drinking and alcoholism—which makes the work more difficult. We should publish, on the basis of a model form, in every oblast, an information bulletin of the struggle against hard drinking, alcoholism, and the legal offenses related to them. It can be prepared (if only in 30-50 copies), on the basis of their own departmental statistical data, by the administrations of internal affairs, the public health departments of the oblispolkoms, and other interested state and public organizations under the direction of the statistical administrations.

A factor of no small importance for the further consolidation of a sober way of life and support of an atmosphere of intolerance of hard drinking is purposeful and systematic propaganda and agitation in the pages of the local press. We have analyzed, for the second half of 1985 and for 1986-87, the speeches of the staff members of the internal affairs organs on these problems in the pages of the local newspapers VECHERNYAYA ALMATA and OGNI ALATAU. The following is observed: During the second half of 1985, i. e., after the appearance of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Measures to Overcome Hard Drinking and Alcoholism," their statements were active and systematic, then there is a gradually fading away of their activeness. An insignificant "splash" was observed after the appearance of the CPSU Central Committee Decree "On the Course of the Implementation of the CPSU Central Committee Decrees on Overcoming Hard Drinking and Alcoholism and the Activization of This Work." Now articles by staff members of the internal affairs organs on the anti-alcohol subject in the pages of these newspapers are rare. In the collegium of the KaSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in January of this year, it was noted that the internal affairs organs change their tactic with difficulty, operate in the old manner, while hard drinking and alcoholism have moved into the sphere of everyday life and the home-distilling of vodka is on the increase.¹⁴ That is, from the materials of the collegium it is evident that we have passed through the first stage of the struggle against hard drinking and alcoholism, and a second stage has begun—a more complicated and responsible stage. And here laborious work is required, which is aimed at

the undermining of the roots of this social problem. One of the effective instruments in the solution of this problem is well-reasoned statements by staff members of the internal affairs organs in the local press, based on the analysis of local materials, with striking facts. They should also turn more frequently to local television and radio with this goal in mind. However, in practice there are difficulties: The overwhelming majority of officials of the internal affairs organs are unable to expound the material in an interesting manner in the genre of an article, topical satire, or piece of reporting. It would be expedient to conduct periodically, in the pages of departmental newspapers (KaSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs), studies with the assistance of experienced journalists involving the staff members of the internal affairs organs on the subject of the methodology of collection, processing and preparation of materials for the periodical press, television and radio. In addition, to include a short educational course "Foundations of Journalism" in the educational programs (for the specialty 0212—jurisprudence) of VUZ's and secondary special education institutions of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

At the present time, the interaction of the internal affairs organs with labor collectives in the form of the attachment of staff members to "unsuccessful" enterprises and organizations for the purpose of extending assistance to them has become widespread in our republic. This form has become especially widespread in Alma-Ata, but it has not yet found its place in the peripheral regions of the republic. What is the procedure for this interaction? The staff members of the internal affairs organs, participating jointly with the administration of the directors of public organizations in the examination of the state of the struggle against hard drinking and alcoholism in the enterprise, help to make maximum use of the legal means and the authority of the labor collectives and their organs in the struggle against the negative phenomenon being examined. This makes it possible to maintain an atmosphere of high exactingness with respect to the violators of the anti-alcohol legislation and to improve the moral climate in the production collectives. Apparently, such a form of interaction of the organs of internal affairs and the enterprises is acceptable not only for the internal affairs organs, but also for the other law enforcement organs.

An analysis of the 3-year-long practice of activity of the internal affairs organs after the adoption of the appropriate decisions of the party and government indicates that, with the passage of time, new legal problems arise. At the present time, for example, only 20-30 percent of the chronic alcoholics, who have gone through the course of treatment in a medical-labor preventive clinic, stop abusing alcoholic beverages, but about 70 percent are sent to medical-labor preventive clinics a second, third, and even eighth time. Here the following path of solving this administrative-legal problem is possible: After being released from the medical-labor preventive clinic, these persons, if they need continued treatment, should, at

their permanent place of residence, go through outpatient treatment in narcology institutions of the public health organs for a year, and if the expert in narcology arrives at the conclusion that the treatment should be stopped before the end of this year, this question is decided by the narcology service on a collegial basis. In the case of evasion of the outpatient treatment, the question of the return of such a person to a medical-labor preventive clinic is raised.

At the present time, the procedure for the registration of chronic alcoholics is lengthy and complex, and many of them at this time hide from the militia. However, we do not consider it expedient to simplify it and especially the procedure for medical medical examination, for this can lead to lack of objectivity. But if there are grounds to suggest that this or that person will hide during the registration of the material on him in the medical-labor preventive clinic, then the militia should be given the right, with the sanction of the procurator, to effect the administrative detainment of such a person up to 5 days, with his being kept in a local narcology institution. This time is quite sufficient to go through an objective medical examination and the registration of the materials.

The effective legal norms divide alcoholic beverages of domestic production into strong and weak.¹⁵ For the manufacture, acquisition, sale, and storage of strong alcoholic beverages of domestic production, the perpetrators in all cases have criminal or administrative proceedings instituted against them. However, today perpetrators have proceedings instituted against them merely for the sale of wine of domestic production, which is not included among strong alcoholic beverages. But if these weak wines are obtained domestically through natural fermentation only for their own use, the legal norm omits their manufacturers. The analysis of departmental materials shows that some citizens have learned, through natural fermentation only, to bring so-called weak domestic wines to high a high degree of strength.

Since the moment of the adoption of the legal norm, interpreting what should be included in strong and weak alcoholic beverages that are manufactured domestically, 3 years have passed, and practice indicates that the "sages" have found a loop-hole in the legal norm. Apparently, the law enforcement organs, and first of all the internal affairs organs, as well as the department which directly exposes and removes the home-distilled vodka, etc., are poison among the persons who manufacture it; it is necessary to generalize such negative facts throughout the republic and to go before the appropriate organs with a proposal to introduce corrections in this legal norm.

Recently the practice of the additional opening of stores and departments for the sale of wine and vodka products has become disseminated in the republic. For example, in Taldy-Kurgan, from 28 December 1986 to 12 January 1987, in order to "eliminate the line for alcohol," by

order of the gorispolkom, three additional stores were opened. In Alma-Ata, as of 1 September 1986 only 52 such stores remained, as of 1 January 1987 there were 68 of them, in 1987 still more, and at the present time there are more than 100. Unfortunately, these questions are solved *in camera*, without broad publicity, by the ispolkoms of the local Soviets of People's Deputies. With a view to the further consistent realization of the anti-alcohol legislation, it should be established in the legal norm that ispolkoms should take a decision on increasing the number of enterprises trading in alcoholic beverages only after agreement with the law enforcement organs and the commission for the struggle against hard drinking of the appropriate ispolkom.

Footnotes

1. "Materialy XXVII sezda KPSS" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 50.
2. VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA KAZAKHSSKOVY SSR, 1985, No 23, Article 248.
3. *Ibid.*, No 45, Article 458.
4. *Ibid.*, Article 459.
5. Cf. PRAVDA, 1985, 17 May.
6. Cf. "Letter of the Participants of the 3rd Plenum of the Kazakh Republic Council of the Voluntary Society for the Struggle for Temperance," NA STRAZHE, 1987, 4 February; "Materialy respublikanskogo soveta DOBT za 1987" [Materials of the Republic Council of the Voluntary Society for the Struggle for Temperance for 1987].
7. *Ibid.*
8. Cf. "Materials of the Collegium of the KaSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs," NA STRAZHE, 1988, 27 January.
9. Cf. Article 12 of the KaSSR Code of Administrative Law Violations.
10. Cf. Article 1, Part 2 of the Ukase of the Presidium of the KaSSR Supreme Soviet of 23 May 1985, VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA KAZAKHSSKOVY SSR, 1985, No 23, Article 248.
11. G. G. Zuykov, G. I. Chernenko, Ye. F. Yaskov, "Nauchnaya organizatsiya truda v organakh vnutrennikh del" [The Scientific Organization of Labor in the Internal Affairs Organs], Moscow, 1981, pp 91-93.
12. Cf. Yu. Shcherbak, "Defense Ramparts" [Zmiyevy valy], PRAVDA, 1987, 20 January.
13. Cf. S[OBRANIYE] P[OSTANOVLENII] SSSR, 1985, No 17, Article 82; L. Kondratyev, "The Medical-Labor Preventive Clinic in the Range of Problems," TREZVOST I KULTURA, 1988, No 1, pp 22-25.
14. Cf. "Materials of the Collegium of the KaSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs," NA STRAZHE, 1988, 27 January.
15. Cf. "Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 30 September 1985 "On the Procedure for Applying the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On the Intensification of the Struggle Against Hard Drinking," VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1985, No 41, Article 777.

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Russian 'Disdain' for Minorities Aggravates Nationality Problems

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[Article by Natalya Ivanova: "Looking for Plots"]

[Text] It is difficult, practically impossible, to talk about ethnic problems today—everything has become so sensitive, so painful. No matter what you say it will offend someone. But neither can we not speak and continue to pretend that everything is fine.

Stalin's policy of great power chauvinism was a terrible blow against ethnic self-consciousness, and everyone suffered from it, including the Russians whom Stalin shamelessly flattered by calling them the "most outstanding nation of all the nations belonging to the Soviet Union" at the same time as he was destroying millions of people—peasants, workers, and members of the intelligentsia.

With respect to the languages of the peoples of the USSR, the "father of all sciences" had his own theory: "In the process of intermixing, one language proves the victor, preserves its basic vocabulary, and continues to develop according to the internal rules of its development, while the second language gradually loses its quality and gradually dies away." He observes further that "the Russian language has always been the victor." There is no need to ask who was supposed to die. In fact this was a signed and sealed verdict.

An ugly word appeared in our "new-speak" of the 1930's and 1940's—"natsmen" [member of an ethnic minority]. An official formula was imposed in our nationality policy concerning the "older brother" and the "natsmen," the "little" brothers. It is insulting, certainly, for who was to be considered "little"? The Armenians, whose culture goes back millenia? The Georgians, who accepted Christianity in the 4th Century A.D. and whose literary treasures include "The Trials of Shushanika," written in the 5th Century?

In the age of Stalinism the field of inter-ethnic relations was heavily mined, by this quasi-official, totalitarian formula that distorted the real relations of the peoples and cultures and put them in an unequal position, by the monstrous actions of deporting entire peoples in the 1940's (the Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingushes, Germans, Greeks, Turks, and Meskhi were resettled), by the annihilation of the national intelligentsia of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and other republics under the banner of fighting "nationalism," and by the lies about the real postwar history of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (to this day our press is silent about the "activities" of those who actually carried out this policy in the republics: Dekanozov, Zhdanov, Vyshinskiy). And by the arbitrary drawing of borders between republics without considering real, historically established unity.

All this is true. And the ethnic "mines" that are beginning to explode today are old. But as we all know, an old explosive device can just as well go off today.

Nonetheless we must observe that the republics tried to structure their cultural mutual relations even in these, let me repeat, terrible conditions. And here the behavior of the intelligentsia, above all the Russian intelligentsia, was enormously important.

In his remarkable novella "Dzhan," Andrey Platonov wrote the terrible history of the extinction of the Dzhan people. Through his hero Chagatayev, Platonov says: "Chagatayev was not sorry for himself: the big people was alive and it would still realize the universal happiness of the unfortunate. But it was bad that the Dzhan people, of all the peoples of the Soviet Union the most needful of life and happiness, would be dead. 'It will not be?' Chagatayev whispered."

The illusion that the Russian people "would still realize the universal happiness of the unfortunate" remained an illusion. But the price paid for it was too high: the destruction of monuments of Russian ethnic culture and the annihilation of the life-giving foundations of folk culture and replacement with lacquered Palekh and Kkokhloma boxes for export. Plus disruption of the natural functioning of the national languages in the republics. The illusion of the coming "universal happiness of the unfortunate" ended up in common disasters and crisis, including in ethnic mutual relations.

With me, for example, my feeling of attraction for and love of Georgian culture arose through common work. For 10 years now a group of us, translators, critics, cultural specialists, philosophers, prose writers, and poets from Georgia, Russia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Ukraine, Latvia, and Kazakhstan, have gathered each year for a working seminar. And all together we discuss the problems of Georgian culture in the context of our common problems. This seminar, which was organized by the Main Collegium for Artistic Translation and Mutual Literary Ties, is named after the critic and literary scholar Guram Asatiani, who was its initiator and, incidentally, wrote a profound book "O gruzinskem" [On Georgian]. All the reports and statements at the seminar, which met during the most "stagnant" times, are informal and extremely frank. The only way to really know the point of view of your "neighbor" is to let him speak honestly and openly. And it turns out that our misfortunes and problems are generally similar: linguistic (because the real Russian language is also being supplanted by a form of "new-speak," just as the ethnic languages are), cultural, and demographic. Sad as it may be, we were all brought together by the experience of unhappiness, not happiness.

But now new times have arrived. The press has begun to speak with a freedom that has almost surpassed the openness of our seminar meetings. Among other things it has started talking about the roots of our misfortunes,

about the "black holes" of our history and the countless losses which Georgia suffered in the series of brutal repressions of 1921, 1924, 1929-1932, 1936-1938, 1948, and 1951-1952. The movie "Repentance" by Tengiz Abuladze shook society and witnessed the beginning of the changes.

I open the magazine LITERATURNAYA GRUZIYA, No 7. In the article by Tengiz Buachidze, a member of our "seminar" whom I deeply respect, I read: "Some non-Georgian writers, sociopolitical commentators, and journalists are taking advantage of our truly unique period of perestroyka, democratization, and glasnost, a period of renewing life, and unconscionably using it for evil purposes. They criticize and expose the negative aspects of Stalin and Stalinism and point at us, the Georgians, trying directly or indirectly to connect these phenomena with Georgia and the Georgian people. It is as if they are saying, Stalin was a Georgian phenomenon and the Georgians are to blame for everything" (my emphasis—N.I.).

In the September issue of the same magazine, LITEARTURNAYA GRUZIYA, another participant in our seminar, the critic Koba Imedashvili writes: "A number of articles which give off an anti-Georgian flavor have appeared in the pages of the central periodicals recently. Stalin is recognized as a Georgian phenomenon, Beriya as a Georgian nightmare." The prose writer Chabua Amiredzhibi insists on the same thing, except he puts more emphasis on the "ethnic" origin of the anti-Georgian attacks (in connection with Stalin and Stalinism) (DRUZHBA NARODOV, No 12, 1988).

What are the grounds for such assertions? Is it a wounded sense of ethnic dignity? Where, and how, is Stalinism now defined as a **Georgian** phenomenon? But no, none of my painstaking searches here led to anything.

None of the critics of Stalinism goes deeply into the "Georgian-ethnic" aspect of Stalin mainly because Stalinism (this is a much broader phenomenon than Stalin) was a phenomenon hostile to any genuine ethnic culture. It was "super-nationalism" that made demographic use of slogans about the "Russian element" and "Great Russia" to consolidate the country as a great power. The state nationalism of Stalinism was not Russian or Georgian, but it used Russian "patriotic" terminology and imposed its own primitive understanding of Russianness ("Russia—homeland of elephants"). How this was implanted is very well analyzed in V. Tendryakov's story "Okhota" [The Hunt] (ZNAMYA, No 9, 1988).

But here is what I want to call attention to: we ourselves, apparently just talking incidentally, sometimes do not give much thought to whether we are offending the ethnic feelings of others. Especially when these feelings are so highly sensitive today. Of course we must not fall into the extremes of hypercaution and censorship. Thus a certain editor uttered an immortal, in my view, phrase

concerning publication of O. Mandelstam's famous poem "We live without feeling a country under us" about the place where, as we know, there are the following words about Stalin: "and the broad chest of an Ossetian." The editor said, "The Ossetians will be offended." Well, the long-suffering poem has now been published, and the Ossetians did not take offense.

An ethnic epithet to the name of Stalin adds nothing. More than that, the "leader and teacher" himself categorically denied his closeness to everything that was ethnic Georgian. Anna Akhmatova, according to M. Arlov, recalled the following: "After the war one of the main Georgian dances was done for the Mustached One in a brilliant performance. When the dance was over he frowned and said, in very poor Russian, 'I am a man of Russian culture. This is foreign to me.'"

Now here is an example of indiscreet handling of the combustible material of ethnic history. In the article "Either Force or the Ruble" (ZNAMYA, No 1, 1989) the author (without any need in terms of his idea, again incidentally) said: "The Pugachev rebellion did not bring the Russian nobility to their senses, and ultimately they got what they, in their stupidity and animal egotism, fully deserved." Pardon me, but Pushkin, Lermontov, Chaadayev, Herzen, Tolstoy, and Dostoyevskiy were Russian nobles. The Russian nobility went into Senate Square in 1825. The Russian nobility created majestic spiritual treasures. Did they "fully deserve" it?

But I open to another page of the same magazine and see that Mariya Petrovych's verse defends our common dignity:

But if you say, boot him out,
He is a nobleman, and so an enemy.
If Batyyev's kingdoms
Are flooded again by suffocating darkness,

We will not believe, not listen,
Not dislike, and not give...

Incidentally, we should mention vestiges of the class weapon and "enemies of the people."

On 6 January 1989 the CPSU Central Committee resolution entitled "Additional Measures to Restore Justice Toward the Victims of Repressions That Occurred in the Period of the 1930's, 1940's, and early 1950's" was published. It makes the proposal "to set aside nonjudicial decisions (that is, decisions made by the so-called "troikas" and OSO's [special tribunals—N.I.] and consider all persons who were repressed by decisions of these organs to be rehabilitated." The number of cases fabricated and signed by OSO's runs into millions. Today it is not just the novels of Yu. Dombrovskiy and V. Grossman, not only Ye. Ginzburg's "Krutoy Marshrut" [Bitter Journey] and N. Mandelstam's "Vospominaniya" [Memoirs] that tell us how "enemies of the people" were hunted and how fictitious "cases"

were made up. The tragic faces of priests, members of the intelligentsia, peasants, and workers—all who fate brought to the camps—arise from the pages of V. Shalamov's short stories. But the most heart-rending testimony today is not from writers; it is the actual letters of peasants and workers whose parents suffered in those years (see *PRAVDA* and *NAUKA I ZHIZN*).

But even today the vigorous, indefatigable defenders of Stalinism find points to argue; even today, despite all the facts that have been revealed, despite the mass graves discovered in Kuropaty (Belorussia) or in the Kalitnikovskoye Cemetery in Moscow they insist on the idea that there really were enemies, and that the terror of the 1930's was their diversionary action because of "the exacerbation of the class struggle." "Remnants of the 'crushed' elements camouflaged themselves, went underground, dug in at party, soviet, and state organs and continued to wage their struggle against Soviet power and socialism" (*MOLODAYA GVARDIYA*, No 12, 1988). Saddest of all is the fact that the myth of the "father" who knew nothing and the hidden "enemies" is recreated by the son of a repressed person, and the son writes: "Stalin's personal guilt lies in the fact that, waging the struggle against enemies of the party and people (just so, without quotation marks—N.I.), he often assigned the work of waging this struggle to people who themselves belonged to the group of enemies."

You will agree that such a point of view today appears to be a monstrous anachronism, and it is ridiculous even to argue about it. What is not ridiculous is when they start hunting "enemies" today, intensively. In this respect the plenum of the board of directors of the RSFSR Writers Union, held in Moscow in December with the agenda "Sociopolitical Writing in the Struggle for Further Democratization of Society and Implementation of Economic Reform in the Country," seems exceptional to me.

We can, of course, join the general evaluation of this plenum expressed by I. Vinogradov (*MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI*, No 2, 1989) as an event outside the field of literature. But the people at the meeting expressed such archaic ideas that, it seems to me, it is worth giving them some attention.

From one statement to another the stinging attacks rang out, now against Academician T. Zaslavskaya, now against N. Ilina. There were unsupported labels, shouting, hysterics against D. Granin, accuse by S. Vikulov of anti-patriotism, and against V. Grossman, whose novel "Zhizn i sudba" [Life and Fate] was accused by the same speaker of showing "virtually unconcealed hostility toward the Russian people." Abuse was heaped on various organs of the press, and it was revealed that "the Russian word—why hide it?—is under heavy pressure today, and in numerous cases simply banned." This is in our day, in the age of glasnost, when consciousness and the word have been liberated!

In my opinion the well-known sociopolitical writer Ivan Filonenko correctly described this "plenum on sociopolitical writing": "As a sociopolitical writer I regret very much that little was said about sociopolitical writing as such during these 2 days."

Then what did they talk about?

They talked about the fact that "Nina Andreyeva's article is just as much in the spirit of perestroika as the editorial articles of the newspaper *PRAVDA*" (V. Bondarenko).

They talked about how to settle the nationalities issue in the country once and for all: "It is long since time to set up reservations. This is an excellent invention of civilized peoples, and even in the early days there were reservations in Russia where, by state order, whites (?—N.I.) were forbidden to enter under threat of execution" (V. Lichutin).

Yes, dear reader, that is the sad course of development of our domestic thinkers, if we follow the line from A. Platonov ("Dzhan") to V. Lichutin. Such are the flights of humanism which we have attained in our multiethnic (there are 78 literatures alone) Fatherland. That is the kind of future those who frighten us with "Russophobia" have prepared for the country, for society as a whole and for certain "nonwhite" peoples. But let us listen to V. Lichutin further. I will admit that his speech amazed me for the—I want to put this as correctly as possible—"breadth" of problems encompassed. I am sure that I was not the only one who was amazed, for there were in the hall Tatar, Bashkir, and Yakut writers, and Vladimir Sangi, a Nivkh, and Yury Rytkhzu, a Chukchi, spoke. So then, what did they all learn from V. Lichutin? "If you say that we are all brothers, that is the disease." But what are we, if not brothers? We read further in the stenographic record: "Russia was always called 'mother.' The mother of peoples." Moreover, Lichutin thinks that all of them, the Tatars and the Bashkirs, live much better than Russia. But this is not the main thing. The main thing is that the "upper echelons" have been "seized by people without the rudiments of national ethics." And our "state building" should be, it turns out, based on Russian "national" ethics. But how can we subordinate everyone, the Estonians, the Latvians, the Georgians, and the Armenians, to one "national ethics?" And what will we come to then? I learned this from another statement, by A. Buylov. He did not express himself as elegantly as V. Lichutin. His words were straightforward and direct: "We know that our empire is crumbling, cracking at the seams."

Here, finally, they have "said it all." Imperial thinking did not arise today, of course, but preaching it today does, you will agree, make a shocking impression. But how will it be for "all those Armenians" to read this? Incidentally, concerning the Armenians. The tragedy in Armenia highlighted the feeling of inter-ethnic closeness not just of our peoples but of all humanity. This,

however, greatly annoyed that same Buylov: "And we are already beginning to speculate, beginning to exaggerate—the sense of inter-ethnicism, the sense of inter-ethnicism!" But how angrily this word is spoken. Why is that? If "our empire is crumbling," how will we bind it together?

If the "intelligentsia" neglects the fate of other peoples, then the sad perplexity heard in the statements of Yu. Rytkhzu, S. Danilov (Yakutia), and Yu. Whestalov is natural. "I am listening. We all listened to the comrade who gave the report and to Sergey Vasilyevich Vikulov, and for some reason it seemed to me that there were only Russians sitting here, and Old Russians sitting here too, so let us talk about the Old Russians as well," Tatar writer S. Gaffar remarked carefully but firmly. He also talked about the fact that the literature and art of Tataria is to this day forced to feel the unjust burden of the 1944 decree of the VKP(B) [All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee entitled "Ideological Work of the Tataria Party Organization." But this difficult issue did not trouble any of the humanist writers and heirs of the great traditions of Russian literature. Sometime in the future a new "Karabakh" will erupt somewhere in Tataria, and then we will all get excited together! And we will look for instigators! Especially because that is easier, to look for instigators in all troubles. It is easier than to think about and figure out the problems.

The capability of the inhabitants of Russia to respond to any troubles of other peoples is well-known. The Russian intelligentsia truly does have great traditions. This was exactly what S. Danilov, the writer from Yakutia, tried to remind the "zealous" participants in the plenum of: "It was (my emphasis—N.I.) the most conscience-bound literature in the world, with no ethnic or other prejudices. Concern not just for the native Russian people but also for, as was said then, 'other-landers' was a tradition of all Russian literature. And now today. I pose the question: is the noble tradition preserved and developing in contemporary Russian literature?" S. Danilov talked about the extremely poor condition of the ethnic frontiers, of how the question today is "whether the peoples and ethnic groups who populate these frontiers will survive, to say nothing of their cultures." How is contemporary Russian literature reacting to this tragedy? "I cannot name a single serious and powerful book or sociopolitical article on this subject." Not one.

But the disappearance that threatens peoples and their cultures and languages, the burning of books in the native languages, the lack of schools, and other monstrous facts cited by writers from the frontiers made no impression on many of those present at the plenum of Russian writers.

"The empire is crumbling!"

And Lichutin probably really thinks that for his indifference to all that has been said about the tragic problems of the ethnic frontiers and the extinction of entire peoples combined with glorification of his own "national ethics" he will get harmonious "state building." But if he does think so, for his—I do not want to put this too harshly—naivete he will get that which he so angrily christened "Russophobia."

It is very tempting to come forward as the spokesman of the people. As if appointed by them. To put it more simply, to usurp their opinion. The people is by no means a homogeneous "mass," but rather a complex, developing, changing organism. D. S. Likhachev, who put great efforts into the study of Russianness in the fundamental sense of this concept, observed back in 1968: "There is no single national character; there are many characters, especially (but not exclusively) typical of the given nation. Some of them are gone into the past; some reappear. This is a 'community' of characters and types and it is changing all the time together with the movement of history."

There have been many different "authorities" in our long-suffering history. At one time they carried out collectivization "in the name of the people," and at another time they flatly declared who were "friends" of the people and who were "enemies." They passed out "people's" awards, applied labels ("the people have decided"), and confirmed sentences against "enemies of the people." And all of these actions were taken in the name of the people. While praising the people, flattering them, playing up to them, and in reality deeply despising or, at best, remaining indifferent to their aspirations and troubles.

Just picture what imagination it takes to declare the following today: "The Motherland, our grown daughter, must today keep her honor more strictly." These are lines of verse recited by F. Chuyev at a plenum of the RSFSR Writers Union in Ryazan.

We have already had one leader who was proclaimed to be the "father of the peoples," and in his time children renounced their own real fathers.

And here another father, F. Chuyev, has appeared. He is, incidentally, notorious for "publishing" his acroverse, where the first letters of the lines made up the slogan "Stalin in the heart," in the period of re-Stalinization, in the second half of the 1970's.

So it is much simpler, in the interpretation of the new-found "lovers of the people," to substitute a kind of unified mass for the complex organism of the people. And to brandish this concept as they fall upon, for example, the cooperative movement and the many attempts to bring the economy out of its stagnant condition. Professional economists and sociopolitical writers are working on these problems today and a serious, anxious debate is underway in society, but all critic A.

Kazintsev sees in this is "skeptical smirks" (he said that about O. Latsis) or a "practically unconcealed revenge motive" (about N. Shmelev). Moreoever, behind all these discussions the keen-eyed Kazintsev discerns the ominous image of a new "totalitarianism." And he uses it to try to frighten the reader: "Without snitches under the door, without pistols, without 'black mariahs' and camps," but "with technocrats at the head and Masonic lodges at the base of the system" (NASH SOVREMENNIK, No 11, 1988). So here he has arrived where he wanted to be—if someone wants to enlist foreign know-how it means the omnipresent Masons have sneaked in. It would be better if we were to pass away in a "distinctive" manner than for the convertible ruble to appear, for shortages to disappear, and inflation to stop. It may be a worthless economy, but it is our own, "distinctive" economy.

It is true that there is a strange, difficult-to-explain contradiction in this logic: if some "alien" forces were responsible for the "planned" economy and the troubles of the people in the 1920-1940's, does it turn out that the notorious "Masons" are willingly taking part in the attempt to overcome these troubles too? That makes them appear awfully inconsistent.

If we take the point of view of A. Kazintsev then, despite all his flattering incantations ("the people did not accept the role of rabbits. And they were right in every respect!"), it turns out that the people are nothing more than an indifferent test field for historical experiments, of the "Masons" or someone else.

For my part I hold a completely different point of view. I believe that it is better not to make declarations in the name of the people. It is much more useful to think about real historical experience and the causes of the current situation, which are most thoroughly discussed, in my opinion, in the articles "Sources" by V. Selyunin (NOVYY MIR, No 6, 1988) and "The Sources of Stalinism" by A. Tsipko (NAUKA I ZHIZN, Nos 11, 12, 1988 and Nos 1, 2, 1989).

One of the most significant achievements of the new period in our life has been the demythologization of both the past and the present. Dethroning the myths so persistently implanted in our society of not just the "father of the peoples" (although this myth is one of the biggest), but also "mature socialism" in which we are supposedly living, and the unquestionably approaching "bright future" which has kept retreating as we drew closer, like a bashful horizon.

Exposing old myths did not, however, prevent the emergence and propagation of a new mythology. The political myth always hypnotizes thought. And that means it freezes it again. "Isn't it ridiculous," A. Tsipko writes, "what certain of our literary figures are telling society today, that we, the Russians, are not created to live normal lives, to have hospitals and computers, but rather

to build a 'unique' and 'distinctive' economy and to astound the world with our ability to endure deprivations and follow the 'ideologists of sacrifice'?"

The new "myth-creators," reviving the old myths, do not hesitate to use questionable means. The "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" have been exposed as a forgery. But this fact does not stop V. Begun, for example, who in his articles relies on this provocative composition. But this is just one of the Minsk "scholar's" discoveries. The second (NASH SOVREMENNIK, No 11, 1988) upset me much more: it turns out that there has been no philosophy, artistic literature, or music, no great people "who labored, in the field of Jewish 'ethnic culture.'" There was nothing. For some reason V. Begun puts the very words "ethnic culture" in quotation marks when he is talking about Jewish ethnic culture. "And the Jewish geniuses who enriched world culture," he continues, "created their works on the ethnic basis of German, Dutch, English, Russian, and other cultures."

I would like, however, to cite just one "small artifact" of Jewish ethnic culture—the Bible. And not just the Ancient Jewish Old Testament, which encompassed many cultural monuments. In S. S. Averintsev's article we read: "The biblical texts arose over the course of more than 1,000 years (from the 13th-12th centuries B.C. to the 2nd Century B.C.) and assimilated the most varied texts (including some of folklore origin): myths, ancient folk legends, fragments of chronicles, historical documents, legislative monuments, ritual prescriptions, victory, wedding, and other ritual songs, and religious-philosophical compositions" ("Mify narodov mira" [Myths of the World's Peoples]). In another study the same author writes of the "thousand-year treasury of Judaic literature." Moving on to Early Christain literature, S. S. Averintsev remarks: "It is indisputable that admiration of the Bible was the most powerful factor in the literary process of these centuries" ("Istoriya vsemirnoy literatury" [History of World Literature]). Jewish culture is illustrated not only by the Old Testament, but also by the New Testament. I realize that all this may be unpleasant to V. Begun, but facts are facts. Just as it is a fact that all the most famous and talented German, Dutch, English, Russian, and other writers and painters created their work on the basis of biblical subjects. And no one, incidentally, sarcastically called them "zealots of this (read: Jewish) culture," nor were they accused because the direction of their "efforts" was unknown.

It is odd, of course, that V. Begun, who is so "knowledgeable" about Jewish culture, must be reminded of these elementary truths.

I am not even mentioning that the offensive thesis of a "pathetic remnant" in place of Jewish culture in no way fits with such well-known names as Shalom Aleichem and Mikhoels and that the Jewish theater was closed as a result of the struggle against the "cosmopolitans." It somehow makes me uncomfortable to remind the expert

of the lyrics of Ovsey Driz and David Gofshteyn, L. Kvitko, S. Galkin, and P. Markish, whose verse was translated by Akhmatova. They all related to Jewish culture which, according to V. Begun, does not exist.

I would advise V. Begun to familiarize himself with the ideas of S. Kunyayev, who at the Ryazan plenum (which was reported in No 52 of OGONEK), for one called the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" "mythical" and, for two, recognizing the existence of Jewish culture all the same, proposed that Jewish artists (as an example he gave the "outstanding Jewish ethnic artist Chagall") be separated from Russian artists of Jewish origin (Levitin). Maybe it is in fact better for the people themselves to manage their own culture.

Social and political myths arise today in places where knowledge is lacking. The myth substitutes for the real nature of things. Myth creation in the 20th Century is the bulwark of totalitarianism in all its varieties.

Myth creation in criticism and art studies is replacing real problem areas with imagined ones.

For example, in P. Gorelov's article about the novel "Doktor Zhivago" (VOPROSY LITERATURY, No 9, 1988), an article distinguished by the author's ironic and even somehow roguish attitude toward Pasternak and his novel, he at first repeats words about "the honesty of the author" over and over (as if to say some people today have serious doubts about Pasternak's honesty), and then instead of the real work carefully develops a mythologem which replaces the novel (about which the author lets drop, incidentally, that it "does not live in meaning, but only calls to it," and speaks of the main hero as "quite a turkey"). Using quasischolarly slang mixed with vulgarisms the author of the article carefully leads the reader, who is somewhat lulled by the words about Pasternak's "honesty," to the main point: it turns out that the novel is dominated by a "secret fear of loss, irretrievable loss of one's nationality (final rejection of it)."

Are you surprised? Did you think that "Doktor Zhivago" was a novel about the revolution and the fate of the Russian intelligentsia? About the civil war and the cultural catastrophe? Dispense with these illusions. Pasternak's novel is exclusively about nationality. At least that appears to be what the editors of the journal VOPROSY LITERATURY decided. In issue No 9 the journal publishes not only P. Gorelov's article, but also another, by the American Slavist G. Gibian, also devoted mainly to the nationality issue (and here, without any editorial comment the artist L. Pasternak is declared to be a Zionist sympathizer).

We have long been sympathetic to the problems of the North American Indians. Almost everyday we suffer for the indigenous inhabitants of the South African Republic, thanks to the program "Vremya." The mass information media unfailingly report racial problems in the United States to us, arousing in us a natural sense of indignation at racism.

But for decades we have been taught not to be concerned about those who are closer by. Those who are numerically inferior to us. It goes further than that: the limited, everyday consciousness, filled with prejudices, is inclined to transfer our sins to them, our neighbors, in particular, personifying their evil in a designed image of what is "alien."

Let us recall the struggle with the so-called "cosmopolitans." Let us ask ourselves frankly: don't the phrases "without nationality," "other-lander," and "Russophobia" that have been revived today ring in tune with that struggle?

Imagine for a moment a hypothetical picture. It takes place, let us assume, in one of the republics. For a certain time many publications in the local press have listed persons with last names of a "small" (that is numerically smaller than the primary nationality of the republic) nationality as to blame for troubles and problems that are uncovered. There you have the genesis of another Sumgait.

They look for "aliens" to blame, and they look for a "plot." In V. Rasputin's work we read: "It is as if one criminal plot intersected with another to deprive the people of their memory and sensitivity."

Yu. Kuznetsov, in the poem "The Philistine's Revelation," writes: "The kettle there flies off into the sky. The river there turns the wrong way. The people there sell Judas off. Everything seems to be going according to plan. According to some hellish plan. Who entangled us in this hellish plan? Who turned the people into partisans? There is danger at every step." Well, the Philistine can find many "revelations" in the press today.

To sober up the overheated ones I will quote the words spoken by Anna Akhmatova on 4 March 1956, the day after Khrushchev's speech at the 20th congress: "Now the prisoners will return, and the two Russias will look into each other's eyes: the ones who put them in prison, and the ones who were put in prison." This unbearable thought has to be carried through to the end; otherwise we are risking finding ourselves again at that point from which we supposedly have already departed.

To this day, despite all the unexpected journal articles and the stream of interesting newspaper stories and new books, one of my favorite things to read is still the beautifully illustrated two-volume "Myths of the World's Peoples," which came out right in the middle of "stagnation" times.

When studying the creative work of Iskander I turn to Abkhaz myths. When reading a fashionable novel about the transformation of our contemporary into a crow I look for the age-old underlying tale in the same volume. Becoming immersed in the "wolves" world of Aytmatov's "Plakha" [The Execution Block] I again take down the heavy volume from the shelf to get a better

understanding of the author's idea. This encyclopedic publication, whose authors are major domestic scholars, contains so many myths! But it does not (and, of course, could not) contain the main, all-embracing, far-flung myth in whose opiate haze the country suffocated for so many decades.

As we know, there has never been a people without mythology. The human being and the human race have expressed their view of the world in wonderful, poetry-filled legends in which the gods acted together with the heroes, intermediaries between the gods and people. But the 20th Century has given rise to a different type of mythology, political and not poetic. The myth has been imposed in places where thought was persecuted. It took over and employed remarkable concepts—patriotism, the homeland, the people—concepts which were turned into boogie men, adapted into aggressive slogans that ultimately were directed against the people themselves.

What were the signs of this myth? There are not so many of them, and they are fairly primitive. "Life has become better, life has become happier." "If the enemy does not surrender he will be destroyed." "I do not know another country where a person breathes so freely." Myths were created about "enemies of the people," about "socialist realism," about the "triumph of Soviet democracy," about the victory of Soviet biological thought represented by Academician Lysenko, about our military might. And for all these "small myths" we had to pay with 20 million dead in the Great Patriotic War and tens of millions repressed.

New myths are arising today on the ruins of the old ones.

Let us try to leave mythology to the encyclopedia.

Let us return to reality.

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Ukrainian Activists Blamed for Nationalities Friction

18000820 Kiev *POD ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA* in Russian No 5, Mar 89 pp 69-72

[Article by Yulian Shulmeyster, under rubric "Cultivating Interethnic Relations": "What Unites Us"]

[Text] Time invites us to wonder: who are our friends, and who are our enemies? The question is no simple one. The persons who are in favor of perestroyka, democratization, and glasnost include both those who support those things with their heart and those for whom this is only a camouflage for their actions, which lead not forward but backward.

The problem of choice is probably nowhere more acute than in the sphere of interethnic relations. An example of this is provided by the well-known events in Azerbaijan

and Armenia, and in the Baltic republics. We have also encountered in Lvov moods of national limitation on the part of a definite number of people. Frequently I hear, "Everything that is bad comes from the Russians and the other 'foreigners.'" Among Russians one sometimes hears what might seem to be opposing voices, but in actuality are the same ones: "Everything that is bad comes from the non-Russians"...

I would like to say a few words in this regard, because I have lived through a lot. I know nationalism not by hearsay. I am a Jew, the grandson of a tailor, the son of a carpenter, a Communist since 1905, and I myself have been in the CPSU for 48 years. I was born in the Ukraine and I grew up there. I fought at the front and was a participant in the liberation of the western Ukraine. My wife's father is a Belorussian, her mother is a Russian. Their son is married to a Ukrainian. During all the postwar years I have been collecting testimony of Hitler's evil deeds in the Lvov area, and have discussed those evil deeds in my books. I am a member of the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public. I am fortunate to have lived long enough to see the present times, and I perceive the purification that rids us of Stalinism and Brezhnevism as the rebirth of socialist ideals.

But at the same time I see the danger of introducing chronic diseases into the new life. By various methods, including those used in the guise of combatting them.

One of the most dangerous diseases is nationalism. What does it feed on? At the present time, much is being said and written about the fact that during the Stalin and Brezhnev times the rights of the nations in our country were infringed upon, and various methods were used to limit the development of the national cultures. That policy only encouraged and incited nationalistic moods. Taking advantage of that, the enemies of socialism recruited supporters. We might recall that the peasantry, the majority of the population of the western oblasts in the Ukraine, after the annexation received land from the Soviet authority. But then the process of hurried, frequently coercive, collectivization began. It was impossible to invent a better incentive for encouraging many peasants to follow the OUN [Association of Ukrainian Nationalists] leaders. They took advantage of that, and everyone knows what followed.

After the war, cruel repressions were heaped not only on true nationalists, but also, not infrequently, upon imaginary ones. Together with other military procurators, I subsequently happened to examine cases involving OUN members. Those who had been sentenced without justification were freed. A considerably larger number, however, proved to be legally sentenced, because their arms had been in blood up to their elbows. And yet they attempted to "write off" their crimes by blaming the "Stalin cult." They kept repeating that they were not guilty of anything! It is not excessive today to bring this again to the attention of those who are attempting to

resurrect nationalism and who, in order to do this, are whitewashing the OUN members and proposing the raising of monuments to them.

Chauvinism and nationalism are always self-isolation, national limitation, and arrogance. Such programs never bring any good to anyone.

Therefore the attempts to erect barriers among the peoples of our country, and to disdain one another's culture, experience, opportunities, and resources, are criminal. What would have happened to the Ukraine that was occupied by the Hitlerites if it had not been for the Soviet Army—the might of all the republics of the Soviet country!

In 1939, before the annexation, slightly more than 10,000 workers were employed at the dwarf-sized semi-handicraft enterprises in Lvov, and three times that number were unemployed. Today's Lvov is one of the country's industrial centers and its world-renowned enterprises employ more people than lived in prewar Lvov.

Who created modern industrial Lvov? Not only the people of Lvov, not only the people of the Ukraine, but all the nations of our country. The union government sent in approximately 90,000 specialists to restore the city that had been destroyed by the fascists, and allocated 22 million rubles. At that time all the republics were feeling the pinch, and RSFSR most of all. But now we have nationalistic demagogues who disdain those who gave Lvov their mind, their knowledge, and the best years of their lives. Those demagogues are attempting to create visible and invisible barriers between Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians, between those who speak Ukrainian and those who do not.

For those demagogues, the gauge of moral values is no longer a person's conscience, but his nationality and language.

The mother tongue is the basis of the life of every nation, and the concerns about preserving and developing it are noble and highly moral. The national language of a union republic must be its state language. However, people are differentiated from nonpeople not by language, but by the purpose for which they use it, and by the ideology and politics that are proclaimed in that language. People who are worthy of this very high title take a loving and respectful attitude not only to their own language, but also to other languages, and are enriched from communicating with other nations. This is especially so when those nations have made a substantial contribution to developing the national spirituality of the Ukraine.

How many Ukrainians lived in pre-Soviet Lvov? It is not easy to answer that question. Polish statisticians used to define nationality on the basis of the person's religious denomination or his language. If one proceeds from religious denomination, there were 49,747 Ukrainians in

Lvov—15.9 percent of the city's population. If one proceeds from the spoken language, and the Polish statisticians did so, Lvov's Ukrainian population was only 7.8 percent.

In pre-Soviet Lvov there were only two Ukrainian high schools, and the students fought unsuccessfully for the right to take examinations in their native language.

In Soviet Lvov, which surpassed by a factor of 2.5 the prewar city, 76 percent of the population is made up of Ukrainians. In 1195 schools in the oblast (94.7 percent of the total number in operation), and in the university, institutes, and technicums, instruction is provided in Ukrainian.

A considerable contribution to the development of Ukrainian culture has been made by Lvov authors, composers, scientists, theatrical figures, and many public organizations. Achievements in this oblast could have been larger if there had been no deviation from the Leninist principles of national policy during the time of the personality cult and the period of stagnation.

Now, when a large vista has been opened up for public initiative, when much is being done to restore Leninist norms of national relations, various societies have been created and are in operation in Lvov: the Ukrainian Language Society imeni T. G. Shevchenko, the Russian-language Society of Friends of the Ukrainian Language, the Jewish Culture Society imeni Sholom Aleykhem, and the Society of Friends of Polish and Armenian Cultures. All these societies are necessary, and public opinion hopes that they will make a significant contribution to developing the national cultures and reinforcing the friendship among nations.

At the same time one cannot fail to see that people who are contaminated by nationalism are attempting to attach themselves to the noble activities of the national-cultural societies. That is attested to by the actions of the Goryn brothers, V. Chornovil, I. Makar, and others. Operating in a sophisticated manner, they frequently do not advertise their true views, but, on the contrary, advertise "internationalism" and a friendly attitude toward Jews and other nations.

I would like to believe them. But both nationalism and internationalism are indivisible concepts. It is impossible to be a nationalism in some regard, and an internationalist in some other regard. One cannot stigmatize Stalin's crimes and justify, or downplay, the genocide carried out by the Hitlerites and the members of OUN. If people act that way, that means that they are pursuing some other goals. What are they?

The times now are different from when the OUN openly proclaimed its fanatical plans. Today's nationalistic leaders set up a line of demarcation that sets them apart. They remain silent about the crimes perpetrated by OUN, and they assert that the members of OUN were Stalin's victims.

On 23 June 1988, in the Construction Workers' House of Culture in Lvov, there was a public meeting devoted to the forty-fifth anniversary of the destruction of the Lvov ghetto. On that day an organizing group of the so-called Democratic Front for the Support of Perestroika organized at the Lychakovo cemetery a "rally in memory of the victims of Stalinist terror." That rally was held at the graves in which, during the Hitlerite occupation, the persons who had been shot to death in the courtyard of the prison on Ulitsa Lontskogo (currently Ulitsa Bryullova) were re-interred. I do not know who did the shooting, but after rushing into Lvov on 30 June 1941, the Hitlerites on the very next day herded a large group of Jews into the prison courtyard. When the gate was flung open and it was announced to the crowd of nationalists that the corpses were the victims of the Bolsheviks, and the Jews had been the murderers, there began a series of pogroms during which approximately 6000 Jews perished.

Why had the rally been organized at the graves of the dubious victims who were offered up by the Hitlerites? Why didn't the rally organizers mention the Jews who had been murdered during the July 1941 pogroms? Could it not be that at that time it was necessary not only to damn not only Stalin, but also the murderers of the Jews—the Hitlerites and the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists? And yet they were not damned. Not at this rally, or at other similar ones. Nor in their underground literature. They are living with "double truth."

Journalist Lyubomira Sukhonos, in her article "Patriotism Is Love and Conscience" (VILNA UKRAYINA newspaper, 21 February 1988), reported that, during a discussion at the Lvov City Ispolkom, one of the leaders of the Lvov branch of the so-called Ukrainian Helsinki Union—who also is the editor of the underground UKRAYINSKIY VISNIK—Vyacheslav Chornovil, stated that he does not support Ivan Makar, who had proposed, in the name of the same nonexistent Democratic Front, the erecting of monuments to the members of OUN. However, in the RUSSKAYA MYSL newspaper that is published in Paris, Chornovil defends and whitewashes the members of OUN.

The Goryn brothers have always consolidated themselves with Chornovil in all regards. They all act as champions of the national-cultural societies. But they attempt to carry out consistently their own line in them. Frequently I hear: there is no reason to be afraid of them—let them have their struggle of opinions and ideas. I agree with that. But the pluralism of opinions does not free a Communist of the moral duty to oppose openly the alienation of people on the basis of nationalism, or to oppose attempts to incite interethnic enmity. That is the duty not only of a Communist, but also of every humanitarian.

In the Lvov national-cultural societies the interpretations of pluralism are extremely frequent and extremely heated, but apparently no mention is made of those persons who, indirectly or obviously, support nationalistic moods.

The Ukrainian Language Society imeni T. G. Shevchenko, the Jewish, Polish, and Armenian culture societies, and the Russian-language Society of Friends of the Ukrainian Language must not disunite people by means of national barriers, but must unite them in the name of a common goal. The carrying out of this task is inconceivable without decisively opposing the nationalistic moods that separate—if only silently—national culture from socialism, that define a person's belonging to a national culture solely on the basis of nationality, and that consider any traditions to be national pride.

The Russian, Ukrainian, and other cultures were created, and are created, not only by persons of the corresponding nationality, but also by other persons who perceive that culture as their own. Ukrainians Nikolay Vasilyevich Gogol and Vladimir Galaktionovich Korolenko became great Russian authors. Persons who are Jews by nationality have become rightfully well-known representatives of other national cultures. They include such people as Russian painter Isaak Levitan, German poet Heinrich Heine, German author Leon Feuchtwanger, and Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza.

Contributions to the golden fund of Russian Soviet literature include the works of Jews Samuil Marshak, Mikhail Svetlov, Agniya Barto, Eduard Bagritskiy, and many others. Works by Jewish composers Isaak Dunayevskiy, Mikhail Blanter, Mark Fradkin, and David Tukhmanov are an inseparable part of Russian Soviet musical culture. Jews Natan Rybak and Grigoriy Plotkin have become famous Ukrainian writers.

One should not pretend that the process of assimilation does not exist in our society, or see in it something harmful that opposes the development of the national culture. Both these processes are completely natural and inevitable.

Characterizing "the process of assimilation of nations under the present-day conditions of advanced capitalism," V. I. Lenin wrote that New York "is similar to a mill that grinds down the national difference. And what is occurring in New York on a major international scale is also occurring in every large city and factory settlement" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 24, p 126).

Assimilation as a natural and voluntary process also occurs under socialism. In our country it is influenced, in particular, by the need to unite the efforts of all the nations to resolve the major nation-wide tasks—the creation of industrial giants, the building of new cities, the mastery of the virgin lands, etc. I assume that anyone who views these achievements as a distortion of national policy or compares them with the camps of the Stalin era is incorrect.

It is also inadmissible to censure, as some people are now doing, mixed marriages, the number of which has been growing from year to year not only in our country, but

also throughout the world. In South Africa alone—the country of apartheid—racists are in favor of the division of the nations and races, in order to “transplant” love into individual national chambers.

What did this lead to in the past? To Auschwitz? I know many women—Ukrainian, Russian, and of other nationalities—who, at the cost of their lives, saved their Jewish husbands, and if they were unable to do that, accompanied them to their death. I also know husbands like this. There is nothing more beautiful or higher than that kind of love, and are we supposed to believe that it should be banned! Or to assert hypocritically that it is not linked with assimilation? Well, it is! If a Ukrainian has a Russian wife, then what is the children's national culture supposed to be? They themselves will decide, but some will inevitably assimilate and there is nothing reprehensible about that. Mixed marriages exist to the same degree that people with different languages live on the earth, and nations do not disappear as a result of this. On the contrary, they develop and enrich one another.

Hence the conclusion: it is necessary to love one's nation and one's culture, but it is also necessary to love other nations and other cultures. It is necessary to work together to eliminate our common misfortunes, rather than to divide them by nationalities. People of all nationalities must have, in any republic, equal opportunities to participate in state and public life, in the resolution of all the matters affecting the working collective of the rayon, city, or republic. These equal rights presuppose not only the extremely desirable knowledge of the Ukrainian language by citizens speaking other languages. It is necessary to proceed from the reality, and the reality is such that, say, in Lvov, the inhabitants include—in addition to Ukrainians—120,000 Russians, 19,000 Jews, 13,000 Poles, and citizens of other nationalities. Equal rights for all of us are impossible without preserving the Russian language as a language of communication among nationalities.

In everything we do, we must always remain true to the great brotherhood of the nations of the USSR. Therein lies our present and our future.

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Historian Attacks Western Media Interpretation of Uzbek Perestroyka

18300448b Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian
21 Feb 89 p 2

[Article by G. Khidoyatov, doctor of historical sciences, professor: “New Forms, Old Content; What Concerns the Western Ideological Opponents of Perestroyka”]

[Text] The world public has followed closely the revolutionary process of renewal occurring in our country. The ideas of perestroyka and the interest which they evoke throughout the world are persuasive proof of the commonness of the most important problems confronting mankind.

However, overseas perestroyka is not to the liking of everyone. The reactionary circles have seen in it a dangerous rise in the popularity of the ideas of socialism. The ideologists of anticommunism have received a social imperative to discredit the ideas of perestroyka and represent it as an utopia and a program beyond the capability of the Soviet Union. Considering the lessons of previous years, they have made substantial corrections in the doctrine and dogma of anticommunism and these are oriented at more modern and refined forms of anti-Soviet propaganda.

The Western mass information media have altered their tactics and, as if upon command, have become...ardent “supporters” of perestroyka as well as advisers on the matter of its practical implementation. The ideologists of anticommunism have appropriated the right to interpret and comment on the assessments and ideas of its main directions, goals and tasks. They complain that perestroyka is occurring slowly, they have assigned themselves the functions of inspectors of shortcomings and “stagnation phenomena” and themselves “decide” what, in their opinion, is good in perestroyka and what is bad.

Recently the Moscow correspondent of the American newspaper WASHINGTON POST D. Remnick published an article entitled “At the Time Moscow Is Pushing for Reforms, the Uzbeks Hold to the Old” and in which he asserts that the Uzbeks are continuing to live “in the age of Leonid Brezhnev,” in limiting themselves to half-measures and being the rear guard “caught in the swamp of subservience to Moscow and the heritage of corruption.” That is quite a transition! Certainly several years ago the ideologists of anticommunism in very substantial books, articles and radio broadcasts constantly asserted that dissatisfaction was ripening in Uzbekistan, a militant opposition of Moslem fundamentalism was growing and a political opposition was forming in moving toward a confrontation with Moscow.

Who should be believed? Obviously the ideologists of anticommunism are counting on the short memory of their readers and are little concerned with tidying things up and coordinating their previous and current convictions. On what grounds can one believe the new assertions of the ideologists of anticommunism?

Furthermore, D. Remnick asserts that in Uzbekistan perestroyka is being carried out in disorder and it is hard to find any logic or program for its implementation. No proof is given and there are only rumors and gossip gained from “private” conversations at the Samarkand Market where the American correspondent gathered his information. This is not new, but is rather in the style of the anticommunist propaganda from the Cold War period. Even in 1976, the correspondent of the NEW YORK TIMES Hedrick Smith excelled in such methods. In his book “The Russians” he endeavored to present to

the American reader the image of our state and our people drawing on old wives' tales and the gossip of riffraff whom he visited during a 2-month journey through the USSR.

Contrary to the assertions of the propagandists of anti-communism, perestroika is gaining strength in our republic although, possibly, not at the pace one would like. A merciless, uncompromising struggle is being waged against bureaucracy and abuses, corruption, bribery and deception are being eradicated. The long-existing routines, schemes and stereotypes are being rejected and new ways are being promoted to solve problems. New forms of production relations are entering the republic's economic life including leases, diverse forms of cooperation and individual labor activity. Rapid measures are being taken to resolve the primary social problems of providing the public with food, housing and improving public health.

The republic is learning democracy. Measures have been taken to democratize social life and there is a cleansing flow of glasnost and criticism which, in powerfully invading all spheres of life, has raised the broad masses of the republic workers to fight for perestroika. The process of democratization is deepening in production, and the economic role of the soviets and other bodies is rising.

In using the critical materials which appear in our press, the Western authors endeavor to play down the accomplishments of the republic and distort the historic path which it has followed over the years of Soviet power. They assert that in the republic "there is illiteracy, the population suffers from poor medical services, the monocropping of cotton reigns in agriculture, the population has been poisoned by pesticides, the Aral Sea is polluted" and so forth.

We do not deny our shortcomings. There would have been no need for perestroika if we had been confident that we had resolved all the problems. Perestroika is also directed at eradicating these shortcomings. But we decisively reject attempts to represent socialism as being incapable of resolving these, and to belittle our achievements in the area of public education and health. There is no need to give concrete data as these are known to all. They are also known in the United States and to certain authors who have a predominantly objective viewpoint.

In reviewing the distance traveled by the republic over the years of Soviet power, only one correct conclusion can be drawn: only socialism creates favorable conditions for solving the urgent social problems of mankind. Everything consists in correctly and effectively employing the potential opportunities residing in it and drawing honest lessons from our own mistakes and oversights and against which no one in the world is guaranteed.

The ideologists of anticomunism at present are intensely pushing the notion of establishing in Uzbekistan informal associations and organizations which could consolidate all the elements following "other paths" in the development of the republic. In contrast to the Baltic, writes the newspaper WASHINGTON POST, in Central Asia, there is no movement of the People's Front which would broaden the boundaries of "political freedoms." Moreover, the same newspaper asserts, party leadership in Central Asia in terms of its style, its views and its actions lags decades behind colleagues from the Baltic. There, supposedly, there is the possibility of a multiparty system but here not. "Oh, you!" The opponents of communism berate us, "Again you have fallen behind; create new parties, advance alternative programs and then we possibly might praise you!"

Each oblast and republic is searching for the paths of perestroika and new forms of organizing the masses. To strengthen party leadership, to reinforce party influence, to consolidate the ranks of the communists, and to achieve the democratization of internal party life—these are the primary tasks now confronting us. We have no need to either belittle the experience of others or repeat it. At some stage in the process of perestroika, the need does arise for establishing a separate social organization, but this, of course, is not an alternative or opposing political organization, as the ideologists of anticomunism might want.

The publicizing in the national republics of organizations which in the future could become opposing forces in the struggle for leadership is a new element in the attacks by the reactionary imperialist circles on communism. This is not an ideological struggle but rather a form of ideological subversion. This is an attempt to find loopholes for the illegal fostering of ideas which could bring about national hostility.

Under the conditions of socialist pluralism, each social movement, each of the groups or associations operating within the law have the right to express and defend their positions. We are in favor or debate and of comparing views. And we will always endeavor that these processes lead to a strengthening of the underpinnings of a socialist society.

It must also be remembered that the debates and heated arguments which have now become a standard of life in our country are being closely and constantly followed by our ideological opponents who endeavor to use any failing or immaturity in judgments for implementing their own ideological subversion. For this reason it is important that the debates be weighed, well thought out, well argued and be conducted on a high professional level. The dilettantism of certain debates and actions has led to ideological and political confusion and this has been used by our ideological opponents.

Recently, the Radio Ozodlik which is, as is known, a branch of Voice of America expressed "concern" over the ecological situation in Central Asia. In referring to the opinion of certain writers, it asserted that by their actions the writers had prevented the construction of a tool plant in Gazalkent and a chemical enterprise in Tavaksay. In encouraging the opponents of the construction of these enterprises and in urging them to broaden this movement, Radio Ozodlik has attempted to give this a political nature and represent the position of these writers as a clash of official policy with the interests of the indigenous population.

Let us endeavor to argue the necessity or harmfulness of these measures. Certainly "pure air" alone does not feed people, it does not provide the young with work, women with conveniences and children with nurseries. Certainly Switzerland with which Bostanlyk has been compared is not famous merely for the pure air, clean snow and pure lakes. This nation is among the industrially most developed capitalist states.

The plant in Gazalkent should produce high-precision control and metering devices, tape recorders and video tape recorders (not worse than the Japanese). It also could solve many social problems. Certainly many of the young people who now sell pies and shashlik at the Gazalkent Bus Station, who work as waiters in restaurants and sell flat bread at the market could become electronic engineers, highly-skilled foremen and workers. In the rayon new roads would be built, schools and nurseries would go up, and many women would find jobs. Each year hundreds of young men and women from Uzbekistan return from the nation's VUZes with diplomas as physicists, chemical engineers and technicians in highly sought after specialties. But where will they apply their knowledge and skills? Can we now permit that under the guise of protecting nature we are to abandon enterprises which could play an enormous role in solving social problems and in generally raising culture?

Uzbekistan in the nation holds 11th place in terms of the amount of energy per worker, 10th place in terms of the growth rate of the total volume of industrial product, 14th in terms of the proportional amount of products with high-quality categories, and 12th in terms of the growth rate of labor productivity in industry. Do not the reasons for our problems lie in these figures? Should not the public first raise its voice for fundamental changes in such a state of affairs in industry? And shouldn't the concept of perestroika in the national economy now be aimed at eradicating these negative phenomena? It is essential to protect nature and be concerned with ecology, but we must also not forget the solving of social problems. It is inadmissible that some problems are settled to the detriment of others.

Let us turn to the debate over the Aral Sea. It is a pity that the discussion of such an important question has not involved the broader public, in particular, historians

concerned with the search for ancient civilizations. Possibly this would have provided additional arguments for calm polemics and the search for more effective measures to save it. First of all historians would express doubt that the drying up of the Aral has been due to the diverting of water from the Amudarya for irrigation and developing new planted areas. A decline in the level of the Aral Sea was noted in the 18th Century. The Russian traveler and geographer P.A. Chikhachev at the end of the 19th Century pointed out that "the level of the Aral Sea is gradually dropping" and "the drop in the water level in the Aral Sea is more sharply expressed than in the Caspian." For understanding the nature of the Aral Sea, P.A. Chikhachev recommended drawing attention to its position: it lies 74 m above the level of the Caspian Sea and 48 m above the level of the Black Sea. There are the most diverse hypotheses on when the Aral was formed, when the Amudarya returned to the Aral from the old channel of Uzboy, why the Ancient Greeks at no place mention the Aral Sea in their historical and geographic works (not a single object escaped their inquisitive view) and, finally, why the well-known traveler Rubruquis who twice passed through those places where the Aral now lies (initially 10 km away and a second time 20 km) "did not notice" it or did not consider it necessary to mention it? Possibly, precisely with the participation of historians, in particular, archeologists who have found much that is useful in the underground treasure troves of history for solving modern problems, could disclose the mysteries of the Aral and behind the numerous myths and legends find the inner mechanisms of its periodic drying up and flooding.

In solving questions of national significance, we must not permit unnecessary excesses, vehemence and a monopoly right of one group to the ultimate truth. Provincial patriotism can only harm things, as it contributes to the establishing of a relapse to command and administrative principles in resolving problems, when group views are depicted as national interests. Perestroika merely suffers from this.

Anticommunism has commenced a new propaganda and ideological subversive campaign against socialism. At the center of its attention are the problems of perestroika in the USSR. The ideologists of anticommunism have considered the lessons of the previous defeats, when attempts to discredit socialism by obviously slanderous actions were unsuccessful and did not achieve their aim. Now they have altered their tactics and are endeavoring to sow doubts as to the possibilities of perestroika and at the same time are pushing their old doctrines and dogmas in new forms, in hoping that against the background of the general attractiveness of the ideas of perestroika, theirs will work someplace. Perestroika is forcing anticommunism to work out new forms of combating communism. But its essence has not changed.

In world political life, the new thinking has become a most important factor determining relations between

countries and peoples. Perestroyka in world international affairs has opened the way to reciprocal confidence and collaboration and to the abandoning of the image of the enemy. In broad circles of the world community, there is a growing understanding of the need to find the way to a lasting and mutually acceptable peace and which is impossible without mutual understanding and mutual respect. Under these conditions the intrigues by the ideologists of anticomunism are an anachronism and vestiges of the Cold War and against this we must wage a constant and consistent struggle.

Revival of Traditional Uzbek Holiday Tied to Ecological Awareness

18300448a Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian
26 Feb 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the Uzbek CP Central Committee Ideological Commission"]

[Text] The Ideological Commission of the Uzbek CP Central Committee has examined the question of restoring the Navruz holiday in the republic. It was emphasized that the appeal of the Ideological Commission of the Uzbek CP Central Committee to the republic population on the questions of restoring and improving folk holidays and rites evoked a broad public response. Approval for the planned measures was expressed in the numerous received letters and responses. It was pointed out that the recent administrative fiat in the sphere of the cultural and spiritual life of the people and the flagrant ignoring of traditions which had developed over the centuries with the simultaneous imposition of far-fetched measures have told negatively on the sociomoral atmosphere in the republic. Formalism and excessive over-organization have become one of the reasons for the emasculation of the ideological content of national holidays.

An analysis of the proposals from the workers indicates that Navruz is one of the important holidays. Basically it means the start of a new labor year for the farmers of the region and was traditionally celebrated on 21-22 March on the day of the vernal equinox. Navruz over the centuries developed in people a feeling of affection and a considerate attitude toward the homeland and nature and had an important role in labor and moral indoctrination. During the days of its celebrating wars were halted, disputes and insults were forgotten, and people strived for peaceful and good-neighborly relations. In line with this it was recognized advisable to restore this folk ritual and each year on 21 March hold in the republic the broad celebrating of Navruz employing diverse examples of theater-amusement, musical-poetic and circus arts with the participation of professional groups as well as amateur artistic collectives. On the day of celebrating Navruz there are plans to organize an exhibit of books, fine and folk art, as well as trade in consumer goods and food products.

It has been proposed that the period from 21 March through 21 April be declared "A Month of Charity and Environmental Conservation. During this time there are plans to hold "Memory Day," the rituals of the First Furrow, the First Sowing, the Day of Grain, Green and Water, the Children's Holiday of Boychechak, Lola Sayli and others.

It has been recommended that the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms together with the local soviets and considering the local historical and cultural traditions, with the agreement of the labor collectives and residential committees, determine the specific dates for holding the rituals related to celebrating Navruz. Attention has been drawn to the need to employ the best folk traditions aimed at reinforcing feelings of patriotism and internationalism as well as involving representatives of all nations and nationalities living in the republic in the celebrating of Navruz.

It was proposed that the Uzbek Ministry of Culture on 21 March organize a large holiday concert on 21 March and work out a program of republic tours devoted to Navruz. Appropriate instructions have been given to the mass information media to widely take up the course of preparing and celebrating Navruz in the republic.

UzSSR: Pollution Provokes Special Medical Aid for Aral Regions

18300438a Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian
24 Jan 89 p 2

[UzTAG report: "Medical 'Landing' in the Aral Region; Zone of Increased Attention"]

[Text] Around 200 pediatricians, therapists, surgeons, gynecologists, oculists, stomatologists, and nurses have been sent to the Aral region. They represent all oblasts of the republic, medical scientific centers, and the leading clinics of Uzbekistan.

The purpose of this "landing" is to give emergency medical aid to the residents of the Karakalpak ASSR and Khorezm oblast in accordance with the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers entitled "On Measures for Radically Improving the Ecological and Sanitary Situation in the Region of the Aral Sea, Increasing the Application Effectiveness and Improving the Protection of Water and Land Resources in its Basin." The medical men have been called upon to solve the acute problems which have accumulated there on protecting the health of the people in rayons which are most unfavorable in terms of their illness rate, and to provide in-depth dispensary treatment for the entire population. Within the framework of the integrated program "Zdorovye" [Health], which was adopted in Uzbekistan to the year 2000, a detailed study will also be performed of all factors affecting human health under the conditions of the unfavorable ecological situation which is being created here.

The Uzbek SSR Ministry of Health has allocated 10 portable x-ray fluorographic installations, clinical laboratories for performing express-analyses, and the latest diagnostic and treatment apparatus. In order to give qualified medical aid to sick people who work in remote rayons—shepherds in remote pasturelands, geologists, and drillers—medical aviation and a portable ophthalmological operating room have been introduced.

Part of the patients diagnosed in the course of the dispensary treatment will be directed to Tashkent for urgent hospitalization. Over 600 hospital beds have been allocated for them in the treatment institutions in the capital of Uzbekistan. The best clinics in the oblast centers are also ready to accept patients from the Aral region.

"The large-scale measures for giving medical aid to the population of this region stem from the program party-government document and are necessitated by the alarming ecological situation around the Aral Sea," says UzSSR First Deputy Minister of Health D. A. Asadov. "The extremal conditions associated with the drop in water level of the sea have placed a negative imprint on the general state of health of the residents around the Aral Sea, especially the women. They affect the infant mortality and are the reason for the increase in intestinal disorders and infectious diseases.

The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers outlined a set of measures for radically improving the ecological and sanitary situation in the Aral region. In connection with this, work is to be performed for which there is yet no precedent in our practice. Within a year, dispensary treatment must encompass over 2 million people living in Karakalpakiya and Khorezm oblast, and treatment-prophylactic aid must be provided. The best medical forces of the republic have been called upon to perform this work, and if necessary specialists from Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities throughout the country will also be called to action.

Uzbek Researcher Links Morbidity to Pesticides, Tajik Aluminum Plant

18300438b Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian
3 Jan 89 p 3

[Interview with Galina Sergeyevna Khadzhibayeva, head of the laboratory of the Scientific-Research Institute on Obstetrics and Gynecology, Uzbek Ministry of Health, and candidate in medical sciences, by O. Lukyanichikov, *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* correspondent: "The Health of the Woman; A Doctor Helps Us Sort Out Ecological Problems"]

[Text] How can we improve the labor conditions of women employed in the cotton processing industry and reduce the harmful effect of pesticides and wastes from the Tajik Aluminum Plant? G. Khadzhibayeva, head of the laboratory of the Uzbek Ministry of Health Scientific-Research Institute on Obstetrics and Gynecology and candidate in

medical sciences, deals with the solution to these and other pressing problems in the republic. She is an expert on ecology for the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and participates in the work of the Committee to save the Aral and the Prearal regions.

[Correspondent] Galina Sergeyevna, the introduction of the recommendations made by your scientific collective at the cotton processing plants has saved them tens of thousands of rubles. Yet something else is important. These figures also represent the protected health of many people. Tell us please about the scientific work which has led to these results.

[Khadzhibayeva] The studies were begun in 1980 at the direction of the AUCCTU. Prior to this, the effect of labor conditions on the health of the workers in cotton processing plants was practically not studied, although the illness rate among these workers was high.

In Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan we analyzed a great volume of medical documentation and performed multi-profile examinations of women, as well as extensive laboratory studies. We took into consideration not only production factors, but also the social factors—the family situation and income. We used a computer to process the obtained data.

Already after a year our group was able to present specific recommendations. These were approved by the Ministries of Health and Light Industry, and by the trade unions of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kirghizia.

Recently we asked (selectively) several cotton processing plants about the results. The responses indicated that the introduction is still partial, but nevertheless a reduction in illness rate among the workers has been noted and, as a result, also an increase in labor productivity.

[Correspondent] When and in what connection did your group address the problem of pesticides?

[Khadzhibayeva] In the process of conducting the studies, we began to understand that such a high illness rate could not be explained by such production factors alone as noise, dust pollution, and microclimate. That is when we focused close attention on the pesticides which are brought into the cotton processing plants together with the fibers and seeds. This also turned out to be scientific "virgin soil." Yet in our work we encountered more than just scientific difficulties.

[Correspondent] Galina Sergeyevna, I have heard about your difficulties, but you must be more specific for the readers...

[Khadzhibayeva] By that time, our group had accepted the proposal to go from being a branch of the union Institute on Labor Protection to the system of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Health in order to perform a more in-depth study of the medical aspect of labor protection

of women. In 1984 we received a state assignment: To deal with the labor conditions of pregnant women in the cotton processing industry. It was impossible to fulfill this task without considering the effect of pesticides.

The unpleasantries began right away. The laboratory was sometimes opened, and sometimes closed. At first we did not really understand the reasons for this and were convinced that soon everything would fall into place. Yet months passed, and the situation did not change. The intervention of Moscow and Leningrad scientists who addressed the republic's government also did not help.

The former management of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Health, having closed down the laboratory, suggested... that we re-apply for employment. In this case, our work seniority would be lost. The conclusion of the commission of the Union Ministry of Health and the Medical Workers Trade Union Central Committee to restore our employment was ignored. The republic's procurator's office gave contradictory responses to our appeals. I was summoned for "processing" to the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers.

We were reinstated in our jobs only at the demand of the republic's Supreme Soviet. Yet they cut back the laboratory staffing to a group of 6 people and laid down the strictest prohibition: Not to deal with pesticides! Thus the roots were being exposed—we were working in an undesirable direction. I wrote appeals addressed to the former secretary of the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee, R. Abdullayeva and to the former Central Committee science department head, N. Tukhliyev. They did not change anything.

We had to go out to the cotton processing plants literally in a clandestine manner. The associates of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Physiology and of the Central Asian Scientific-Research Institute of Hydrometeorology imeni V. A. Bugayev were of great help to us.

Then at the meeting of the institute's scientific council they announced that all of our materials were a falsification...

All this is painful to recall. The Leningrad Institute of Obstetrics and Gynecology even offered to take me in—to get me away from the nervewracking. Yet only here could I pursue the topic which I had undertaken. To leave would mean that everything had been in vain.

Thirty-five commissions verified the accuracy of our scientific work. Among them was the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Health Committee for People's Control. Finally, they came to the conclusion that the position of institute Director R. Khodzhayeva and Deputy Director R. Stepanyants had been detrimental to state interests. All the data which had been collected was acknowledged as being reliable.

It was under these conditions that we were nevertheless able to complete our work in late 1987. Today the recommendations for employment of pregnant women at cotton processing plants have been approved by the Ministry of Health, the USSR Gosagroprom [agro-industrial complex], and the central committee of the trade union of workers in the agroindustrial complex. Specifically, these recommendations call for transferring the woman to lighter or home labor from the moment that pregnancy is established. The collection of all-union recommendations, which also included these, should be published and sent to the enterprises at the beginning of this year.

I will add that we have discussed our proposals also in the collectives of the cotton processing plants themselves to see if we could realistically expect their implementation. Only after we received positive responses did we submit the recommendations for approval.

[Correspondent] Galina Sergeyevna, A. Minkin wrote about your work on pesticides in his article "Murderous Contagion," published in the journal OGONEK. The article caused much controversy. How did you yourself react to it?

[Khadzhibayeva] In my opinion, to the present day not much has been written in the press about pesticides. Yet we do need to write about them. It is just a pity that one very important fact did not get into the article—recommendations for protecting the health of the mother and child. They have not only been developed by us, but are being introduced and are in force.

After publication of the article there were efforts to remove me from my job. I was, however, able to prove their illegality and lack of substantiation. The party organs became involved. The chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, Rasul Gulamovich Gulamov, studied our problems in depth, and largely facilitated their solution. After that, already in October of 1988, a laboratory for studying the effects of production and ecological factors on the reproductive function of women was created on the basis of our group.

[Correspondent] Yes, the problems of ecology arise more acutely today than ever before. I know that you and your associates were also assigned the task of studying the effect of harmful wastes from the Tajik Aluminum Plant on the health of the women in Sariasiyskiy rayon in Surkhandarya. PRAVDA VOSTOKA wrote about this problem. What are your conclusions?

[Khadzhibayeva] We have been conducting studies in Sariasiyskiy rayon for about a year. We have analyzed thousands of medical documents and examined over 2,000 women. The Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Nuclear Physics joined in analyzing the biological material which we had collected. For comparison, we performed analogous work in Dzharkurganskiy rayon of Surkhandarya. It has practically the same level

of social development and medical services, and uses the same pesticides. The difference is in only one factor—there is no aluminum plant nearby.

Comparative data allow us to affirm that the waste output of the Tajik Aluminum Plant has a negative effect on the reproductive function of the female residents of Sariasiyskiy rayon and on the health of the newborns. The director of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences Scientific-Research Institute of Obstetrics and Gynecology confirmed the correctness of our conclusions.

There were several publications in PRAVDA VOSTOKA on the Sariasiysk problem, and the most varied opinions were expressed. In my opinion, those who believe that the waste output from the aluminum plant have been reduced to the norm and therefore everything is alright are mistaken. The rayon residents have already been subjected to their harmful effect. Also, we cannot forget about the need for providing urgent medical aid. More hospitals and medicines, more competent doctors, and more passes to sanatoriums and preventative health treatment facilities are needed.

We reported our conclusions to the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Health and to the republic soviet and party leadership.

I know that other medical scientific expeditions working in Surkhandarya already have no less alarming data at their disposal.

[Correspondent] It would be interesting to learn of your participation in solving the problems of the Aral.

[Khadzhibayeva] It began recently. The Committee to Save the Aral and the Prearal region suggested that I formulate a commission on medical questions. This work is a community effort, but I believe that merging of efforts of the community and the official organs is especially important in solving such global problems as the Aral. I am trying to include in the commission people with a high degree of medical training who are distinguished by their scientific objectivity and who are capable of presenting real and positive suggestions...

The main thing of which I am convinced is that, having learned of the troubles of the people, we cannot remain uninvolved. Neither as doctors, nor as citizens.

Goskompriroda Chairman Morgun on Ecology Factors in Economic Planning
18300413 Moscow PLANOVYE KHOZYAYSTVO in Russian No 2, Feb 89 pp 53-63

[Article by USSR Goskompriroda F. Morgun under the rubric "Economics and Ecology": "The Ecology in the System of Planning"]

[Text]

Revival of the Ecological Situation—One of the Main Problems of the Country's Socio-Economic Development

The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, taking into account the difficult ecological situation in a number of regions, on 7 Jan 88 adopted the decree "Radical Restructuring of Environmental Protection in the Country," which envisaged major steps in that sphere, in particular concrete dedicated tasks for improving the organizational structure of the economic mechanism for the purpose of the more effective solution of ecological problems. The USSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature [USSR Goskompriroda] was created in accordance with that decree.

Public opinion, concerned with the worsening ecological situation in many parts of the country and shortcomings in the utilization of land and water resources, forests and mineral fields, has an active interest in how matters stand with environmental protection today as well as what concrete practical steps are being developed and realized by USSR Goskompriroda to revive the ecological situation in the country and make the utilization of natural resources—the chief and fundamental wealth of society—more rational. This interest is natural. The welfare of the people and their health under contemporary conditions, after all, are linked to a decisive extent with the quality of the environment in which people live, work and relax. The standard of living is in turn conditioned by how rationally and efficiently natural resources are exploited. And moreover, it is not only the welfare of the generation of people living today that depends on this, but the fate of their children and grandchildren as well.

A natural question arises: is a decisive turnaround in environmental protection occurring in the country, is there a sufficiently decisive shift toward improving the ecological situation? Despite a number of positive steps that have been undertaken, the answer to this question must still unfortunately be no. No few instances of a worsening of the ecological situation are being observed. Air and water pollution and soil degradation are worsening, the forests are being impoverished, fishing resources are being depleted and many specimens of the plant and animal worlds are perishing. Extensive zones of ecological strain are continuing to arise. They include the basins of the Caspian Sea and Lake Ladoga, the regions of the lower Volga, Don and Kuban rivers, the Chernozem center of Russia, Moldavia, the Aral Sea and the territories adjoining it, the resorts of the Azov shore, the Crimea and the Riga seaside.

The USSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature was created not long ago and is still just completing the formation of its structure and working bodies, and thus it has not yet been able to expand active operations. The heart of the matter is this: will USSR Goskompriroda be able to erect a solid barrier to those offending the

environment, is this body able to provide for the rational utilization of nature in the country? It is a fundamental question. Recall that important party and government decrees have been adopted before. A series of all-union laws on environmental protection were adopted in 1978 and 1985, as were decrees for the protection of many specific natural sites—Baykal, the Volga, the Urals and the Black and Aral seas among others. USSR Gosplan has an environmental-protection department. The Commission of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Protection of the Environment and the Rational Utilization of Natural Resources was functioning until recently. State appropriations for the execution of natural-protection measures have grown considerably, and the ecological situation in the country has continued to worsen anyway.

What is going on? Why are the efforts being undertaken by the state to protect nature proving to have inadequate results?

The main reason is the prevailing attitude of production enterprises toward nature as a free and inexhaustible resource and toward the territory on which they operate as a spacious expanse to accommodate them. The enterprises, oriented by the ministries toward maximization of the output of products of their own types, strive for the fulfillment of production targets without considering the pollution and destruction of the natural environment and the socio-economic needs of the population.

The attitude toward the worsening state of the environment, for example, that was manifested in the course of the construction of the Astrakhan Gas-Condensate Complex (AGC) elicited a sharp negative reaction from the public. There were breaches of technological discipline and natural-protection legislation as early as at the beginning of 1987 on the first line of the gas-refining plant started up: the operation of process equipment without the scrubbing installations for tail gases and the unregulated combustion of significant quantities of condensate. Emergency burst emissions into the atmosphere (principally sulfurous anhydrites and sulfur-containing natural gas) occurred constantly due to interruptions in electric-power supply and breakdowns. The first phase of this complex was accepted as is for operation at full capacity by a working commission on 1 Jan 88. Some 14 out of 42 planned facilities for environmental protection had not been built nonetheless. Discharges of pollutants into the atmosphere more than doubled as a result. The concentration of harmful substances in the air of the adjoining cities in the region repeatedly exceeded the maximum allowable norms. The leadership of USSR Mingazprom [Ministry of the Gas Industry] and the Astrakhangazprom [Astrakhan Gas Industry] Association were compelled to rectify matters in the shortest possible time.

The largely helpless mechanism of economic operation was and yet remains a serious drag to rational resource utilization in the country. Evaluation of the work of

ministries and enterprises is done chiefly according to indicators of the fulfillment of sector plan targets for growth in product output volume. The damage done to the environment by pollution and the irrational utilization of natural resources has practically no effect on the results of economic operation.

The economic efficiency of the development and disposition of productive forces in the country is determined by the level of expenditures for the production of this or that output without regard for pollution damage or the state of the ecological situation in the region. The ecology factor is not sufficiently taken into account in the development of planning solutions, especially in the selection of sites, causing large-scale interference with the natural environment.

Economic methods of management in the utilization of nature are still quite inadequately employed compared to other spheres of production activity. Enterprises and organizations engaged in the reproduction and improvement of natural resources are on budget financing, as a rule. No monetary evaluation of the end results of their activity—natural resources reproduced or improved—is done, and only individual elements of business organization based on evaluating their intermediate results (volume of work completed, funds assimilated etc.) are utilized. Effective economic incentives aimed at the realization of natural-protection measures are lacking. In the majority of cases their implementation does not correspond to the economically accountable interests of the labor collectives, which leads to the systematic under-assimilation of funding allocated for natural protection and the unsatisfactory state and operation of existing environmental-protection structures and facilities. The fees that exist in a number of cases for the use of some types of natural resources have little effect, since they have a weak influence on the economically accountable results of the enterprises using the natural resources. Much will have to be done in the extant climate to convert the enterprises of land reclamation, geologic survey, the timber industry and other sectors and types of activity for the reproduction, protection and improvement of natural resources to full economic accountability [*khozrashchet*] and self-financing.

The lack of an accounting for the ecological costs of production are also negatively reflected in the foreign economic activity of the country. It is well known that some Western countries are going in for compensation agreements and the creation of joint ventures primarily in the extraction, chemical and petrochemical industries. Recall the large contracts for the construction of nitrate-fertilizer complexes in the middle of the 1970s and the protocols recently signed that envisage the creation of joint ventures with the Sandoz firm along with a joint petrochemical combine in Tengiz.

Specialists feel that one of the incentives for the participation of foreign companies in these projects, aside from their proximity to cheap sources of raw materials and power, is the essentially liberal ecological monitoring here compared with Western European countries and

the associated opportunity to reduce production costs. Attempts by individual firms to sell equipment and technology that there is no demand for in the West are observed therein. Under the conditions of the approaching ecological contradictions and conflicts, the right to locate polluting types of production has the nature of an unjustified concession or service subject to payment in freely convertible currency at high prices. Income from the sale of the right to locate production and continue business operations under similar conditions is comparable to the expenses that will have to be borne in the event of the import of the same products.

The acuity of ecological problems here has been caused to a certain extent by growth in the materials-intensiveness of national income and, consequently, the unfounded increase in the man-made burden on the natural environment. Whereas a 1-percent increase in national income required a 1.1-percent rise in industrial output in 1985, in 1986-87 it was 1.4 percent. The structure of the economy, in which no small place is relegated to "polluting" sectors—power engineering, metallurgy and the mining industry—is also having an effect.

Our country has surpassed the most developed and wealthiest country of the capitalist world—the United States—by 1.5 times in the production of oil, 1.5 times in natural gas, 1.8 times in mineral fertilizers, 2.2 times in steel, 4.6 times in numerical-control machine tools, 6 times in iron ore and 6 times in tractors. At the same time, the national income of the USSR is only 64 percent that of the United States.

The metals-intensiveness of national income in the USSR is double that of the United States, while the overconsumption of metal for the whole amount of national income totals about 75 million tons.

Excessive materials- and power-intensiveness of production brings about the large-scale extraction of minerals along with their refining and combustion, which engenders gigantic volumes of dumps of waste rock, ash and slag and harmful emissions into the water and the air.

Mineral fields, with some exceptions, are not utilized in comprehensive fashion. Only 10 percent of the 15 million tons of minerals extracted is converted into useful product. The extraction of a number of mineral components from the earth is typified by extremely low indicators. Such a scarce metal as manganese, for example, has only 25 percent of its actual content extracted in the process of extraction, enrichment and metallurgical conversion.

Timber resources are also in need of more rational utilization. The output of end product in monetary form per cubic meter of raw timber is 3 times less in the USSR as in the United States.

The further advancement of our economy along this resource-squandering path is incompatible with the protection of nature and the rational utilization of resources. It can only lead the country to the dangerous depletion of natural wealth.

It can thus be concluded that the main direction for improving the ecological situation in the country is progressive changes in the sector and territorial structure of the economy in the direction of reducing the proportionate share of the extraction sectors and the transformation of the technological and technical base in the "polluter" sectors with the aim of conversion to ecologically clean and waste-free technological processes. It seems that the economists, and first and foremost the workers of planning bodies, are facing two serious tasks: devising an ecologically well-founded strategy for the development of social production, and creating an economic mechanism providing for its unconditional realization by ministries, departments, associations and enterprises.

Directions for Raising the Scientific Substantiation for the Forecasting and Long-Term Planning of the Utilization of Nature

The scientific level and substantiation of the development of the problems of natural protection and the rational utilization and disposition of the country's productive forces and other pre-planning documents must necessarily be raised. Scholars face the following problems:

- a comprehensive evaluation of the natural and resource potential of regions and the ecological and economic zoning of the country;
- the formation of a standards base for forecasting and planning the utilization of nature, including an economic evaluation of natural resources and standards for proportionate expenditures on reducing the pollution of the environment;
- the execution of a comprehensive ecological and economic analysis of prevailing trends and prospects for the development of social production at the level of the national economy overall and for individual regions; and,
- the creation of a unified system for forecasting and planning the utilization of nature and the development of methods for the mutual coordination of pre-planning documents, along with their realization through a system of plan indicators and economic standards for enterprise management.

A key role in devising a strategy of natural-protection activity belongs to the study and objective evaluation of the state of individual natural spheres and the whole natural complex of individual regions and the territory overall. The task of integral evaluation of the pollution

of the territorial natural complex and parts of it by technologically generated chemical compounds—the most dangerous forms of violation of the natural balance—is especially topical.

Calculations therein can be based on accounting for the mass of pollutants produced on the territory, the danger of each ingredient of pollution and specific territorial features of self-cleansing processes in the air, rivers and soil, as well as their relative abilities to preserve pollutants. If one of these factors defines the volume and significance of the burden on the ecological environment, then others reflect its ability to counter them, permitting the resultant receipt of the most trustworthy indicators of the danger of the pollution of natural systems with a regard for both "horizontal" (interterritorial) and "vertical" (between spheres) migration volumes of pollutants.

The criteria for defining the maximum allowable man-made burden on various natural systems must be substantiated. For this the organs of USSR Goskompriroda, with the participation of interested ministries, departments and councils of ministers of the union republics, are obliged to develop and affirm state environmental-quality standards and standards for allowable effects on the environment in the near future. These standards and limits, along with integral indicators of the state of pollution of natural systems of various regions, will serve as a base for performing substantiated ecological and economic zoning of the territory of the country and ranking territories and natural spheres by priority of implementation of natural-protection activity.

An economic evaluation of natural resources is the key to solving a whole range of issues associated with the rational utilization of nature. They should be evaluated in monetary form in order to manage the utilization of natural resources efficiently. Only thus can the national-economic detriment from the withdrawal of this or that type of natural resources from operational economic circulation or their inefficient or non-comprehensive utilization be evaluated objectively, the expediency and sequence of their assimilation substantiated or the optimal parameters for the utilization of these resources selected.

At the contemporary stage of development of the country's economy, when a basic policy of resource conservation and the utmost economy of all types of resources, considerable reductions in the power- and materials-intensiveness of national income and changes in investment policy has been determined, the economic efficiency of resource utilization will be defined more and more not by expenditures for the assimilation of new natural resources with the aid of the sometimes imperfect equipment and technology existing today, but rather by reductions in the requirements of the national economy for natural resources and raw materials. Improvements in methods of economic evaluation of natural

resources are needed in this regard in the area of a more complete accounting for the ecological factor and the priority of resource conservation.

Reductions in the needs of the national economy for specific types of natural resources can be achieved in several ways differing both in the profundity of the transformation of the material base of social production and in economic efficacy. Methods of economic evaluation of natural resources will also differ depending on what method of resource conservation is selected as the defining one for a given type of primary natural raw material in various regions.

The development of standards for proportionate expenditures on reducing emissions (effluents) of pollutants into the environment for individual types of production is a topical problem. Standards are needed not only to raise the substantiation of pre-planning and planning documentation, but also to account for them in the formation of systems of payments for pollution of the environment.

The major drawback of extant practices in forecasting and planning the protection of nature and the reproduction of natural resources, along with the undeveloped nature of the system of norms and standards for allowable technologically generated impact on the environment, is the lack of a close coordination of natural-protection activity with the economic indicators of the development of the national-economic system and its constituent elements broken down by sector and region. This does not permit the economically substantiated delineation of priority areas of ecological policy or the determination of the optimal scale and time periods for the performance of operations for protecting the environment and reproducing natural resources proceeding from the country's future goals for socio-economic development or an evaluation of the economic efficiency of the given operations.

The necessity of executing a comprehensive ecological and economic analysis of the extant situation and the trends and prospects for the development of social production at the level of the national economy overall and for individual regions has become acute.

Scholars, and especially economists, are obliged to develop a methodology for evaluating the effects of the dynamics of the natural-resource potential of the country on the rate and proportions of development of the national economy.

The substantiation of strategic directions of natural-protection activity is accomplished in the process of preparing the Comprehensive Program of Scientific and Technical Progress, the General Scheme for the Development and Disposition of Productive Forces, the long-term State Program for Environmental Protection and the Rational Utilization of Natural Resources, intersector scientific and technical dedicated national-economic

programs and the Concepts and Basic Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR. A unity of scientific and technical, ecological and economic policy should be ensured in developing these documents.

The tasks and specific features of a study of the problems of the utilization of nature must be elaborated in each of the indicated documents, and a system of summary descriptions of the socio-economic efficiency of resource utilization established with the aid of which the mutual coordination and linking of pre-planning and planning documents will be performed. The summary descriptions include dedicated indicators of the quality of the natural environment and the parameters for the maximum burden on it in various regions, amalgamated balance sheets of the most important types of natural resources, and the basic parameters of resource-conservation activity and the protection and reproduction of the natural environment, including a cost estimate of results and indicators of the national-economic efficiency of investment in the protection of nature and the rational utilization of natural resources.

USSR Goskompriroda considers one of its paramount tasks to be organizing comprehensive research on these problems. The Ekologiya All-Union Scientific Research and Information Center [VNIITs]—the lead organization in the country for ecological research—is being created. The formation of republic divisions of the Ekologiya VNIITs with dual subordination is being proposed: to the republic environmental-protection committees in the development of regional problems and administrative and financial activity, and to the all-union center for overall scientific and methodological planning. The creation of divisions of this center in Leningrad, Perm, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Norilsk and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka is moreover envisaged. Scientific-production subdivisions (ecocenters) can be created at the oblast and rayon levels.

Success in resolving the tasks of raising the substantiation of forecasting and planning natural protection depends largely on how quickly the network of ecological scientific centers can be formed and the scholars of academic and sector institutes and institutions of higher learning attracted to this work.

Problems in Forming an Efficient Mechanism of Economic Operation for Managing the Utilization of Nature

The growing influence of the ecological factor on the development of social production should be suitably reflected in the mechanism of economic operation for the management of the national economy, including in the forms and methods of planning and economic incentives for enterprise activity.

The principal outlines of the new system for planning the development of the national economy have been defined by the resolutions of the June (1987) Plenum of the

CPSU Central Committee. The following most important directions of restructuring apropos of planning the protection of nature and the rational utilization of natural resources can be delineated:

- an orientation toward economic methods of planning under conditions of the widespread development of payments for the utilization of nature and changes in the forms and methods for developing plans for natural-protection activity with a regard for the effects of the State Enterprise (Association) Law;
- a strengthening of the territorial principle in planning the protection of nature and the rational utilization of natural resources;
- a decentralization of planning functions and a rise in the role of the soviets of people's deputies in preparing plans for natural-protection activity; and
- a redistribution of functions for preparing plans for the protection of nature and the rational utilization of natural resources among the bodies of state management in connection with the formation of the USSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature.

The topical nature of the development of economic methods for the management of resource utilization is especially increasing under contemporary conditions, when a significant portion of the indicators of environmental protection and the rational utilization of natural resources have been eliminated from approved plan targets for associations and enterprises that have been transferred to full economic accountability and self-financing.

An analysis of 1987 plan fulfillment showed that the elimination of the section of the state plan for environmental protection under the conditions of the lack of preparedness of many enterprises for the independent execution of natural-protection measures along with the lack of economic standards for payments for natural resources and emissions of pollutants is leading to a serious lag in the fulfillment by ministries and departments of the targets for the construction of environmental-protection structures and reductions in the assimilation of capital investments allocated for that purpose as envisaged by the five-year plan. The limit that was established for 1988 for capital investments in executing measures for the protection and rational utilization of natural resources was thus only assimilated by 39 percent over the first half of the year. The half-year plan for the start-up of waste-water treatment facilities was 49 percent fulfilled, while for water-recycling systems it was 61 percent.

Payments for natural resources and emissions (effluents) of pollutants into the environment will have a material role in the system of managing environmental-protection

activity. Proposals on the types and sizes of these payments are being widely discussed today. Economic standards for payments for the utilization of mineral reserves and land, water and air resources, in my opinion, should be established for state and cooperative enterprises in three basic forms of payments: reimbursements for spending on the reproduction of the corresponding types of resources included in the cost of the output of the producers utilizing natural resources; rent for the exploitation of the relatively best natural sources paid out of the profits (profit-and-loss income) of enterprises; and, fines and sanctions for making use of natural resources beyond standards or violating environmental-protection legislation, also paid out of the profits (profit-and-loss income) of enterprises.

All three types of payments for resource utilization are defined, as a rule, per unit of natural resource being utilized or consumed (tons of reserves used up, hectare of territory and the like) and are differentiated with a regard for the quality (productiveness) and location of the corresponding resources. Payments for emissions of pollutants into the environment are established for enterprises and associations with the aim of reimbursing the state for damages from the pollution of the environment and providing economic incentives to stimulate the implementation of environmental-protection measures and put the sources of their financing and credit in order.

The two types of payments for the discharge of pollutants into the environment differ depending on whether they were within the framework of established norms and limits or exceed them, including burst (emergency) emissions.

The size of payments for polluting the environment are determined according to the economic standards for fees for the discharge of pollutants into nature that are passed along to the enterprises as part of initial planning data. The size of payments for pollution allowable under the standards are differentiated by region of the country (oblasts, krays, ASSRs, union republics without oblast subdivisions) and enterprises and are set for the five-year plan.

It is essential to provide for the organic unity and efficient interaction of planning and economic incentives for the rational utilization of nature along with an increase in the substantiation of planning through the broader utilization of all-round planning balance sheets and standards for the utilization of natural resources.

The policy of including the economic interest of enterprises through setting standard fees for natural resources and pollution of the environment requires changes in the makeup of the indicators of environmental protection and the rational utilization of natural resources that are developed in the state plans for economic and social development.

The system of payments for natural resources, under the conditions of an increase in the independence of enterprises and associations in planning their activity, should provide an incentive for enterprises to develop and include in their five-year plans measures ensuring the achievement of summary indicators for the corresponding region and the country overall. The conversion from developing sector targets for implementing measures to protect and make rational use of various types of natural resources as part of the basic guidelines and five-year state plan to planning the allowable effects of social production on the natural environment is being proposed through a system of summary descriptions: limits on the consumption of natural resources, limits on emissions and effluents of pollutants and indicators of the completeness and quality of utilization of natural resources and primary raw materials.

A trend toward the prevalence of a sector and departmental approach is observed in the prevailing system of managing environmental activity in the national economy. State plans for protecting the environment, including planned sites of capital investment for these purposes, are based on the proposals of sector ministries through the realization of natural-protection measures by sub-departmental enterprises. Certain efforts to correct the corresponding targets in favor of an increase have been made in the consideration of these proposals in the planning bodies and discussion of project plans in the government and the USSR Supreme Soviet. Fundamental changes have not yet occurred, however. The lack of vested interest, and sometimes even conscious counteraction, of individual ministries and enterprises in the realization of this direction of productive activity along with the residual principle of the allocation of capital investments for environmental-protection purposes associated with this have brought about completely inadequate volumes of planned capital investments, their non-optimal distribution as broken down by territory and the chronic non-fulfillment of even clearly diminished plan targets for their assimilation.

Resolutions for the realization of these or those measures on specific territories have been adopted at the "ministry—Gosplan" level. Local soviets of people's deputies, charged by legislation with responsibility for the state of the natural environment on territory under the department, have had no real economic levers and practically no effect on the formation of state plans for environmental protection.

I would especially like to emphasize that the transition from sector to primarily territorial planning is coming forward today as a fundamental direction of the restructuring of the management of the utilization of nature.

It has been determined that the targets for the protection of the environment are formulated in the USSR State Plan for Economic and Social Development based on the

comprehensive plans for economic and social development of the union republics. The organs of territorial management at all levels (republic, oblast, city, rayon) should take part in formulating the targets of the comprehensive republic plans.

The task has thus been posed that the territorial plans for the protection of nature be of a tasking nature and orient enterprises toward the planning and realization of production measures facilitating the essential social development of that region. The basic work in preparing plans for natural-protection activity will be completed at the level of "local soviet of people's deputies—enterprise."

The fact that structural subdivisions for environmental protection were not envisaged in creating the main economic-planning administrations in a number of the oblasts of the RSFSR and the other union republics, however, evokes serious concern. The possibility of the quality development of the corresponding section of the comprehensive plan for economic and social development of the territory and its fulfillment are threatened as a result. The planning subdivisions of the republic and local committees for the protection of nature will be preparing proposals for comprehensive plans for the development of the territories on issues of environmental-protection activity, but they will be unable to replace the planning organs of the local soviets of people's deputies.

One indispensable condition of restructuring the management of environmental-protection activity in the country is a fundamental change in the attitude of the local soviets of people's deputies toward the ecological situation on subordinate territories. The question of the extreme situation that has taken shape in Yaroslavl with the utilization and protection of water and steps to normalize it were recently being considered at the collegium of the USSR Goskompriroda. Inspections showed that sewage is discharged into the Volga with 5 times more than the maximum allowable norms for organic substances, 20-40 times more for petroleum products and nitrogen and over 100 times more for some pollutants. This situation took shape largely through the fault of the city ispolkom and local monitoring organs. New production, residential and other facilities have been hooked up to the sewerage system since April of 1985 in spite of the existing ban. The city ispolkom had provided assurances that the third phase of the treatment facilities would be started up in 1985, but it has not fulfilled its obligations. A session of the Yaroslavl oblast soviet of people's deputies moreover adopted the resolution to construct these treatment facilities only in the 13th Five-Year Plan.

The state committee has demanded the adoption of immediate measures to construct treatment facilities by the enterprises and organizations of the city, as well to charge the committees for the protection of nature of the union republics with considering the state of sewerage systems and waste-water treatment facilities in major cities and

industrial centers and, making use of the rights they have been granted, taking steps to ensure the strict observance of the requirements of water legislation by the users of water.

Local organs of power, so that they have a real foundation for the management of environmental-protection activity in the territories under them, should have strong ecological levers. One material step is the formation of dedicated regional funds for the protection of nature and the rational utilization of natural resources, at the expense of which natural-protection measures of a predominantly intersector and general-regional nature could be financed. The principal source for assembling these funds will be the payments of enterprises for standard emissions (effluents) of pollutants into the air along with fines for exceeding the established standards. Regional funds for the protection of nature are a tool for mobilizing the financial resources of enterprises for environmental-protection purposes and accumulating and redistributing them with the aim of realizing natural-protection measures with the greatest economic efficacy.

Passing along to the enterprises the maximum limits of allowable effects and standards for payments for pollution will assist in the economic management of planning environmental-protection activity. The enterprise, in formulating the plan, will have a choice: deduct the payments for pollution of the stipulated dimensions or implement natural-protection measures at the expense of in-house funds (the production-development fund or credit among others).

The performance of ecological and economic experiments in Zaporozhye, Kemerovo, Krasnoyarsk and in Donetsk and Sumy oblasts is projected for 1989 with the aim of working out methods for setting the standards for payments for natural resources and pollution of the environment along with the principles for the assembly and utilization of republic and local funds for environmental protection. The choice of those territories for organizing the experiment was conditioned first of all by the initiative of city and oblast soviets of people's deputies, who were able to attract the executives and specialists of enterprises and scholars from scientific-research institutes and higher educational institutions to this work.

The decisions of the collegium of the USSR Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy can be cited as a positive example of restructuring attitudes toward environmental-protection activity. A sector Ecological Council was formed there; basic guidelines for a long-term sector program for the protection of the environment and the rational utilization of natural resources for the 13th Five-Plan and to the year 2005 have been approved, on the basis of which the long-term natural-protection programs for all enterprises and associations of the ministry are being reconsidered, elaborated and coordinated with the ispolkoms of the local soviets of people's deputies. It has been established at the same time that the realization of the environmental-protection programs should take priority

in the implementation of measures associated with capital construction and the reconstruction and modernization of enterprises.

A republic fund for environmental protection and the rational utilization of natural resources has been functioning as an experiment in the Estonian SSR since 1983. The USSR State Committee for the Protection of the Nature and Timber Resources, in conjunction with the ESSR Academy of Sciences, has organized the development of the essential methodological materials. It was decided as an experiment to employ economic standards for resource utilization at the Estonslanets PO [Production Association] in 1988, and standards for compensation payments for agricultural and timber lands were approved and a draft of payment standards for generally occurring minerals and peat was prepared. The experience of the Estonian SSR shows that the tasks of forming an economic mechanism for managing environmental-protection activity are entirely achievable.

The introduction into practice of payments for natural resources and pollution is possible only when they are reflected in wholesale prices. Otherwise the profit-and-loss income of the enterprises could prove to be insufficient for these payments. This situation, with certain exceptions, however, is not taken into account in practice in the standard documents of USSR Goskomtsen [State Committee on Prices]. The Technique for Determining Wholesale Prices for Production and Technical Products for the raw-materials sectors of heavy industry, approved in 1988, does not envisage the introduction of payments into the wholesale price structure for natural resources established on the basis of differentiated rents or for emissions (effluents) of pollutants into the environment.

Scales of compulsory premiums over wholesale prices for ecologically more advanced products compared to the price of analogous products with worse ecological properties (content of harmful substances in fuels and raw materials, toxicity of mineral fertilizers and pesticides, unit pressure of agricultural equipment on the ground and the like) should be introduced (in the course of the impending price reforms) for the purpose of providing economic incentives for the production and use of ecologically "clean" types of fuels, raw and other materials, closed (waste-free) process systems and the like.

USSR Goskompriroda considers a most important area of its activity to be participating in the creation of an efficient economic-planning mechanism for management that is oriented toward the rational utilization of nature. The state committee in turn needs support and assistance on the part of central economic, sector and territorial bodies in the execution of purposeful work to improve the country's utilization of nature.

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Scientist Views Chemical, Biological Substances as Threat to Mankind

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[Article by V. N. Soyfer, doctor of biological sciences: "Technology of Degradation"]

[Text] The journal OGONEK, issues No 1-2 for 1988, published the article by Valeriy Soyfer, "Bitter Fruit," which depicted the apocalypse of Soviet genetic science. The article was preceded by an introduction by G. R. Ivanitskiy, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member and laureate of the Lenin and State prizes.

We asked Genrikh Romanovich to acquaint our readers with V. N. Soyfer and his new work, "Technology of Degradation." It seems to us that the events described in the article, "Bitter Fruit" have led us to that limit at which the problems of saving mankind will have no solution. The time to think is now.

Serious Analysis Is Needed

V. N. Soyfer's article, "Technology of Degradation," is about the possible degeneration and self-destruction of mankind as a result of its ecological short-sightedness. The problem has long since gone beyond the boundaries of the interests of fantasy writers. It is second in its significance only to the threat of nuclear warfare. Yet while there are positive shifts in the direction toward mutual trust between peoples, the problem of environmental protection has not even been clearly formulated.

Based on a systematic scientific analysis, we must find a compromise between the egotistical tendencies of man, the growth of the population, and nature's limited capacities for self-restoration. The ecological catastrophe can have no boundaries. To solve this problem we need the collective reason of the entire planet. The means of mass information must help the community at large to recognize the severity of the situation. This is the moral debt of scientists and journalists alike—our responsibility to future generations.

Now about the personality of the author—Doctor of Biological Sciences V. N. Soyfer. I do not know the motives for his departure from the USSR, but I believe that this fact has no bearing on the essence of the published article. For many decades we have formulated in our country the generally ruinous opinion that dissent is incompatible with USSR citizenship. We need a serious and frank analysis of the motivating forces and reasons why people of great talent are forced to leave their Homeland.

Under conditions of glasnost and pluralism, the fact of publication of V. N. Soyfer's article indicates that the new thinking is making a direction for itself, although with difficulty. We can say that it has been fully formulated only when we finally deeply acknowledge what a loss this "brain and talent drain", which is occurring through our own fault, is inflicting on the economy, on science, and on the intellectual and spiritual life of the country.

Technology of Degradation

We have become accustomed to priding ourselves on the achievements created by the human mind, ingenuity and purposefulness. We believe that man's life has become easier, his everyday existence improved, his food richer and more varied, his clothing more dressy, and his medicines more healing. Yet far from everything that man has acquired in the form of products of chemistry and physics is harmless. The system of control over the safety of all innovations has not been well planned, and such events as the criminal negligence of engineers and scientists which led to the Chernobyl catastrophe immediately affect huge numbers of innocent and helpless people. It seems to me that we should discuss these problems and not put off the discussion for the future.

I am in no way trying to select only those factors which fit into the conception being developed. Nor am I ignoring facts which indicate the opposite. The dramatism of the situation is that there is no alternative to the ominous expansion of technological products which afflict the hereditary apparatus of all the creatures on Earth. The increase in mutations (this was the term used at the beginning of the century to describe hereditary changes) may at some point become uncontrollable. Once they have appeared, mutations manifest themselves in the following generations of cells. In order to stop their effect we need rather forceful measures, whose arsenal, unfortunately, is as yet inadequate. In reading this article, we must constantly keep in mind the principle of unavoidability of the harmful effect of mutations.

Chemical Substances and Heredity

In 1980, the American Medical Association reported that the industrial enterprises of the USA alone use 1,500 chemical substances (solvents, oxidizing agents, preservatives, etc.) which are capable of causing cancerous tumors, and that in the U.S. automobile industry alone 6 million workers are being subjected to the risk of cancer due to inhalation of these substances and contact with them. In the 70's it was also proven that over 70 percent of the cancer-causing substances have the capacity of altering the organism's hereditary properties by affecting the genes, i.e., they provoke gene mutations.

In order to understand how great this figure is (1,500 chemical substances), we should remember that world industry has perfected the large-scale manufacture of about 3,000 compounds. Around 47,000 compounds are

manufactured in a smaller quantity, yet are still quite widespread. Substances which comprise the make-up of medicines (4,000 specifically medicinal preparations and 2,000 fillers) or used as food additives (2,500) are produced in relatively small volumes. The preparations for agricultural chemistry (on the order of 5,000 compounds) and household chemical products are produced in huge quantities. A significant portion of the chemical products is harmful to the health of the population. Specifically, a connection has been found between the expanded arsenal of chemical means and the parallel growth of cancer incidences.

For many thousands of years, man has come into contact only with natural substances. Of course, the smoke of the fires around which our forebears sat also contained carcinogens, but their amount was immeasurably minute as compared with that which awaits man today at every step. Also, the activity of those carcinogens was much lower than that of present-day chemical products.

Much has been written and said about the danger of these products. However, in most cases the discussion centers around direct harm—illness or death of people and farm animals, destruction of animals and plants.

Yet there is an even more insidious danger of which we prefer not to speak. This is the appearance of children encumbered with hereditary diseases, the birth of various freaks. "Silent Spring"—that is what the leading American writer Rachel Carson entitled her warning book. It is the spring of the future, during which only mutant plants will awaken, and horrible monstrosities from the world of mutated animals will abound. Such a future is the most frightening thing of all.

...People who live near the shores of reservoirs and seas located near mines and unpublicized industrial enterprises quite often hear about fish which are caught without scales and fins, sometimes without eyes, and with metamorphoses of the internal organs. Teratogenic disorders (i.e., deformities of various organs) are just as well known to livestock breeders, and specialists in cattle breeding have noted the tendency toward an increase in such disorders. The primary cause of all the cases indicated is changes in the genes. Man is no exception. Workers of maternity homes are well aware of the fact that year after year there are more freaks being born. There is an even greater increase in the number of children born with organs which are normal in their external appearance, but who are suffering from hereditary diseases caused by gene damage. Already 10 years ago it became known that of about 10,000 illnesses afflicting man, one-fifth (around 2,000) were caused by damage to the genes. Today this figure has been more clearly defined in an increased direction.

No less important is the fact that there are widespread hereditary diseases which manifested at the early stages of childhood development, long before the onset of sexual maturity. These children grow into adults thanks

to the achievements of modern medicine. They are able to superficially cure these incurable ills, enter into marriages, and...breed those like them.

Yet even this is not the main thing. Not all gene breakage is immediately evident. Most of it remains in a long hidden (latent) state and is manifested only in distant generations. Therefore, today we are still not in a position to evaluate the dimensions of the potential danger of accumulated mutations in our descendants.

Spheres of Distribution of Substances Altering Genetic Structures

We should at least briefly characterize the types of substances which cause mutations. I will limit myself merely to an indication of the most widespread and therefore the most dangerous groups of substances.

Agricultural chemical products. The chemical means of combatting weeds, crop diseases and pests are used on a colossal scale. Among them there are the so-called herbicides which kill weeds, insecticides which kill insects, defoliants which cause droppage of the leaves and thereby facilitate machine harvesting of the crop, fungicides which are intended to combat fungi, nematocides to protect against nematodes (round worms), rodenticides against small rodents, and other types of substances. Many of them are far from harmless.

Several years ago our family was driving through Uzbekistan—from Bukhara to Samarkand. We found ourselves on a road passing through endless fields of cotton as far as the eye could see, and for the first time we discovered what defoliants were. On both sides of the road, small aircraft were buzzing in a business-like manner, spraying a murky cloud of foul-smelling substance. The planes were preparing the fields for cotton picking by spraying a noxious, stinking suspension which would make the leaves drop off the plants so that the cotton-picking machines could easily harvest the "white gold". We tightly rolled up the windows of our car, covered our mouths and noses with kerchiefs, but there was no way to avoid the foul smell.

Upon returning to Moscow, I began to wonder whether anyone takes into consideration the health hazard posed by these defoliants. It turned out that all the necessary permits for using the defoliants had been obtained. One high-ranking associate of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture even assured me that the substances being sprayed over the fields (2,4-D and a number of others) are, first of all, completely harmless to man, and secondly, absolutely necessary to agriculture. They are used not only on cotton, but also on sunflower fields as well. Plans are being developed to expand their application. New factories are being built. The same thing is going on in the entire civilized world.

Yet this same substance and its derivatives is what the American army used in its war against Vietnam, and their application led to the ruin of the heredity of plants, animals, and man alike.

Up until recently, ethylene dibromide—a wide spectrum insecticide—was used in the struggle against insects damaging the crops of grain, fruit and berry cultures. Preliminary tests of its toxicity and carcinogenic nature yielded encouraging results. It was found that the substance quickly disintegrates into harmless components. On this basis it was advertised and introduced into widespread application. Today it has become clear that this substance is a strong carcinogen. In the USA, at least in four states, ethylene dibromide has accumulated in the soil in many places, in excess of the maximally allowable concentrations. It has been found also in the drinking water, which poses a threat to the lives of millions of people. Now it has been urgently banned and should have been taken completely out of circulation. It will take years, if not decades, to decontaminate the soil and the water-bearing strata. Therefore, references to the fact that all substances which have been approved for widespread application have passed adequate safety testing cannot help but raise serious objections. In connection with this, I would like to point out three circumstances.

First of all, specifically in those regions where pesticides are widely used in agriculture there has also been observed an increase in the level of hereditary illnesses. This conclusion is contained, for example, in the speech presented by the chairman of the section on genetic aspects of the problem of "Man and the biosphere" of the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee on Science and Technology, Academician N. P. Dubinin. In discussing the problem of pesticide use in the cotton-raising republics—in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Moldavia, he said:

"For the present day we...possess data on the significant increase in hereditary developmental defects in the population of the Uzbek SSR and on the discovery of a correlation between the frequency of developmental defects and the distribution of pesticides in the Armenian SSR" (boldface mine—V.S.).

The second important circumstance is the accumulation of pesticides in the soil, water, and tissues of animals and plants. It is believed that pesticides break down rather quickly in the soil. Yet year after year the concentration of these substances in the soil increases. Therefore, to think that they are not accumulated in the soil is to exhibit a criminal lack of concern. And in those months before the pesticides have decomposed, do they not kill the flora and fauna? Are they not washed out into the rivers, from which they get into our drinking water, etc.?

The third circumstance which evokes alarm is the change in the selection of pesticides and the transition to the joint application of more mutagenic compounds of copper and sulphur. Thus, while from 1964 through 1971

the organochloric pesticides dominated, "at the present stage it is the copper compounds (over 50 percent of all utilized means of plant protection) that dominate." Considering the fact that from 1965 through 1978 the volume of introduced pesticides in the USSR alone increased by 5 times,¹ it is appropriate to stop and think how many times over the harmfulness of these compounds to man and the biosphere on the whole has increased during these years.

In this same speech, N. P. Dubinin cited the following figures: Of 126 pesticides studied (around 17 percent of all those used in USSR agriculture), 90 turned out to be mutagenic, or 71.5 percent of those tested. There is reason to believe that among the other pesticides the proportion of those which are dangerous to heredity is about the same. On the other hand, we know that over 90 percent of chemical mutagens cause cancer.

Let me present one more example. One of the most dangerous compounds which affects the biological structures is dioxine. It is being found with ever greater frequency in various food products. Recently dioxine was found in the milk of cows grazing in the region of a chemical enterprise in Scotland. From the contaminated soil it had gotten into the grass. The grass was eaten by the cows, and then the dioxine got into the blood, and from there—to the milk. The authorities immediately closed down the enterprise. Yet how many people had already drunk this milk, and what can be done with the contaminated soil on which poisonous grass and trees will still grow for a long time to come? And is this going on only in the quiet, if not to say patriarchal, Scotland?

It is not surprising that the scope of calamities is beginning to encompass ever more extensive areas of the Earth's surface. Recently, for example, all the studied samples of Canadian pike perch caught in Lake Torch (state of Michigan, USA) had liver cancer. This same illness was found in the cod caught in the Hudson River, and in the flounder caught in the bays of Washington state. An article in the journal NEW SCIENCE stated that the bottom sediment of these areas was found to contain chlorinated butadienes, heavy metals, aromatic hydrocarbons, and other products of the chemical industry.²

However, we know that the pests plaguing agricultural crops adapt quickly to new pesticides and not only stop reacting to them, but sometimes even begin to multiply more intensively on this background. Recently the associates of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency reported that in the last 10 years, 204 species of harmful insects have stopped "reacting" to pesticides and acquired an immunity to them. This means new, more active, and consequently more dangerous pesticides will have to be synthesized.

Polymer materials. In the last three decades, polymer materials, lacquers and new synthetic paints, whose odors we breathe every day, have become very widespread. It is believed that all of them are relatively

harmless, since they have been tested on laboratory animals. Yet the farther we go, the more apparent the relative nature of these evaluations becomes. For example, it has been precisely determined that epoxys are very strong mutagens. We are assured that polymerized epoxy resins, like other polymers, are not harmful. But what happens when the temperature of the objects glued together by these resins increases?

Evidently, it is appropriate to ask similar questions in regard to most polymer materials. Quite recently, only about 10-15 years ago, studies were undertaken on the potential danger of various organic monomers used for making various plastics, and how many alarming findings these works produced!

In 1974 it was determined that vinyl chloride—the basis for a large number of polymers—is capable of inducing tumors. Two years later it became clear that vinyl chloride is also a strong mutagen. Ominous discoveries poured forth as if from a cornucopia.

After this, can we discount the discussion as to the need for seriously thinking about the problem of stability of polymers and the permissibility of their widespread application in the food and canning industry,³ in products subject to the effect of high temperatures, direct sunlight, acids and alkalis... or in buildings where people spend long periods of time, especially if we are speaking about areas where there are often high temperatures or aggressive environmental conditions?

The same is true also for the lacquers and paints which turn our homes and offices into a "festival of colors, caressing the eye". No one is refuting the latter statement, but what about the health of our descendants, if we know ahead of time that the solvents used in these lacquers and paints, as well as they themselves, affect the genes?

When I tried to pose detailed questions to a number of persons responsible for this practice, I was inevitably met with puzzlement, and then the good-natured patronizing response: "Of course, all these substances have undergone comprehensive testing, including also on laboratory animals, and have been deemed safe."

Medicinal substances. An extremely remarkable example of unhealthy optimism in the approach to the problem of safety to hereditary structures was the incident with a popular preparation manufactured under the name of thalidomide. In tests with female hamsters, a dosage of 350 mg thalidomide per kilogram of body weight was judged dangerous. Based on this, smaller doses were recommended for humans.

Yet it turned out that for dogs the minimal dose at which developmental disorders in offspring were noted was not 350 mg/kg, but only 100 mg. For rats it was 50 mg, for mice—30, and for humans only 0.5 mg/kg of body weight! Man turned out to be 700 times more sensitive

than the laboratory hamsters customarily used by the experimenters. The failure to take this factor into consideration led to the situation where the medicine which had passed testing and been patented led to the birth of children without arms and legs, with fused cranial bones, and other deformities. The medication was banned, and some of those guilty of manufacturing it were sued.

It is a well known fact that incidents analogous to the thalidomide case have recently been repeated. Recently the journal SHTERN reported that around 15,000 people in the FRG alone die each year from taking medications which have not undergone sufficient testing but which are nevertheless approved for use. If we consider the fact that each year there are 700 million prescriptions for medication written in the FRG, it is easy to understand how difficult it is to find in this sea of physician's prescriptions the dangerous new drugs which may cause harm to the health. The situation is similar also in other countries. I might repeat: The genetic cargo multiplied through the generations will weigh on mankind even when everyone has forgotten about these thalidomides, oraflexes, tandorils and butazolidines which were so thoughtlessly taken by their great-great-ancestors.

Pollution of the Atmosphere and Household Chemical Products

It has been determined that certain substances which are constantly present in the atmosphere of cities, such acetylaminofluorenes or products of rock coal and petroleum combustion (for example, benzantracenes) are not in themselves mutagens. Therefore, they do not cause mutations in tests with bacteria, viruses and fungi. However, in the air, under the effect of sunlight, some of them take on the capacity for causing hereditary changes. Thus, specifically, benzantracenes in this case begin to cause mutations in the cells of the skin, lungs, and other organs of man and animals.

Many household chemical products are also strong mutagens. This is the reason for the precautionary warnings on the labels of many of them: "Do not allow to get into foodstuffs." We are speaking not only of their high toxicity, but also of their effect on the gene structures. However, even in regard to toxicity the information is unsatisfactory. No detailed instructions on this matter are given, and people are inclined to take such warnings lightly.

Part of the chemical products widely used in household application may not themselves cause mutation, but may facilitate its induction by other substances. These are the washing substances—detergents. Ordinary soap which our parents used was a mere toy as compared with this chemical innovation. It is true that soap burned the eyes, but nothing bad happened if it got into the organism. The soap particles decomposed into their components—ordinary molecules present in the cells of our body.

Synthetics are another matter. Getting into the organism in even minute quantities, they practically do not decompose, but are deposited in the liver, kidneys, and other organs. The main thing, however, is that these washing substances "digest" the cell walls of the internal organs and thereby undoubtedly facilitate the penetration of mutagens inside the cells. The increased frequency of mutations with the use of detergents has been clearly demonstrated in experiments with plants. Thus, the substances which are seemingly intended to make our life easier in reality not only poison it, but also facilitate gene damage.

The Phenomenon of Delayed Manifestation of Mutations in Later Generations

Of course, we cannot doubt that the examples presented above are only the beginning brush strokes of that horrible picture which specialists in the field of genetics and environmental protection paint before our very eyes. Yet they are sufficient to make us stop and think about what the future holds for us if we do not take immediate precautionary measures.

Such immediacy is dictated also by one other discovery of geneticists, which undeservedly remains in the shadows. Everyone understands that there is a huge difference between the two events—death and such damage to the genetic apparatus under which life would be preserved, but all the subsequent generations of the organism altered in this way would exhibit the hereditary defects at an ever increasing rate. This was proven in 1946 by the American geneticist M. Demerets, who studied the number of mutations in *E. coli* bacteria after irradiation. He decided to irradiate the bacteria one time, and then study the frequency of mutations in their offspring. The answer, it would seem, may be given ahead of time. In fact, is it not clear that the irradiated subject would suffer most of all, and that in the course of time the effect of the consequences, if they are indeed observed, will begin to diminish?

However, M. Demerets found that in the first generation after one-time irradiation the frequency of mutations was much lower than in subsequent generations. The children, grandchildren, great grandchildren, and great-great grandchildren showed no attenuation of the mutation process. On the contrary, the frequency of mutations increased from one cell division to the next, reaching a maximum by the 6th-8th generations, and declining to the level characteristic for normal non-irradiated bacteria only by the 20th-30th generations.

In subsequent years, information was obtained on the presence of potential disorders in plants, insects, fish, and tissue cell cultures of higher animals subjected to one-time irradiation or to the effects of chemical substances. It was shown that these changes are retained in the genetic apparatus for a long time—from several cycles of cell division to several hundred divisions, and give rise to mutations at the time when, it would seem,

the organisms should long since have forgotten about the ruinous effects of the harmful agents which had come crashing down on the distant forebears of this organism.

Although answers have not been found for all the questions, nevertheless many different facts have been uncovered which indicate that the human gene pool is accumulating more and more pre-mutation afflictions from one year to the next. After three generations, the descendants of people subjected to radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945 still continue to exhibit new cases of cancer illnesses, and at a much more frequent rate than that of the surrounding population. The case histories were analyzed for 24,000 residents who received a radiation dosage equal to about 50 rem during the bombing. Among these, all cases of cancer incidence were recorded. The number which would be characteristic for cancer incidence among the standard population was subtracted from this figure. It turned out that by the mid-70's the number of deaths due to cancer among the 24,000 people irradiated exceeded the norm by 100 cases. The fact of increased mortality several decades removed from the incident of one-time irradiation, was proven.

An even greater number of above-norm deaths from cancer was found among the persons who were present in the zone of radiation effect during the testing of nuclear weapons in 1954 on the Marshall Islands, as well as among miners working in uranium mines. A group of authoritative experts noted that in Great Britain among 15,000 persons subjected to x-rays of the spine for the purpose of diagnosing arthritis and receiving a dose of 250-500 rem computed for the entire body, there were over 100 above-norm deaths from cancer in the next 20-25 years. Unfortunately, the authors of the report do not present any data on the direct study of mutations in the following generations of these people, or at least on the cases of occurrence of hereditary illnesses. The data on distribution of radiation-induced cancer by various age groups is also not reported. Nevertheless, since there is a close correlation between the frequency of occurrence of induced tumors and induced mutations, the data presented above may be extrapolated also in regard to mutations. Specifically, we may point out that in the USA the accepted level of safe radiation during x-ray diagnosis is equal to 170 millirem per year, or 5 rem in 30 years. However, even with this rather low dosage, as computed by geneticists, we should expect the birth of from 642 to 15,600 children with new hereditary defects per 3 million newborns per year. This figure relates to children of the first generation. Evaluations for more remote generations are absent.

Thus, the discovery which Demetret made for bacteria is applicable also to man. It is no accident that the research group on evaluating U.S. policy in the field of nuclear energy concluded that: "Certain genetic effects occur primarily in the first generation, others become apparent later, and some last for tens of generations."⁴

Human Mutations, Reparations and Illnesses

The study of reparations (correction of DNA defects) in man has produced a discovery which is tied with defining the role of special enzymes in maintaining health. Long ago it was discovered that in some patients sunlight causes the formation first of red spots on the skin, and then crusts which turn into scabs which do not heal. Often this illness ends up as skin cancer. Up until recently, no one suspected that the reason for this illness, which was called xeroderma pigmentosum, was a defect in the reparative enzymes. Similar discoveries followed one after another.

Initial tests showed that it was possible to stop the work of the "doctor enzymes", but only by damaging the genes which encode these enzymes, or by giving them more work than they are capable of performing. It turned out that if the organism finds itself under conditions in which its genes are subjected to too many harmful effects, the amount of damage begins to exceed a certain critical level. There are not enough enzymes in the cell of the molecules to treat all the points damaged in the hereditary molecules. The synthesis of new portions of reparations is present and ongoing, but in insufficient amounts, and the reparation systems go out of order. Now the organism is no longer able to save itself from the damage inflicted on its genes, and only two possibilities remain. The first—to perish sooner or a bit later without giving offspring, and the second—to give offspring, but those which are burdened with a number of hereditary defects.

Also, we cannot exclude the possibility that the increase in the number of cancer cases observed in recent times is associated with the participation of the same factors which suppress the work of the reparation enzymes and lead to human hereditary diseases.

Thus, the results of reparation studies first gave rise to optimistic hopes for the use of reparative enzymes in treating particularly severe cases. Yet these hopes have still not been justified. Adapted to the level of mutation characteristic for the normal natural environment, the reparation enzymes have turned out to be helpless in those cases where the genetic damage becomes excessive.

The Reality of Damage To Human Genes

We will try to once again discuss in a goal oriented manner that real threat of hereditary ruin of man which is already present for the current day. Part of the data were presented above, and we will try to give a summary picture of the dynamics of the process.

First of all, we must point out that in the last quarter century the frequency of occurrence of congenital hereditary defects in children has doubled. One in every 10 Europeans either carries from birth a hereditary illness or has a developmental defect determined by gene breakage. If we plot a graph of the increase in frequency of

hereditary afflictions during these years, we will get a linear curve which shows no tendency toward decrease. In other words, the hope that the increase in illnesses will subside by itself is unfounded. Analogously, it has been determined that the frequency of cancer incidence in recent years is also steadily increasing, and has tripled in the period from 1930 through 1975.

This avalanche of hereditary defects is the direct result of the accumulation of more and more mutagens in man's environment. In 1958 only 412 mutagenic substances were described, while in 1981 there were already more than 3,300 of them. And again we may note that the kinetics of the process of emergence of mutagens in the environment still does not indicate a tendency toward decline. On the graph, the line showing the increase in the number of mutagens based on time is represented by a section of straight line extending upward over the last three decades without any deviation or reduction. Here we must keep in mind that if all the mutagen substances were unmistakably identified, the increase in the number of these dangerous substances would be even more steady.

The situation with pollution, undoubtedly, is different in different geographical regions. As a result of this, the proportion of children born with deformities or hereditary diseases varies in different parts of the globe. However, we should not cherish vain hopes that we might find a secluded place and "sit through it all" there, without subjecting our genes to the risk of damage. There are no more such places on this earth. Due to the chemical substances getting into the air currents and into the water, as well as due to the dispersion of radioactive dust from places of accidents, the migration of mutagens is proceeding at a terrifying rate. There are countries, for example, where many chemical mutagens were not used in agriculture and in everyday life, yet they are found there in the water, the soil, and the tissues of plants and animals in quantities which are not much less than in other parts of the world.⁵ Hundreds of dangerous substances have been found on the surface of the perennial snows of Greenland. Radioactive dust from Chernobyl was found 2-3 days later, far beyond its boundaries. Therefore, each catastrophe, each lack of moderation in the application of dangerous innovations, takes on a global (planetary) character. It is practically impossible to protect oneself against gene damage.

We may repeat once again: **Medicine as yet is almost helpless in terms of aiding man in his struggle against hereditary diseases.** Only a few of these diseases are subject to correction. The process of correction (treating the effects, and not the causes) is also complex. It is influenced by many factors, such, for example, as the simultaneous presence of a hereditary and nonhereditary illness in a single patient. For example the presence of a hereditary disease together with an allergy greatly complicates treatment, and in turn, the number of allergic illnesses (many of which are also the result of gene damage) increases due to the progressive pollution of man's environment.

As yet it is practically impossible to conclusively cure those illnesses which are passed down to one's descendants. Of course, genetic engineering will in the future feel out approaches to solving this problem which is so very complex in its theoretical, practical, and even its moral and ideological aspects. However, until there is a solution, we must think about something else—about setting up a reliable barrier in the path of the spread of hereditary diseases.

Work on identifying and treating hereditary diseases in the Soviet Union is particularly difficult. Due to the four centuries of supremacy by proponents of Trofim Lysenko in Soviet biology, agronomy and medicine, more than one generation of doctors and biologists working in fields associated with medicine have been brought up with the conviction that genes do not exist at all, and that genetics as a science is the strumpet of imperialism. The phenomenon of Lysenkoism is too serious to characterize in a single phrase. It has led to great misfortunes, and to the suffering of people, a great number of people.

Where Is the Way Out of the Situation?

On many questions, mankind has shown itself to be wise and mature. Thus, most countries, with the exception of China and France, have agreed to ban atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons have been banned (although now and then we learn of cases where individual barbarians use them for their hegemonic purposes). The question of banning another barbaric type of weapon—biological, including bacteriological—is next.

I am convinced that the time has come to place a veto on many chemical products, some of which may even facilitate our existence in some way. To some this may seem absurd, and some will find it simply stupid. Yet we have no other choice if we think not about whether it will be convenient for us to get along without these substances, but rather about what awaits mankind in the future. We cannot allow the genetic burden to continue to grow.

It is true that a number of countries including the USA and USSR have begun experiments on testing various substances in regard to their potential harm to man. Yet this testing is random and rather narrow. Generally, the toxicity of the substances is studied, more rarely—their carcinogenic property, and most rarely—their mutagenic nature. The question of potential pre-mutation damage to the genes which is capable of expressing itself in far-removed generations is not even presented. Yet it is specifically the evaluation of the danger of hereditary alterations in subsequent generations that must be of primary focus in this testing. The international legislative statutes must reflect these questions in their most specific form.

I believe that we must also seek out funds for such testing. In my opinion, it would be expedient to legislatively force companies, concerns and enterprises producing chemical substances to subsidize the testing of their manufactured product in regard to its potential genetic detriment. This relates primarily to firms producing new medications and preparations for agricultural use.

The axioms which have become expressed as the affirmation that modern agriculture is impossible without pesticides, are, of course, an exaggeration. Today it has been proven that it possible to do without them by following two main directions: Developing biological methods of combatting weeds, pests and agricultural plant diseases and creating varieties which are resistant to diseases and pests. All plants used in agriculture have genes which give them a certain degree of resistance to pathogens. By methods of selection, we can increase not only the crop yield of cultures, but also strengthen their resistance to insects, fungi, bacteria, and viruses. Work in this direction must be comprehensively intensified. In combination with the development of biological methods of combatting pests and diseases, such an approach will save the heredity of the living beings from further destruction. Then there will no longer be a need for chemical treatment in agriculture. I believe that **the purity of agriculture which does not pollute nature and does not bring mutagens into the world around us must become the sole prospective criterion.**

This is only one of the examples of how we can solve these problems. Upon the advice of the leading Soviet geneticist I. A. Rapoport and with his help, Uzbek breeders have developed a strain of cotton which drops its leaves before maturation of the bolls and harvesting of the cotton. This means that this variety does not require defoliants.

If only one-tenth of the money spent for that part of chemical science which works for industrial needs were handed over to geneticists and breeders, they could in a short time solve many of the problems of agriculture which today require the application of herbicides, defoliants, mordant treatment of seeds, and other "helpers" of the land cultivator which ultimately play the role of a Trojan horse. It is also important to stress the fact that expenditures for developing any [crop] variety are much less than the expenditures for the synthesis and production of new pesticides.

Chemical science and chemical technology, like nuclear energetics, must, of course, be developed. Yet what we must do immediately is, on one hand, to unconditionally limit the marketing of new products of chemical technology which have not passed extensive testing, and to stop the construction of nuclear power plants according to cut-rate projects and their operation outside the framework of firm guidelines.⁶ On the other hand, we must conduct a most scrupulous inspection of the possible hazard posed by those facilities which have already been constructed. We must seek out means for such

inspections, excluding the possibility of influence on the investigators by the heads of the chemical and nuclear projects, military men and state officials who are responsible for this sphere. Undoubtedly, such an inspection must be international. While the investigation is being conducted, we should stop the manufacture of at least those substances which already today may be related to the class of potentially mutagenic. Similarly, we must achieve the safe operation of nuclear power plants in practice, and not merely in the reports of safety regulations. Then, using the information which we have obtained, we will have to define our future strategy with maximal precision. The people of the present day must clearly understand what they are leaving as a legacy to their descendants.

Without this, their existence becomes amoral, and our apparent progress- -blasphemy. Scientists must assume the difficult responsibility of studying the possible harm which may be caused by everything made by their fellow scientists, and then together with the representatives of other specialties they must define the criteria for testing future developments.

Each new substance, each new installation must be tested in such a way that incidents such as the thalidomide case or the accident at Chernobyl are never repeated. We must always remember that it is easy to ruin the genes (mankind has learned to this), but that we are not yet able to repair genes.

And, of course, we must learn to repair genes. There may be different approaches here—genetic engineering, the application of reparative enzymes, the development of anti-mutagen substances, and many other means which should be sought by biologists and medical men of many specialties.

One thing is clear: It has been specifically in our 20th century that the various factors damaging the heredity of the living beings on our planet were invented, and it is we who bear the responsibility for preserving this heredity. People of the third millenium who are healthy and strong in spirit and in body must live in wonderful and peaceful surroundings.

The picture which this article draws, of course, should not be perceived as something which cannot be corrected. If scientists take the dumping of substances dangerous to heredity under strict control, then the unrestrained expansion of these substances will be stopped. If biological methods of protection come to replace chemical methods of combatting pests and diseases, then both we and future generations will benefit from this.

Accuracy and truthful information will help to create public opinion, to orient people toward giving up some of their seeming conveniences and taking into their

hands the main thing—the assurance of a safe future life. Reason combined with responsibility—that is the main road for the development of mankind.

Footnotes

1. Zimina, N. I. et. al. In: "Genetic Problems of Environmental Pollution on the Territory of the Moldavian SSR", Kishinev, 1980, p 11-13.

2. IZVESTIYA, 7 September 1984, p 4.

3. Bochkov, N. P. "From the Apple Tree—the Apple..."; IZVESTIYA, 28 February 1984, p 3. Yet here again the discussion is not about banning, but only about cosmetic improvement of the harmful substance! (V.S.).

4. Nuclear Power Issues and Choices. Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, Ballinger Publ. Co., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977, p 169.

5. Thus, due to circulation of DDT in the atmosphere and its fallout with precipitation to earth, in the area of Antarctica alone the amount of such fallout was around 250,000 tons of this substance.

6. Cf. report on the Chernobyl accident prepared for MAGATE, cf. also the journal ATOMNAYA ENERGIYA, 1986, Vol 61, No 5, p 301-320.

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Journal Cites Air Pollution Problem Caused by Soviet Power Plants

18300417 Moscow ELEKTRICHESKIYE STANTSII in Russian No 1, Jan 89 pp 2-4

[Unsigned article: "Problems of Protecting the Air from the Emissions of Thermal Electric Power Plants"]

[Text] The technical progress of thermal electric power engineering is inseparably linked with the solution of ecological problems. The ecological factor is currently a decisive one in the selection of new locations for the construction of electric power plants and the determination of their maximum capacity and equipment composition.

The volume of operations associated with protecting the environment has increased over recent years in the sector.

During the 1978-87 period, the generation of electric power at thermal electric power plants [TESs] grew by 29 percent, heat output went up by 38 percent and fuel consumption increased correspondingly, while emissions into the atmosphere over that time declined by 4.2 million tons, or by 20 percent. This occurred as a result of increases in the share of gas in the fuel equation to 45 percent, the construction of gas pipelines to TESs and

the re-equipping of boilers for gas combustion, the modernization of fly-ash collectors on 302 boilers and the incorporation of technological measures for nitrous-oxides suppression on 340 boilers. Sulfur-removal installations were put into service at the Dorogobuzhskaya and Gubkinskaya TETss [heat and electric power plants]. Over 2,000 local boilers were closed through the development of centralized district heating in the cities.

About one billion rubles of capital investment were spent for environmental-protection purposes in 1981-87, while total expenses with a regard for modernization and repair work totaled about three billion rubles.

Thermal electric power plants are currently responsible for roughly 25 percent of the total emissions of the country's industrial enterprises, which total 5.46 million tons of ash, 8.23 million tons of sulfur oxides and 2.6 million tons of nitrous oxides.

Directive bodies have posed the task of increasing sharply the ecological level of existing and newly constructed electric power plants. The state program for protecting the environment of the USSR for the period to the year 2005 that is being developed envisages a two-fold reduction in emissions from the enterprises of USSR Minenergo [Ministry of Power and Electrification], and by 1995 it will moreover be necessary to reduce emissions to the maximum allowable norms at 156 TESs in 78 cities across the country. The development of thermal power engineering to the year 2005 will at the same time be accompanied by an increase of 1.8 times in the consumption of organic fuels. The start-up of high-capacity GRESs [hydro-electric power plants] at the KATEK [Kansk-Achinsk Fuel and Power Complex], Ekibastuz and West Siberian power complexes has been planned, where today's high level of emissions of nitrous oxides are limiting the introduction of initially planned power capacity in those regions. The heat and electric power plants must be built under conditions where the background air pollution in the cities has already reached or exceeds the maximum allowable norms.

Calculations testify to the fact that to ensure the assigned indicators for emissions, 152 exhaust-gas scrubbing installations to remove sulfur oxides and 64 for the removal of nitrous oxides will have to be built by the year 2005, along with equipping newly started electric power plants with fly-ash collectors with 99 percent or more efficiency and modernizing boiler and ash-collection equipment.

The realization of these resolutions requires the purposeful and coordinated work of power systems, planning and scientific-research institutes, construction and installation subdivisions and machine-building plants.

A series of fundamental organizational measures have currently been adopted for this.

The government has charged USSR Mintyazhmash [Ministry of Heavy, Power and Transport Machine Building], starting in 1990, with ensuring the delivery of boiler units for new and expanded electric power plants as part of a unit with dust-gas scrubbing equipment, including for sulfur and nitrous oxides.

Planning institutes were charged by order of USSR Minenergo in 1986 with making low-waste and waste-free technologies and sulfur and nitrous scrubbing installations and systems for the removal and utilization of ash inherent in the designs of electric power plants.

Electric power plants may allocate 60 percent of the funds obtained from the sale of ash at contract prices to material-incentive or production-development funds.

Fees for emissions according to established standards and fines for exceeding maximum allowable emissions (or effluents) will be instituted starting with the 13th Five-Year Plan.

State expert ecological analysis of enterprise designs and sector development patterns, as well as machine-building output, has also been instituted.

The USSR GKNT [State Committee for Science and Technology] is conducting a competition for the development of a concept (technology) for the creation of ecologically clean condensate electric power plants using Kansk-Achinsk, Kuznetsk, Ekibastuz and Donetsk coals, as well as a TETs using Kuznetsk coal. The results of the competition will make it possible to select the best ideas and technical solutions and formulate requirements for the machine-building sectors.

Existing experience makes it possible to recommend carrying out operations for raising the ecological cleanliness of TESs in the following directions.

Recommended as fly-ash collectors in the construction of new electric power plants and the modernization of existing ones are chiefly 4-5-field electrostatic precipitators providing for a gas speed of no more than 1.0-1.2 meters/second in the active zone. In the northern regions of the country, the Urals zone, Siberia, North Kazakhstan and the Far East, the installation of electrostatic precipitators on a TES should be envisaged in enclosed accommodations.

A method of decomposing nitrous oxides with the aid of ammonia in the temperature range of 900-1,000 degrees Celsius without a catalyst and with an efficiency of up to 60 percent has been incorporated in the gas-and-oil burning boiler of the Kirovakan TETs. The prospects for this method will be determined according to the results of testing and after its tryout on the coal boilers of the Togliatti and Novokemerovo TETSs in 1990.

A key role in the creation and series output of dust-gas equipment belongs to the organizations and plants of USSR Minkhimmash [Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building], USSR Mintyazhmash and a series of allied machine-building ministries to which requisitions have been issued for the output and delivery of complete-set modular automated installations. The corresponding capacity specializing in the output of equipment for sulfur- and nitrous-oxide removal will need to be developed in the machine-building complex in order to realize the proposals of USSR Minenergo. An increase in the production of limestone, lime and ammonia is essential.

The incorporation of power equipment with enhanced ecological indicators will be a material contribution to the cause of protecting the atmosphere. These include boilers with fluidized-bed and circulating combustion, making possible a reduction by half in the content of nitrous oxides in the exhaust gases compared to boilers of traditional designs. Some 60-80 percent of the sulfur oxides are bonded with the feeding of dolomite or crushed limestone into the fluidized bed. Such boilers are projected for installation in the near future at the Barnaul TETs-3, the Novomoskovsk GRES [state regional electric power plant] and a number of other electric power plants. The steam-generating capacity of fluidized-bed boilers is limited by technical capabilities to 420-500 tons/hour for the near future.

The planning of installations with intra-cyclical gasification of Kuznetsk coal at the Kirov TETs-5 is underway. The technology envisages the deep dust removal and desulfurization of exhaust gases before the gas turbine.

It is being proposed to obtain a reduced level of nitrous-oxide emissions on one of the boilers of the Alma-Ata GRES which has been redesigned for the organization of spray-grate combustion of fuels, as well as with the introduction of airflow primary furnaces on a redesigned boiler of the Dobrotvorskaya GRES.

World practice testifies to the fact that programs for improving fuel quality—the extraction of sulfur from fuel oils in the process of petroleum refining and coal enrichment (with the removal of sulfur as well as ash)—are being accomplished in parallel with environmental-protection measures. The long-term "Clean Fuel for Electric Power Plants and Boilers" program has thus been adopted in the United States, and in Japan about 40 million tons of low-sulfur fuel oil are being produced.

The proportionate cost of sulfur-scrubbing of various types is about 40 to 100 rubles per kW [kilowatt] of installed capacity overall, increasing operating expenses by 10-15 percent. Capital spending on the construction of 152 sulfur-removal installations is valued at 4-5 billion rubles.

The principal methods for reducing emissions of nitrous oxides from new and existing boilers remains technological methods of suppressing their formation in the furnace chamber, i.e. the stage-by-stage combustion of the fuel, the employment of special burners, the recirculation of exhaust gases to the burners, the squirting of moisture into the furnace etc. But whereas a level of nitrous-oxides content in exhaust gases of 200-300 milligrams/cubic meter was achieved through a set of such measures as proposed by the VTI [All-Union Institute of Heat Engineering] imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, the Gas Institute of the UkrSSR Academy of Sciences and ENIN [Power Engineering Institute imeni G.M. Krzhizhanskiy] in the combustion of gas and fuel oil at a number of electric power plants (the Pervomayskaya TETs, the Shchekinskaya GRES, the Surgut GRES-2 and the Krasnodar TETs), for coal boilers, especially with liquid slag removal, these methods have less of an impact or cannot be employed at all. A reduction in the formation of nitrous oxides of 15 percent was achieved at the Burshtynskaya and Starobeshevskaya GRESs with conversion to the feed of dust into the boiler at high concentrations. This method will be further disseminated to TESs with a system of dust preparation with an intermediate dust hopper. The modernization of burners—replacement of swirl-type burners with flat-spray types—will have to be performed on coal boilers in upcoming years.

A method of three-stage coal combustion with the reduction of nitrous oxides in the furnace with products of incomplete combustion that has been developed seems promising.

New burners for the two-stage combustion of gas from the Gas Institute of the UkrSSR Academy of Sciences and VTI, making possible a two-fold reduction in nitrous-oxide emissions with the preservation of the basic technical and economic indicators of the boilers, will have to be installed on all PTVM-type hot-water boilers in the 13th Five-Year Plan.

The USSR Minenergo program for the period to the year 2005 envisages the incorporation of technological measures on more than 600 boilers.

In cases where the technical means of suppressing nitrous oxides in furnace chambers prove to be insufficient, it is necessary to employ systems for the nitrous scrubbing of exhaust gases in order to observe ecological requirements.

Over 60 installations for the decomposition of nitrous oxides in the temperature range of 300-400 degrees Celsius with the aid of ammonia using a catalyst with an efficiency of up to 80 percent have been incorporated over the last 10 years on units of up to 700 MW [megawatts] in Japan, West Germany, Austria and the United States. The development of ammonia-catalytic nitrous scrubbing of this type is projected for incorporation in 1991-92. The cost of the installation is 30-40 rubles/kW, which is an order of magnitude higher than the cost of measures to improve fuel combustion.

This area is developing poorly in our country. The coal and fuel oil being delivered to electric power plants cannot be deemed ecologically acceptable.

The expediency of enriching Moscow-area, Donetsk, Kuznetsk, Ekibastuz and Lvov-Volynskiy coals and desulfurizing petroleum in its refining is undoubted. The repeated proposals of USSR Minenergo to resolve this problem have not met with a response from USSR Minugleprom [Ministry of the Coal Industry] or USSR Minneftekhimprom [Ministry of the Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry].

Our country has 45 percent of the world's coal reserves at its disposal. The future of thermal electric power engineering is ecologically clean electric power plants using coal. The chief direction of the utilization of coals is gasification within the configurations of electric power plants. There are intra-cyclical gasification, gasification in airflow primary furnaces and other configurations. The widespread application of gasification opens up the possibility of using steam-gas installations that do not depend on gas or liquid fuels and make possible a sharp rise in the economy of thermal power engineering and the standardization and type-uniformity of the designs of steam and boiler installations oriented toward one ultimate form of fuel—gas.

Only the joint and mutually linked efforts of power engineering, machine building and the coal and petroleum-refining sectors will make it possible to fulfill the tasks of reviving the ecological situation in the country; the scope of these tasks merits the adoption of a corresponding state program.

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